The Korean ‘Safe Trucking Freight Rates System’ (‘Safe Rates System’) was an important effort to address road safety risks by regulating road transport supply chains. In effect between 2020 and 2022, the system set minimum standards for truck driver pay and placed obligations on road transport supply chain parties to comply with these standards. In this article, we explain how the system developed in response to the deregulation and restructuring of the road freight market in the late 1980s and 1990s. We also trace the influence on the system of regulatory development in Australia and debates at the International Labour Organization (ILO). In 2019, workers, employers, and government representatives at the ILO reached an agreement on the main principles of the Safe Rates regulatory model through the adoption of the Guidelines on the promotion of decent work and road safety in the transport sector. We use these principles to explain and evaluate the Korean system. We also summarise assessments of the system’s impact, arguing that the results of the few studies that exist, justify the continuation of the system. By locating Korean Safe Rates as part of a broader global trend, we respond to opponents’ claims that the system is without international precedent and make the system eligible for a global audience. In so doing, we seek to contribute to the ongoing debate about the reintroduction of Safe Rates in Korea and draw lessons from the Korean experience that may be used in other countries.

The question of whether global norms are experiencing a crisis allows for two concurrent answers. From a facticity perspective, certain global norms are in crisis, given their worldwide lack of implementation and effectiveness. From a validity perspective, however, a crisis is not obvious, as these norms are not openly contested discursively and institutionally. In order to explain the double diagnosis (crisis/no crisis), this article draws on international relations research on norm contestation and norm robustness. It proposes the concept of hidden discursive contestation and distinguishes it from three other key types of norm contestation: open discursive, open non-discursive and hidden non-discursive contestation. We identify four manifestations of hidden discursive contestation in: (1) the deflection of responsibility; (2) forestalling norm strengthening; (3) displaying norms as functional means to an end; and (4) downgrading or upgrading single norm elements. Our empirical focus is on the decent work norm, which demonstrates the double diagnosis. While it lacks facticity, it enjoys far-reaching verbal acceptance and high validity. Our qualitative analysis of discursive hidden contestation draws on two case studies: the International Labour Organization’s compliance procedures, which monitor international labour standards, and the United Nations Treaty Process on a binding instrument for business and human rights. Although both fora have different context and policy cycles, they exhibit similar strategies of hidden discursive contestation.