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This chapter analyzes the class base of support for left-wing parties in Western Europe, in light of early political socialization and patterns of intergenerational social mobility. We ask to what extent contemporary left-wing party support is a legacy of political socialization in the traditional social democratic constituency class of industrial workers – and if this is a sustainable model for future social democratic support considering postindustrial occupational transformation and upgrading. By investigating support for the Social Democrats in contrast to green and left-libertarian, radical left, and moderate and radical right parties, we identify the main competitors of the Social Democrats among classes traditionally associated with social democratic support. Analyses using the European Social Survey (2002–10) indicate three main findings. First, the composition of the electorates indicates that Social Democrats rely more than other parties on support from individuals socialized in the industrial working class, while contemporary patterns show that one-third of the social democratic electorate now stems from the middle class and workers make up the largest part of the radical right electorate. Second, as expected, contemporary middle-class social democratic support is largely a legacy from socialization in the working class, especially among older generations in Northwestern Europe. Third, new legacies are being built along postindustrially realigned patterns, as offspring of sociocultural professionals is relatively more likely to vote for the Left, but for the Green Left or Radical Left instead of the Social Democrats. However, the impact of socialization among younger generations appears to be weaker than the one identified for working-class origins in older generations. These results imply that relying on middle-class support alone is not a viable long-term strategy for the Social Democrats, given the seemingly unique impact of past industrial alignments that is unparalleled by other class–party linkages among younger generations.
This chapter deals with the topic of inequality in the healthcare sector. The chapter begins by looking at some summary data and the inequality in various measures of health that are obvious from simple differences. Then the chapter discusses some basic social philosophy on the topic of how to judge fairness in an abstract society. More detailed data on health outcomes is then explored, highlighted inequality along different demographic lines. Then there is a discussion of theories that fit the facts presented: why do these inequalities exist, and what do we learn by unpacking them: both social implications as well as clinical. Finally, inequalities in the labor market for healthcare workers are discussed.
The rapid widening of wealth inequalities has led to sharp differences in living standards in Great Britain. Understanding whether and separately the rate at which individuals accumulate particular types of wealth by family background is important for improving wealth and social mobility. We show offspring wealth inequality is driven by housing wealth, and holding such wealth is becoming increasingly associated with early life circumstances relating to parental housing tenure and education, even after controlling for adult offspring’s own characteristics. Importantly, we find adult offspring whose parents hold a degree and are homeowners are no less likely to report homeownership and housing wealth compared to older cohorts from the same background. Our findings infer the intergenerational rank correlation in housing wealth is set to double in approximately three decades.
Chapter 7 offers a pathway toward understanding how the Love Jones Cohort navigate wealth-related issues and outcomes, and what the implications of this might be both for themselves and for the Black middle class more generally. Chapter 7 explores previous, current, and future wealth experiences and decisions of the Cohort, and sheds light on the ways in which the members of this demographic group traverse the various stages of their life course without a partner or child. Scholars make compelling arguments for adding wealth as a fourth indicator of middle-class status, and Chapter 7 focuses on how those in the Cohort accumulate wealth, particularly in terms of decision-making related to homeownership and explores the crucial issue of intergenerational mobility and the dissemination of wealth. Chapter 7 interrogates these issues so that we can begin to fully understand the implications of the rise of the Love Jones Cohort for the future of the Black middle class.
This article investigates how class of origin and intergenerational social mobility impact left-wing party support among new and old core left-wing electorates in the context of post-industrial electoral realignment and occupational transformation. We investigate the remaining legacy of political socialization in class of origin across generations of voters in the UK, Germany and Switzerland. We demonstrate that part of the contemporary middle-class left-wing support is a legacy of socialization under industrial class–party alignments, as many individuals from working-class backgrounds – traditional left-wing constituencies – have a different (post-industrial) class location than their parents. These enduring effects of production worker roots are weaker among younger generations and in more realigned contexts. Our findings imply that exclusively considering respondents' destination class underestimates the relevance of political socialization in class of origin, thereby overestimating electoral realignment. However, these past industrial alignments are currently unparalleled, as newer left-wing constituencies do not (yet) demonstrate similar legacies.
Israel is at a crossroads. It has one of the lowest productivity levels and one of the highest poverty rates in the developed world. With roughly half of its children receiving education that falls short of preparing them to work in a modern economy, future economic sustainability is not a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, the country’s leading universities are excellent, and they have been converging with the top American universities. The knowledge needed to raise Israel to viable economic trajectories exists within its borders, but the education system is not channeling this knowledge effectively to the primary and secondary schools, which in turn limits many pupils’ subsequent ability to enter quality higher education institutions. This chapter highlights aspects of education’s economic impact and focuses on a number of misconceptions about the state of education in Israel. It provides an overview of achievements and failings in Israel’s primary, secondary, and higher education systems, and highlights the importance of high school curriculum and academic field of study to adult wages.
Turner Station, Maryland, is a century-old African American neighborhood just east of Baltimore that housed the families of workers who were employed at a nearby steel plant from the founding of the community in the early 1900s until the plant closed in 2012. Its story provides a window into the lives of the understudied Black working-class during the peak decades of industrial employment and the ensuing decades of decline. Long-time residents recall a vibrant, self-sufficient community with a heterogeneous class structure, produced in part by residential restrictions and employment discrimination that constrained professionals such as physicians and teachers to reside and to practice or work in the neighborhood. They report a high level of collective efficacy and joint responsibility for childrearing. Current and former residents describe a strong emphasis on education as a means of upward mobility. As levels of education rose and residential opportunities opened, the children of the mid-century steelworkers left Turner Station for other communities in the metropolitan area and beyond. As out migration continued, the community suffered a decline: virtually all of the businesses are gone, vacant homes are common, and a more transient population has moved in. The members of the Turner Station diaspora still cherish the memory of the neighborhood, even as many have moved on and up. Their achievements show what happened when a generation of African Americans were given access to decent-paying jobs that did not require a college education—a degree of access that no longer exists because of the decline of industrial employment in the Baltimore region and elsewhere.
This chapter looks at access to and retention in higher education of children of migrants with low levels of education across a number of Western European countries, using data of the Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) survey. The comparative perspective shows the impact of national institutional arrangements on education. Access to and retention in higher education of children of migrants with low levels of education still show considerable gaps when compared to those of peers of native descent. Data analysis shows that socio-economic background characteristics or the migrant background is only partly responsible for the gaps between students with and without a migrant background. We zoom in on students of Turkish descent in the Dutch school system to analyse whether these gaps are the result of socio-cultural background characteristics related to their ethnic group or migration (their own or that of their parents) or whether the gap in educational outcomes can be explained by how educational institutions provide opportunities or, on the contrary, fail to cater for children of immigrants. Based on detailed information available in the Netherlands, we show how differences in the preparation for higher education that students get can lead to important differences in study success later on.
We study a model in which parents care about the economic and social status of their offspring. The chances of an individual achieving social status depends on innate traits, that is, IQ, ability, social and cultural environment, and other price-insensitive endowments, passed on by their parents, on human capital investments and on chance events. Parents can, through human capital investments, increase the offspring’s probability of climbing the social ladder, although they cannot borrow against the children’s perspective earning. Consequently, income and trait heterogeneity are the determinants of unequal opportunities and of intergenerational mobility.
We build a model that, according to the empirical evidence, gives rise to oscillations in wealth within a dynasty while keeping intergenerational persistence in education attainment. We propose a mechanism based on the interaction between wealth and effort as suggested by the Carnegie conjecture, according to which wealthier individuals devote less effort in their job occupations than poorer. Oscillations in wealth arise from changes in the occupation chosen by different generations of the same dynasty as a response to both inherited wealth and college premium. Our mechanism generates a rich social stratification with several classes in the long run due to the combination of different levels of education and occupation types. Furthermore, we generate a large mobility in wealth among classes even in the long run. Our model highlights the role played by the minimum cost on education investment, the borrowing constraints, and the complementarity between education and occupational effort.
This article explores the association between intergenerational social mobility and attitudes towards income differences in post-socialist societies. I hypothesise that based on the psychological mechanism of self-serving bias in causal attribution, those who experience upward social mobility are more likely to support greater income differences, and that subjective intergenerational mobility has stronger association with attitudes towards income differences than objective mobility because individuals filter their objective environment in order to derive their subjective perceptions of the world and their own experiences. The described hypotheses are tested with two cross-national data sets – European Values Studies and Life in Transition Survey. The derived findings are robust to alternative statistical specifications and indicate that individuals who perceive themselves as subjectively mobile have significantly different attitudes towards income differences in comparison to non-mobile groups, but that this effect does not manifest among objectively mobile individuals.
Intergenerational mobility—the association between parents’ and adult children’s economic wellbeing—is an important sociological concept because it provides information about inequality of opportunity in society, and it has gained relevance in the recent past due to the increase economic inequality in most of the affluent world. This article provides an overview of the different measures of mobility used by sociologists and economists, as well as main empirical findings about mobility. I then move to topics that push mobility analysis beyond its bivariate focus: The association between intergenerational mobility and economic inequality, the mechanisms for mobility, and the validity of mobility as a measure of inequality of opportunity. I suggest that the association between mobility and inequality is likely spurious, driven by varying institutional arrangements across countries, and that mobility analysis is most useful when focused on describing the bivariate intergenerational association across countries and over time.
How well do parents’ education, earnings, income, and wealth predict the same outcomes for their children? Scientists have been trying to answer this question for a long time. Francis Galton (1822–1911) was the first to apply statistical methods to tackle this question. Centuries earlier, the great Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) famously observed that the prestige lasted at best four generations in one lineage.
This article seeks evidence on trends in intergenerational income for cohorts born after 1970. As many of these cohorts have not yet joined the labour market, we must look at relationships between intermediate outcomes (degree attainment, test scores and non-cognitive abilities) and parental income to forecast forward from these to estimates of intergenerational earnings correlations. We find no evidence that the relationship between these intermediate outcomes and parental income have changed for more recent cohorts. Evidence from the earlier 1958 and 1970 cohorts shows that as mobility declined in the past the relationship between intermediate outcomes and parental income strengthened. We therefore conclude that, under realistic assumptions and in the absence of any significant unanticipated changes, the decline in intergenerational mobility that occurred between 1958 and 1970 birth cohorts is unlikely to continue for cohorts born from 1970 to 2000. Mobility is therefore likely to remain at or near the relatively low level observed for the 1970 birth cohort.
How do taxes affect human capital accumulation? This question has been studied extensively in the context of two model classes: overlapping generations (OLG) and infinite horizon (IH). These embody very different assumptions about the intergenerational transmission of physical and human capital. This paper investigates how such differences in intercohort persistence affect the responsiveness of human capital to taxation. A model is developed that nests OLG and IH models as special cases. The steady-state and transitional effects of tax changes are computed for varying degrees of persistence. The main finding is that stronger intercohort persistence magnifies the impact of taxation on human capital and leads to slower transitional dynamics. As a result, IH models generate systematically larger tax effects than OLG models. For the tax experiments studied here, models with complete persistence generate steady-state tax elasticities at least two times larger and transitional half-lives at least three times longer than do models without persistence.
Trends in absolute rates of both career and intergenerational mobility in Britain since the 1950s are outlined and some of the cultural consequences of the resulting heterogeneity in class composition are briefly considered. It is argued that while supply-side factors – educational attainment, ability, etc. – may determine who has been mobile or not, aggregate rates and changes in aggregate rates are largely dictated by demand-side factors. But current trends in the composition of the working population are necessarily self-limiting. A forecast of the occupational structure in the first half of the twenty-first century together with the assumption of some continuity in the pattern of class advantages, indicates a ‘mobility transition’ in which trends are likely to reverse within the next thirty years or so. The long-run replacement of recruitment heterogeneity by homogeneity of social experience in the enlarged middle class suggests that, in contrast with present-day pluralism, there will emerge the structural conditions for a greater cultural uniformity and the onset of an era of orthodoxy.
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