The Chorus in Milton's Samson Agonistes are framed as Milton's friends. In the mold of friendship in this era, they are therefore his peers, his counselors, his advisors, and his allies. They are both companions and neighbours. They also make common cause with Samson in resisting both women, the larger nation of Israel, and especially the Philistines. By showing male friends as creators of a boys-only clubhouse, Milton invokes the local chorographies and regionalism of his day. In making friendship both racist and sexist at its core, Milton also makes his closet drama a tool in exclusive and localized patriarchal networks. Juxtaposed with Thomas Fuller's Worthies of England and Pisgah-Sight of Palestine, Milton's Samson Agonistes is deliberately ungenerous to outsiders or larger loyalties.

Given that “Nature” is historically imbricated in the history of Christianity, the secularizing movement of modernity puts nature under intense pressure. The resulting conflicts are modeled by the United States, which authorized political revolution by invoking “the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” The American Transcendentalists extended nature as divine order and transcendent arbiter to authorize intellectual revolution, consolidating liberal Protestantism, European Romanticism, and modern science into a template for the meaning of nature in modernity; humans became not humble creatures in God’s creation but God’s avatars commanding all merely material beings. Today, as the resulting ecological collapse destabilizes inherited concepts of nature, “ecology” is offered as a replacement, even though ecology as a science cannot offer moral value or spiritual meaning. This intellectual history is traced through the founding work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who offered idealism as the engine of modernity, and three followers, Orestes Brownson, Henry David Thoreau, and Margaret Fuller, who variously pluralized nature into the plenitude of material forms and beings seen as vulnerable incarnations of a higher or divine life force, prefiguring the science and ethics of ecology as an aspect of, rather than replacement for, nature.

This chapter explore some implications of the book for scholarship on Chinese law and politics. Many legal scholars speculate about whether China might adopt “rule by law” without embracing “rule of law.” This stylized discourse, however, assumes that the Chinese government is willing and able to implement “rule by law.” However, because coercive substitutes for the law are often available and preferred, even “rule by law” is optional, and discussions of rule of law norms are on even shakier grounds than legal scholars realize. I suggest that the economic and ideological contests between China and Western countries will increasingly depend not on who better represents the rule of law, but on who has more inclusive institutions. Should the Chinese government maintain its tax capacity and be willing to engage in redistributive social spending on the poor, its domestic legitimacy will strengthen. The book thus suggests that both policy makers and social scientists should pivot away from studying the Chinese state’s predilections for the rule of law and toward its capacity and willingness for inclusivity and redistribution.

This chapter proposes a definition for legal fiction. The problem of definition has divided scholars into multiple camps and held back progress. The definition proposed here is a compromise which seeks to preserve precision while covering the true range of fictitious devices. My definition is composed of two limbs: Hard Fiction and Soft Fiction. In developing this definition, I address a range of theoretical issues. I rebut arguments by Vaihinger and Kelsen that fictions do not exist. I discuss fictions from a linguistic perspective. I discuss the relationship between fictions and rules, and between fictions and counter-factuals. Also explored are contributions to the definitional debate by Fuller, Olivier, Ross, Chiassoni, Del Mar and earlier thinkers. The Chapter concludes with an application of the proposed definition in two case studies: the reasonable man and volenti non fit injuria. I argue the latter is a Soft Fiction and the former is not a fiction.

Chapter 2 surveys and analyzes the greatest ideas and theorists in war theory and strategy – including the philosophies of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and Mao. This chapter makes war theory and its recurring themes more accessible by presenting diverse perspectives spanning all eras of military thought from classical through the twentieth century. Each theorist’s background and main ideas are presented, and their strengths and weaknesses are summarized. As history’s preeminent but also most misunderstood war theorist, special attention is given Clausewitz. Principal themes include war’s fluidity, unpredictability, violence, and reciprocity; concentration and momentum; adaptability, intelligence, and relative capacity; military genius; centers of gravity and decisive points; fog, friction, chance, and policy; guerrilla, asymmetric, and nuclear warfare; and war’s moral and physical dimensions.

This chapter considers the extent to which the (so-called) international legal order provides an example of government in accordance with the rule of law.It begins in the first two sections with a discussion of the elements that comprise that ideal, before turning in the third section to competing accounts of its value; that is, explanations of what makes government in accordance with the rule of law (morally) superior to other forms of rule. The chapter concludes with a somewhat pessimistic assessment of the degree to which the international legal order exhibits fidelity to the ideal of the rule of law.