Monetary policy in the USA affects borrowing costs for state and local governments, incentivizing municipal borrowing and spending, which in turn affects economic outcomes. Using municipal bond indices and transaction-level data, I find that responses to monetary policy are dampened relative to treasuries and heterogeneous across location and bond characteristics. In my baseline estimate, muni yields move 26 bp after a 100 bp monetary shock. To study implications for local fiscal policy, I model US localities as small open economies in a monetary union with independent fiscal agents. In a calibrated model, monetary transmission is significantly affected by municipal borrowing costs.

Against the background of the European Commission’s reform plans of the Stability and Growth Pact, this paper uses NiGEM to simulate the macroeconomic implications of re-applying the fiscal rules in 2024. Next to returning to the unreformed rules, the most prominent options include an expenditure rule. Our results indicate that re-applying the unreformed rules leads to severe cuts in public spending. An expenditure rule would, however, not necessarily alleviate the fiscal adjustment burden. Instead, our simulations show that great care must be taken to specify the expenditure rule, such that fiscal consolidation is achieved in a growth-friendly way.

This paper critically examines the key empirical evidence used to support the fiscal consolidation argument, complemented by a brief assessment of the limitations of the analytical foundation of the growth promoting benefits of the fiscal consolidation thesis. It also reviews the evidence on the debt-growth relationship at some length. It finds that the negative relationship between debt and GDP growth is influenced by outliers or exceptionally high debt-GDP ratios. It also points out that the composition of public debt matters. Additionally, the debt-GDP relationship appears to be non-linear—positive first and turning to negative, but there is considerable variation in the estimated turning or ‘tipping’ point, which is not helpful as a policy guide. Historical evidence does not lend support to the concerns that the current situation is likely to cause rapid upward spiraling of public indebtedness. Finally, the argument that fiscal consolidation is possible without adversely affecting growth is not based on robust empirical evidence. This conclusion is reinforced by a succinct overview of some country-specific experiences (Denmark, Ireland and United States).

This paper describes how the large budget deficits of 2020 in the United States and the United Kingdom were financed, how central banks are in practice managed not just short-term interest rates but also yields on government bonds, and how their ability to resist a post-coronavirus surge in inflation has been compromised.

I assess a novel rule that was introduced in the UK in 2015. It gave the British government fiscal flexibility whenever GDP growth warranted it. This rule lasted just a year, but it had features worth exploring. I apply solution methods for models with occasionally-binding constraints to assess the demand stabilisation properties of state-contingent fiscal rules. First it is shown that fiscal flexibility can make recessions shallower. Second, it is suggested that GDP growth, rather than measures of the output gap, is a better indicator for triggering fiscal flexibility.

Oil prices fell from around $US110 per barrel in 2014 to less than $US50per barrel at the start of 2017. This put enormous pressure on government budgets within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. The focus of GCC economic policies quickly shifted to fiscal reform, including the removal of domestic subsidies on energy products. In this paper, we use a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to investigate the economic impact of the gradual removal of subsidies on refined petroleum and electricity, with specific reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).

Our study shows that removing subsidies eliminates a large distortion in the economy. This improves the efficiency of resource use, so that even though employment and capital in most years fall relative to baseline levels, real GDP rises. In addition, we show that fully-funded compensation payments offset the increases in energy prices, leaving economic welfare of the Saudi-national population little affected. Removing the energy subsidies leads to an improvement in the net volume of trade, while leading to a mixed outcome for industries.

This paper argues that the Bank of England's independence in monetary policy has been compromised as a result of quantitative easing (QE) and makes practical suggestions for restoring it as far as possible, by transferring the gilts that the Bank has bought to the Debt Management Office of the Treasury and thereby shrinking the Bank's balance sheet. The paper discusses the problems that will arise when QE is unwound and suggests that they would be less intractable if the unwinding were managed by the Debt Management Office.

The Scotland Bill 2015–16 would make the Scottish government one of the most powerful sub-central governments in the OECD in terms of its control over spending and taxation. The UK government has also announced plans to introduce ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (EVEL), where the support of a majority of English MPs would be necessary to pass legislation deemed to impact on England only. The objective of this paper is to examine the potential for spillovers to arise in monetary unions of asymmetric nations where fiscal policy choices are taken locally. We extend a model of Chari and Kehoe (2008) to show the sub-optimal consequences of devolved fiscal policy in a moneteary union with a dominant member state. Because England is so much larger than the other constituent nations of the UK, its fiscal policy choices will have a commensurately stronger impact on UK monetary policy. As a result, UK monetary policy might be inappropriate for the smaller nations, calling into question the economic efficiency of EVEL. This is a general result which arises from the asymmetry of nations rather than specific UK funding arrangements or behavioural responses.

With the current sovereign debt crisis, the incompleteness of economic integration in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has become patent, leading to an intense debate among academics and policy makers. Much of the debate concerns fiscal rules and austerity measures, both of which weigh on growth prospects. In this paper we look at the main structural shortcomings of EMU through the lens of general equilibrium theory. We address two issues (international sharing of macroeconomic risks and coordinated growth stimulation) which are at the heart of the sustainability of EMU. We propose: (A) a specific scheme for mutual insurance of macroeconomic risks; (B) locating responsibility for demand policies at the EMU level, with ambitious investment programs (public, or fiscally-neutral private) as main instrument.

The recession of 1937–8 is often cited as illustrating the dangers of withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus too early in a weak recovery. Yet our understanding of this severe downturn is incomplete: existing studies find that changes in fiscal policy were small in comparison to the magnitude of the downturn and that higher reserve requirements were not binding on banks. This article focuses on a neglected change in monetary policy, the sterilization of gold inflows during 1937, and finds that it exerted a powerful contractionary force during this period. The transmission of this monetary shock to the real economy appears to have worked through lower asset (equity) prices and higher interest rates.

Macroeconomic theory clearly suggests that at the zero lower bound, fiscal contraction will reduce output and slow any recovery. Yet in 2010 the focus of fiscal policy in many countries switched from supporting activity to reducing debt, despite the fact that the recovery from recession often appeared weak. While high levels of public debt can explain this switch in some countries, it does not provide a satisfactory account in others. In addition, the possibility of using balanced budget fiscal expansion or tax switches that bring forward spending remain largely unexplored. This paper suggests that policy has been influenced by an opposition to countercyclical fiscal policy which has ideological roots.

Restoring sustainable public finances in the aftermath of the Great Recession is a key challenge in most EU countries. In order to learn from history, our paper examines consolidation episodes in the EU since 1970. We shed light on the factors that favour the start of a consolidation episode and determine its success. Compared to the existing literature, we add a number of new dimensions in the analysis. First, we explore a broader set of potential ingredients of the ‘recipe for success‘, including the quality and strength of fiscal governance and the implementation of structural reforms. Secondly, we check whether the ‘recipe for success’ changed over time. Our analysis broadly confirms received wisdom concerning the conditions triggering a consolidation episode and the role of the composition of adjustment for success, with some qualifications related to the role played by government wages. In addition it provides evidence that well-designed fiscal governance as well as structural reforms improve the odds of both starting a consolidation episode and achieving a lasting fiscal correction. We also show that, over time, successful and unsuccessful consolidation episodes have become more similar in terms of adjustment composition.

In this paper we propose a simple, automatic insurance mechanism designed to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union, which could be used as starting point of a more elaborated policy instrument. The mechanism would use as indicator of the occurrence of a shock the changes in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging to the union, and would be financed through a fund built from contributions of these countries as a percentage of their tax receipts. The fund would be distributed among the countries affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to the proportion in which every one of them would have been affected by the shock. Our proposal is illustrated by means of an empirical application to the case of EMU.

Cet article étudie l’organisation monétaire socialement optimale dans le cadre d’un modèle à trois joueurs (banque centrale, gouvernement et secteur privé), et les raisons poussant la population à choisir un gouverneur dont l’arbitrage inflation-chômage diffère du sien. Il jette un regard critique sur les assimilations entre autonomie et conservatisme du banquier central d’une part, et entre indépendance de l’institution monétaire et absence de coordination des politiques d’autre part. Il est montré que les agents n’ont pas toujours intérêt à annoncer d’autres préférences que celles inscrites dans leur fonction de bien-être du moment que le gouvernement est «bienveillant», et que le décideur monétaire optimal peut être moins allergique à l’inflation que l’agent représentatif. L’existence d’un biais dépend plus généralement des rapports de force s’établissant entre les deux autorités, et du degré selon lequel les acteurs privés s’estiment correctement représentés par leurs élus. Il est soutenu que la coordination des politiques fiscale et monétaire est la configuration la plus pertinente pour expliquer la nomination d’un banquier «conservateur».

Cet article examine la relation entre le taux de croissance de la masse monétaire et l'accumulation du capital physique durant la dynamique transitoire d'un modèle de croisssance endogène à deux secteurs (capital humain et capital physique) à la Lucas [1988]. Utilisant une fonction d'utilité CES, on montre que, sur la trajectoire d'ajustement, pour un rapport initial du capital physique sur le capital humain inférieur à sa valeur stationnaire, le saut de l'investissement en réponse à un accroissement du taux de croissance de la masse monétaire a le signe de (S – 1)(S – σ), où S est l'élasticité de substitution intertemporelle, et σ l'élasticité instantanée de substitution entre consommation et monnaie. Les propriétés d'hystérèse des modèles de croissance endogène sont ensuite invoquées pour mettre en évidence la non-superneutralité de la monnaie à long terme sur le niveau des variables réelles.

This paper examines the impact macroeconomic policies in a system where the product market is modelled as an oligopolistic supergame in which potential entrants incur sunk entry costs. It is shown that policies which affect the interest rate, influence both the degree of competition in the industry and the structure of the industry. Moreover, it is demonstrated that when sunk entry costs are introduced in to the model firms respond in an asymmetric manner to policy changes. These results suggest that the economy may exhibit hysteresis.