The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) was the first initiative to include citizens in deliberations about the future of European democracy since the failed Constitutional Convention of 2002/03. Although embedded within broader trends to involve ordinary citizens in the political process, it is of specific relevance in the European context because it raises expectations of democratic catching up and relates to ongoing discussions and struggles about the constitutional character of the European Union. This article argues for a citizen-centred perspective on constitutional renewal in the European Union that places European citizens as constituent subjects at centre stage. It outlines how making the European Union accessible as a political arena allows citizens to regain control over developments that have evolved behind people’s backs. It concludes that deliberative tools of citizen participation should be used to pave the way for a wider reorganization of public authority and a renewal of the European Union’s constitutional basis.

This Article sheds new light on one of the longest-running debates in the European Union (EU) citizenship literature: the concept of ‘reverse discrimination’ and the question of whether it is justified. Reverse discrimination has divided EU lawyers into roughly two distinct groups. One group believes that it constitutes an unjustified violation of the principle of equality; a second that it is inevitable in a Union governed by the constitutional principle of divided powers. This Article questions this by offering a typology of reverse discrimination. While most scholars assume that reverse discrimination is a singular phenomenon that demands a singular response, this Article shows that it is a variegated phenomenon that demands a variegated response. It distinguishes three types of reverse discrimination and explains that the proper response depends on the type we are considering. Type I is caused by the application of the principle of mutual recognition; Type II by an interaction between domestic federalism and internal discrimination; and Type III by the CJEU’s confusion over the aim of the right to free movement and residence. Through this typology, the Article shows that reverse discrimination is never a corollary of the principle of divided powers, nor is it always incompatible with the principle of equality. Finally, the Article shows that to the extent that reverse discrimination violates the principle of equality, the solution is not to equalise rights upwards but downwards to the lower (national or regional) level of government. This shows that the principle of equality and the principle of divided powers need not collide.

EU institutions have argued on several occasions that national and EU citizenship should not be awarded without any genuine link with the Member State concerned. Some scholars have adopted the same position, justifying their position referring to the genuine link requirement established by the International Court of Justice in Nottebohm. This has prompted criticism from legal scholars, who point out that Nottebohm was wrong as a matter of international law and moral principle. This paper shows that supporters and critics have failed to recognise that they have been talking with different conceptions of the genuine link requirement in mind. The question of whether to apply a genuine link requirement for the recognition of nationality is altogether different from the question of whether to apply a genuine link requirement for the acquisition of nationality. Nottebohm concerns the first; the arguments of EU institutions the second. The argument of EU institutions cannot therefore be dismissed by dismissing Nottebohm. I subsequently explore the normative arguments for predicating the boundaries of national membership on a genuine link requirement. There are weighty moral reasons for member states to condition the acquisition of national and EU citizenship on the presence of a genuine link. Finally, moving from the normative to the practical, I argue that such a requirement would have far-reaching consequences (targeting not just investor citizenship schemes) and cannot be enforced as a requirement under EU law.

The mainstream democratic critique of EU law rejects the argument that standard EU citizenship rights have a democracy-enhancing effect within the EU Member States. This Article shows how the democratic critique can benefit from a critique of critique that is missing in the discussion on the democratic effects of EU law. From this perspective, the Article makes an original contribution to critical EU legal studies at three levels. First, the critique of essentialist binary oppositions revisits what is political in the interests protected under EU citizenship rights. Second, the Article demonstrates how an Arendtian theory of political judgment counteracts the mainstream democratic critique in assessing the effects of EU citizenship law on democratic politics. Finally, reopening the question of what the conditions for democracy are translates into a methodological argument that rejectionist critique must yield to a more developed critical methodology in EU legal studies.

The relationship between EU citizenship and nationality is still defined by ‘linkage’ and ‘derivation’: national citizenship enjoys primacy over and conditions access to EU citizenship. However, because naturalisation decisions have a European dimension as well as a cross-border dimension, various commentators have questioned whether this primacy is desirable. This article examines alternative models of EU citizenship and argues that the answer is not to reconsider the criteria of ‘linkage’ and ‘derivation’, but to create some common EU rules on ‘access’ to national and EU citizenship. A particularly attractive solution is for rules on the grant of nationality to be guided by the idea of a ‘genuine link’. Reflecting on the Commission's recent report on investment citizenship within the EU and the debate it provoked, this article questions whether such shared rules can currently be adopted.

This article argues for the (re)construction of citizenship of the European Union as an autonomous status. As opposed to the current legal regime, whereby individuals with nationality of a Member State are automatically granted citizenship of the Union, under this proposal individuals would be free to choose whether or not to adopt the status of citizen of an incipient European polity. At present, the telos and essence of citizenship of the Union is contested. It may be argued that the status is partial or incomplete. This has informed competing normative perspectives. ‘Maximalist’ positions praise the judicial construction of Union citizenship as destined to be the ‘fundamental status’ for all Member State nationals. By contrast, ‘minimalist’ positions argue that the status should remain ‘additional to’ Member State nationality, and the rights created therein should remain supplementary to the status and rights derived from national citizenship. This article will argue for a new approach to the dilemma. By emancipating the condition for acquisition of EU citizenship from nationality of a Member State, and reconstructing it as an autonomous choice for individuals, it is tentatively suggested that a new constitutional settlement for Europe may be generated.

This article scrutinizes the last ten years of the academic debate on EU citizenship law taking nine fundamental disagreements among scholars as starting points. It explores EU citizenship's relationship with three groups of issues of fundamental importance, including the place of this concept within the fabric of EU law, the influence of this concept on the essence of the Union as a system of multi-level governance, and its impact on the lives of ordinary Europeans. A large number of key works which influenced the Court and the legislator in the recent years is assessed to outline the likely direction of future research, as well as EU citizenship's future development. Although the literature on the subject is overwhelmingly rich and diverse, this article aspires to provide a representative sample of issues of interest for the framing of the concept at issue from a supranational perspective, necessarily leaving national literatures aside.

Taking its cue from Benjamin Constant’s famous comparison of the liberty of the ancients with that of the moderns, this article examines the compatibility of democracy with free markets within the EU. Constant argued that commerce had replaced the political liberty of the ancients with the civil liberties of the moderns. Nevertheless, he contended a degree of political liberty remained necessary to guarantee these civil liberties. The difficulty was whether the political system could operate in the interest of all if modern citizens had ceased to identify with the public interest in the manner of the ancients and preferred to pursue their private interests. Constant believed representative democracy offered a form of political liberty that was compatible with modern liberty. It involved a less demanding view of civic virtue to ancient liberty and a different conception of the public interest as promoting rather than in conflict with private interests. However, for it to operate as Constant expected required certain social and cultural conditions that emerged in European nation states but are not themselves the products of commerce and may even be undermined by it: namely, a national identity; a social contract; and political parties. The EU involves a further deepening of modern commercial liberty beyond the nation state. This article explores three main issues raised by this development. First, have any of the three elements that facilitated the operation of representative democracy within the member states evolved at the EU level? Second, if not, is it possible to create an effective form of representative democracy on a post-national basis as the logical entailment of the liberties of the moderns? Third, if neither of these is possible, can we simply detach modern liberty from political liberty and see social rights as attributes of free movement, and efficient and equitable economic regulations as the products of technocratic governance? All three questions are answered in the negative.