Many states, almost invariably among those most ignored in international relations theory, exhibit some inconsistent and initially incoherent behaviour on the world stage. In particular, some of them have appeared to invite international scrutiny of domestic practices on which their governments rely to stabilize domestic affairs and to stay in power, but for which they could be punished, often by the very state or organization whose attention they request. The introduction provides an overview of the book’s argument and its implications for international relations theory and practice, especially when these states are miscoded as strong supporters of the norms they in fact violate as part of their domestic stabilization. When powerful actors make concessions in order to acquire a success case within their global missions of rights promotion, democratization or good governance reforms, they may also contribute to a slow erosion of those same norms.

This chapter takes the approach of quantitative analysis to test the book’s theory: It shows that there is a systematic connection between the domestic institutions and the US ability to attend to its double tasks of maintaining friendly relations while fostering good governance and more respect of human rights. The chapter shows that partner nations with domestic political institutions that allow for more open and competitive political processes of leadership turnover have closer foreign policy alignment with the United States, experience fewer coups, enjoy better governance, and have more respect for human rights than the ones that do not. That is the case both among democracies and autocracies: in parliamentary democracies more than in presidential democracies; in autocracies with multiparty legislatures than in autocracies with personalist leaders or single-party legislatures.

This chapter delves into US relations with the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 era. The chapter describes the idiosyncratic processes that led Afghanistan to have presidential institutions and Iraq to have parliamentary institutions. It then shows how the different constitutional arrangements in Afghanistan and Iraq changed the dynamics through which the United States interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in the two countries. It analyzes the extent to which the United States was able to exercise leverage over the incumbent leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, given their different constitutional frameworks.

This chapter places the book’s theory into a historical perspective: It describes several ways in which the United States has interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in partner nations. From this, the chapter identifies and operationalizes the mechanisms of the book’s theory in respect to the domestic politics of partner countries, differentiating between democratic and authoritarian partners. The chapter also operationalizes four dimensions of the relations between the United States and its partners: (a) the alignment of the foreign policies of the United States and the partner nations’; (b) the likelihood of coups in the partner nations; (c) good governance through the provision of public goods; and (d) the respect of human rights. This chapter, therefore, sets the stage for the systematic empirical analysis of Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Political science has long claimed that African political systems are dysfunctional because they are too embedded in social and material relations. This assumption informed the rise of the World Bank’s good governance agenda in the late 1980s. This chapter situates this technocratic vision of how to fix African politics in a longer ‘epistocratic’ political tradition that emphasises the knowledge-based, epistemic dimensions of governance. In this context, the Lagos model, developed first in Lagos state, southwest Nigeria, and then extended to nearby Oyo and Ekiti, was celebrated by donors as an example of ‘home grown good governance’, where governance reforms were not imposed by donors through conditionality but actively adopted by the government itself. By tracing how this domesticated version of the good governance agenda was contested in the twenty-first century electoral competition, this book re-evaluates the social, material and epistemic dimensions of good governance. This chapter offers a brief overview of the history of good governance in Nigeria. It then considers the methods and methodologies we can use to study competing conceptions of good governance, connecting the empirical study of politics ‘on the ground’ to more theoretical debates in political theory, before summarising the key contributions of the book.

The previous chapter demonstrated how politicians and voters in southwest Nigeria value accessibility as a form of accountability: in order to be accountable, leaders should maintain spaces for direct face-to-face communication with their constituents. This chapter builds on further empirical examples to give a theoretical account of accountability as accessibility and argues that it helps reveal the ontological limits of dominant scholarly approaches to accountability, namely, principal–agent models. It starts by asking what makes communication an intrinsically valuable part of accountability. Theories stressing the power of communication in the public sphere to confer recognition and dignity on citizens are considered and found to capture part of the lived experience of accessibility. However, they neglect the way accessibility draws on social sanctions to constrain rulers in the context of unequal power relations. A review of the historical roots of the principal–agent models in liberal theory explains why dominant theories struggle to accommodate the sanctioning power of communication. More generally, the assumed desirability of an anonymous and impersonal modern state leads to a neglect of the more socially embedded aspects of governance. In contrast, Yoruba political vocabulary fluently expresses the political importance of social sanction via the concept of olá (social honour).

Politics in Nigeria teaches us that power must be socially embedded for it to be accountable. Previous chapters drew on in-depth qualitative fieldwork in southwest Nigeria to theorise alternative conceptions of the constituent parts of the good governance agenda, namely, accountability, transparency, and the public–private divide. If we are to take the social dimension of these “ethnographically derived political concepts” seriously, then we need to rethink the neo-classical economic ontology of the dominant approach to good governance, which relies on principal–agent models. Thus, the book’s empirical analysis gives rise to normative political prescriptions which entail a methodological critique. The second part of the chapter argues that by neglecting the social dimension of governance, technocracy is vulnerable to populist challengers who leverage unmet demands for closeness and connection. Socially embedded governance intersects with three key debates of interest to theorists of democratic politics, concerning scale, inequality and conflict. By rethinking the contours of politics, we discover that the struggles of Nigeria’s fourth republic are not marginal to democratic theory – the struggles of a democracy yet to really get started – rather, they lie at the crux of what it means to wield power responsibly.

This chapter argues for a conception of accountability as accessibility. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork with local politicians, market traders and NGO activists in Ibadan, Oyo State, it shows the ubiquity of calls for accessibility in Nigeria and beyond. Politicians are accessible insofar as they maintain spaces for direct contact between themselves and their constituents. At the level of theory, accessibility reveals a blind spot in dominant conceptions of accountability, which rely on principal–agent models, and poses new conceptual questions about the interaction between communication and sanctioning power. Thus, Nigerian political discourse gives us the language to describe a universal but neglected aspect of accountability and hints at a more socially embedded approach to good governance. Political competition in the twenty-first century southwest Nigeria shows how the politics of competing conceptions of accountability play out in practice. The rise and fall of the ‘Lagos model’ in Oyo and Ekiti states can be understood as a struggle over different conceptions of democratic accountability. Where technocratic notions of good governance insulate decision-makers from their constituents and favour abstract data over face-to-face interaction, it leaves open the field for populist politicians to promise accessibility through exaggerated, almost pantomime performances of connection and communication.

This introductory chapter situates the book within existing debates about the effects of investment treaties on national governance. The book’s methodology and conceptual framework in socio-legal and ethnographic approaches to law is described, and the typology of investment treaties’ impact on national governance used in the book explained: ideological-discursive effects and formal-institutional effects. Finally, the structure of the book is outlined.

Due diligence is absolutely key to stem possible problems with investment migration programs. Focusing on examples from Canada, Saint-Kitts and Nevis, and the European Union, this chapter offers a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of due diligence practices.

The rule of law is a contested and multidimensional concept. In this chapter, the aspects highlighted in the UN Secretary General’s 2004 Report are used as a point of departure, focusing on equal enforcement and independent adjudication of legal rules and principles as well as fairness in the application of the law, legal certainty, the avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. From such rule of law-perspective, investor-state arbitration will be scrutinized, in particular, in regard to independence and impartiality of arbitrators, what is required for parties to have a ‘fair trial’ before an investment tribunal (procedural fairness, the right to be heard, equality of arms), access to justice given the financial implications for both host states and investors, as well as the adequacy of the ‘control’ system, be it ICSID annulment or set-aside procedures before domestic courts, to guarantee predictable, consistent and legitimate outcomes.

This chapter, while acknowledging that there are certain differences and similarities in how the law treats standards development organizations (SDOs) that develop voluntary standards, offers a holistic analysis of the procedural principles introduced in the WTO, EU, and US regulatory frameworks, namely, transparency, openness/participation, consensus, impartiality, balance, effectiveness, relevance, coherence, coordination, concerns of developing countries, appeal, and access to standards, which this study collectively refers to as “due process” principles. This chapter further explores the relevance and suitability of these principles to the different types of standards bodies and identifies the shortcomings of each of the legal mechanisms with regard to ICT standardization. It concludes that these principles are formulated rather flexible and, to be effective, need further concretization by SDOs.

This chapter focuses on legitimacy of ICT standardization as a form of regulation. After reviewing the relevant scholarship on legitimacy and effectiveness of private transnational regulation, it takes up Schmidt’s framework on input, throughput, and output legitimacy as the most relevant for ICT standards. It then introduces a nonexhaustive list of procedural meta-principles through which the private regulatory regime created by ICT standardization can be legitimized. These processes are addressed in this chapter as “good governance principles” and include participation, transparency, reason-giving, and review; they also serve as procedural mechanisms to hold private regulators accountable and to ensure legitimacy of their rule-making.

This chapter analyses the extent to which the legal instruments discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 apply to the examined SDOs. It also evaluates these organizations’ rules and procedures against the due process requirements of the applicable regulatory frameworks discussed in Chapter 6. While acknowledging the heterogeneity of the organizations’ operational frameworks, this chapter also emphasizes that their organizational rules – while designed in self-regulatory processes – should yet be considered within the legal constraints of the applicable regulatory frameworks. Indeed, SDOs enjoy a wide discretion not only to implement the due process requirements, but also to determine what these requirements mean, defining such terms as “consensus,” “openness,” and “balance” in their procedural rules. While observing that there are different ways to implement due process principles into the organizations’ procedures, this chapter notes that the level of procedural guarantees offered during the different stages of decision-making differs per organization, but is often insufficient from the perspective of legitimacy.

What is the added value – or disvalue – of a “right to effective governance”? That question is phrased in relative terms, and needs a baseline. If the baseline is the United States Constitution, then suffice it to say that the US Constitution is notoriously an eighteenth-century constitution with a few later additions, and that it includes rather few “positive rights” (meaning affirmative rights to government action, as opposed to negative rights to government forbearance). Assuming that the “right to effective governance” is defined in a manner that actually requires the government to do something, and especially if the right is enforceable by private persons, then it would add a great deal to the requirements of the US Constitution. (Whether the result would be a net benefit is a different question.)