Coal is declining in the U.S. as part of the clean energy transition, resulting in remarkable air pollution benefits for the American public and significant costs for the industry. Using the AP3 integrated assessment model, we estimate that fewer emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and primary fine particulate matter driven by coal’s decline led to $300 billion in benefits from 2014 to 2019. Conversely, we find that job losses driven by less coal plant and mining activity resulted in $7.84 billion in foregone wages over the same timeframe. While the benefits were greatly distributed (mostly throughout the East), costs were highly concentrated in coal communities. Transferring a small fraction of the benefits to workers could cover these costs while maintaining societal net benefits. Forecasting coal fleet damages from 2020 to 2035, we find that buying out or replacing these plants would result in $589 billion in air quality benefits, which considerably outweigh the costs. The return on investment increases when policy targets the most damaging capacity, and net benefits are maximized when removing just facilities where marginal benefits exceed marginal costs. Evaluating competitive reverse auction policy designs akin to Germany’s Coal Exit Act, we find that adjusting bids based on monetary damages rather than based only on carbon dioxide emissions – the German design – provides a welfare advantage. Our benefit–cost analyses clearly support policies that drive a swift and just transition away from coal, thereby clearing the air while supporting communities needing assistance.

In recent years, ‘environmental economics’ has provided the dominant logic underpinning policies for ‘sustainable development’ in the form of government managed price-based and rights-based mechanisms. The advocacy of property rights in environmental management is taken further in the libertarian ‘free market’ approach and this ‘privatisation’ perspective is reflected in the growing use of property rights instruments in climate change policy. This article examines the efficacy of using economic instruments in the environmental context where ‘market ecology’ promotes the commodification of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ and their management by market forces. It argues that the pricing of ‘nature’ or its useful properties is a crude abstraction that implies ecological values can be alienated, but this is incompatible with the material and relational qualities of such values. The limits of this conceptualisation are further demonstrated through an examination of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a price and property rights instrument which enables private project developers in developing countries to produce carbon credits in order to offset greenhouse gas pollution in developed countries. The evident negative social and environmental effects flowing from implementation of the CDM reinforce the limitations of economic logic in the environmental context.

Three common misconceptions persist about federal regulations. The first misconception is that most new regulations concern the environment, but in fact, only a small minority of regulatory flows are environmental. The second misconception is that regulators offer reasonable justifications and quantitative evidence for the majority of regulations. However, quantitative estimates rarely appear in published rules, negating the impression given by executive orders and Office of Management and Budget guidance, which require cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and clearly articulate sound economic principles for conducting CBA. Environmental rules have relatively higher-quality CBAs, at least by the standards of other federal rules. The third misconception, which is particularly relevant to the historic regulations promulgated during the COVID-19 pandemic, is that regulatory costs are primarily clerical, rather than opportunity or resource costs.

We measure how taking into account air quality affects relative welfare levels and welfare convergence across countries. We use the equivalent variation framework by Jones and Klenow [(2016) American Economic Review 106(9), 2426–2457.] which takes into account consumption, life expectancy, inequality, and leisure and extend it with respect to environmental quality in form of air pollution. Our results show that omitting environmental aspects from welfare accounting might lead to both a substantial over- or understatement of actual relative welfare and welfare developments for different (groups of) countries.

This paper seeks to understand the link between resource governance and investor expectations in resource-rich countries. We test whether voluntary membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public-private partnership that promotes transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, behaves as a credible signalling mechanism to investors that governments in resource-rich countries can manage resource revenue and adhere to sustainable fiscal policies in the medium and long run. Using an interrupted time series analysis coupled with a fixed effects model, we examine whether investor expectations on the price of sovereign debt behave as a credible signalling mechanism in the presence of certain conditions. Results indicate that in some cases there is a significant change in spread on the default price of sovereign debt as a result of announcement of either EITI candidacy or EITI compliance. However, it is clear that EITI membership alone is not a sufficient signal to investors that a country can effectively manage its resource revenues in the long run because the result of EITI implementation is heavily influenced by country-specific conditions.

In our opinion, the challenges of ongoing measurement, the ever-moving behavioral baseline, and strategic self-ignorance return us full-circle to a sensible point made by Peter Bohm–Benefit-Cost Analysis for environmental goods should use an interval method.

Federal legislation mandates substantial reduction of air pollution emissions from electric utilities. Utilities in Appalachia that use locally mined high-sulfur coal must choose among abatement options such as fuel mixing and smokestack scrubbing technologies. Wet scrubbers are the most frequently adopted abatement technology in Ohio. This paper investigates beneficial reuses of by-product from wet scrubbers. By-product is most often disposed of in landfills, resulting in large external costs. We combine social cost and benefit transfers with a linear optimization model to investigate potential benefits of by-product recycling. Results suggest that significant incentives exist to find beneficial uses for by-product.

Benefit-cost analysis is required for many regulatory decisions in the United States and in other countries. In this paper, I examine a standard textbook model that is used in benefit-cost analysis as it is actually applied to environmental policy and other areas of regulation. My primary objective is to suggest how including some key factors in the analysis could promote the development of smarter regulation.I begin by presenting a standard economic model for government intervention in markets, which balances benefits and a narrow definition of costs. I then introduce a richer normative theory that considers several political and economic costs that are frequently not considered in analyzing real-world applications. Examples include costs associated with rent seeking, design and implementation, and raising revenues. The richer theory suggests that the government should supply less of a good, or ask the private sector to provide less of that good, than the standard economic model suggests. The reason is that intervening in markets is often more costly than the standard model assumes. In special cases, the theory provides guidance on the setting of socially optimal taxes and subsidies. I then explore how the theory needs to be modified in the presence of biased estimates of benefits and costs. I conclude with a discussion of how the theoretical framework can be applied to the actual design of regulatory policy.