The lawfulness of carbon border adjustment measures (CBAMs) under general international economic law and particular economic agreements is explored; specifically, if their international lawfulness can be determined by thinking of them as countermeasures necessary to implement climate change obligations. As there are no non-discriminatory obligations under customary international law, it is argued that CBAMs are lawful under general international law, but under particular international economic agreements they can be seen as countermeasures lawfully taken in response to breaching the obligation to curb GHG emissions, allowing their justification as a breach of primary non-discriminatory economic obligations, particularly the national treatment principle under the GATT and GATS. This shifts the burden of proving necessity/proportionality to the State in breach of the obligation. CBAMs are fundamentally lawful measures and can only give rise to compensation if it they are unnecessary/disproportionate. This chapter also assesses whether they can be thought of as erga omnes contractantes obligations under international economic agreements, particularly the GATT and the GATS.

This chapter discusses the building blocks of the European Union’s strategy for climate neutrality. Carbon pricing in the EU is described, focusing on the EU ETS and on the forthcoming CBAM. Then the roles of electrification and clean molecules in the future European energy system are discussed. Finally, sustainable finance priorities, capacities, and regulatory instruments put forward by the EU are reviewed, before a brief conclusion.

This chapter aims to inform reflection on business self-regulation (or corporate social responsibility, CSR) in addressing climate change by drawing on developments in ‘business and human rights’ and the experience accumulated in the European Union (EU). Despite dissimilarities in addressing the environmental and human right impacts of business operations, there are commonalities around incentives, impacts and regulatory dynamics of CSR that help clarify its expected place in global governance. This analysis revisits long-standing claims about CSR in light of current legal and market evolutions. The main finding is that the notion of CSR has been fundamentally transformed in the last 20 years. What is the change, what are the drivers enabling such change, and what are the expected impacts on corporate compliance and sustainability performance? The analysis contributes to the regulatory governance area, including regarding climate change, and promotes cross-fertilisation among the social and environmental areas in CSR.

Africa’s unique vulnerability to climate change has become entrenched as a central theme in international climate politics and has precipitated a transformation in climate policy on the continent from relative disorganisation to effective and unified cooperation in the span of barely 30 years. In the same period, Africa has also emerged as one of the fastest growing and most promising regions in the world economy. In light of these developments, and spurred by an international discourse of ‘energy transition’, a new wave of European foreign direct investment headlined by renewable energy has crested – with Africa in its sights. This contribution will explore the efficacy of such investments as a vehicle for ‘exporting’ European climate policy, and the extent to which these policy aims are compatible with similarly massive investments into Africa from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By interrogating the focus of energy investments from Europe and the PRC, both in terms of stated aims and actual outcomes, it will posit that the success of Africa’s energy transition will depend in large part on the PRC’s sincerity about its domestic and international climate ambition.

Can ‘digitalisation’ (the process of running business through procedures that take place in digital format) contribute to the green transition? If so, to what extent? The European Union (EU) has recently embraced the idea of synergically combining climate policies and digitalisation, whereby the digital transformation becomes a key tool to achieve net zero carbon emissions. Arguably, while there are manifold advantages in improving, for instance, energy distribution via smart grids, digitalisation also contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore necessary to strike the right balance and understand how to best harness digitalisation to implement the green transition. Notably, it is essential that the EU monitor the impact of digitalisation on the overall energy demand to avoid an excessive increase in energy consumption. Arguably, the EU can profitably couple a holistic embracement of digitalisation as the panacea to climate challenges with a ‘learn-by-doing’ approach, setting a variety of real-world experiments across supply chains to test the viability of its digital policy, in close collaboration with stakeholders.

Russia is one of the main oil and gas producers and one of the biggest emitters of carbon dioxide globally. Its energy policies are still underpinned by the necessity of establishing ‘spheres of influence’ and are not on track to achieve the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. Politically, war in Ukraine is arguably a consequence of this approach and discloses for the European Union (EU) the possibility of a diversification of its energy sources to achieve security of supply, which unlocks the opportunity of accelerating the green transition envisaged in the European Green Deal. Legally, given that they are not at war with Russia, the EU and its Member States could invoke the energy supply crisis and the political misalignment between the Russian energy policy and the Green Deal, rather than war per se, as a justification to abandon consolidated long-term energy contracts and accelerate the green transition.

While most sovereign entities have committed to greening their economies and investment under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), several of them are also bound by obligations contracted under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which protects investors in renewables and fossil fuel alike. Arguably, such a situation triggers a ‘regulatory clash’ that has the potential to impede the implementation of net zero carbon policies, such as the European Green Deal. This contribution contextualises the ECT within the framework of the UNFCCC and scopes the potential conflict between such regulatory regimes. Particularly, in light of the so-called ‘sunset’ clause, the contribution concludes that a suitable avenue to resolve the clash is establishing a preferential track for investment in clean energy under the ECT. On this basis, fundamental solutions are envisaged for greening investment, by applying model de lege ferenda proposals for a substantive and procedural modernisation of the ECT.

It is uncontested that the European Union (EU) – endowed with distinct international legal personality (pursuant to Article 47 of the Treaty on European Union) and being a subject of international law – is bound by relevant norms of customary international law (CIL). Rules of CIL form an integral part of the EU legal order, and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) must use CIL at least as an interpretive tool. Still, the CJEU’s interpretations of CIL norms and the interpretative methods and techniques it employs have received little attention in legal scholarship. This chapter aims to map and understand the ways in which the CJEU interprets CIL rules and compares them to those that exist for the interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Chapter 8 concludes the book with a study of Ukrainian refugees’ migration to Europe after Russia’s brutal attack on their country in February 2022. It shows that publics and elites across Europe’s political spectrum sustained extraordinary levels of support for the refugees’ inclusion, and deploys the book’s analytical framework to explain why. The EU’s Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) provided Ukrainian citizens with immediate and collective protection and full social rights in EU member states. Public opinion data and political parties’ (including populists’) programs are used to account for positive reception of the refugees, based on their multiple sources of deservingness. Relying on UNHCR, OECD, and other studies of refugees’ reported experiences the chapter assesses progress in their social inclusion as well as deficiencies. It considers welfare nationalist grievances that have arisen in Europe and shows that governments have responded to them as ‘normal politics’ rather than by scapegoating the refugees. The chapter ends by comparing European responses to the MENA and Ukrainian refugee migrations, and externalization agreements to address the continuing problem of migration to Europe from MENA and other third countries.

Chapter 3 focuses on political mobilizers of welfare nationalism, mainly popular attitudes toward welfare deservingness, and agents that mobilized anti-immigrant politics. The chapter elaborates on four types of deservingness criteria for migrants; need or vulnerability, ethnic closeness, contributions to receiving states’ economies and to their national security. It argues that societal norms for outsiders’ deservingness have narrowed in both Europe and Russia. Populist parties, anti-immigrant, and Euroskeptic are shown to be key mobilizers of welfare nationalism, abetted by anti-immigrant mass media. The chapter tracks one major populist party each in Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Poland, showing how that party gained vote share and national influence by opposing the CEE and MENA migrations. Using party programs and electoral outcomes, it shows how populists reinforced and amplified welfare nationalist grievances in societies, channeling them into electoral success and pressures for exclusionary migration policies. In authoritarian Russia, popular grievances against migrants are shown to be similar to grievances in Europe, but welfare nationalism was mobilized by regional elites, governors, and mayors. The chapter draws on arguments about authoritarian elites’ motivations to respond to popular grievances in order to explain how sub-national leaders used anti-immigrant mobilization for political advantage in Russia’s hybrid regime.

The final chapter brings us back to the contemporary political dilemmas we face today and discusses how the recovery of premodern conceptions of the nation helps us think through the challenge of national pluralism and resurging nationalist sentiment. It encourages openness to some virtues of empire as a multinational form of politics, considers the merits of a pluralistic political order, and suggests new avenues for cultivating democratic solidarity in diverse polities. In particular, the chapter engages with liberal multiculturalist arguments to illustrate the advantages of medieval approaches to national diversity. In place of self-government rights, the book suggests legal pluralism and policies of recognitions as more fruitful arrangements for multinational polities. Moreover, the chapter applies the insights of the study to the European Union and the United States, respectively. It concludes by responding to a number of liberal nationalist concerns, especially the need for pre-political partnership to undergird democratic politics.