Co-management regimes are institutional innovations that hold the promise of achieving sustainable common-pool resource governance. However, the transition to such institutional regimes in coastal resource systems has faced challenges in many countries. This article examines the processes and outcomes of such institutional changes in coastal fisheries in Ghana, where the transition to co-management was unsuccessful. Combining theoretical perspectives from legal pluralism in legal anthropology and ideational theories of institutional change within institutional economics, the paper uses process tracing to examine the role of ideology and historical institutional dynamics of the resource context in the institutionalization and failure of co-management arrangements for governing coastal fisheries. The study finds that ideological conflicts and historical legacies of legal pluralism hindered the practice and outcomes of coastal fisheries co-management in Ghana. The article argues for particular attention to the historical institutional dimensions and underlying worldviews of the resource context in institutional interventions for sustainability in coastal resource systems.

A variety of wormwood, Artemisia cina, once grew abundantly in the Syr-Darya province of Russian Turkestan. Santonin, a drug derived from it, was in high demand. Flowers harvested by Kazakhs were handed over to intermediaries to be processed in Europe, but from the 1880s entrepreneurs from different parts of the Russian empire established their own chemical plants in Chimkent and Tashkent. They pressured the Russian imperial government to restrict the rights of the Kazakhs on land where Artemisia cina grew, and grant them the exclusive right to exploit this resource. These entrepreneurs used conservationist arguments and advocated a ‘cultured’ approach to the management of natural resources located on supposedly ‘State land’. These attempts collided with the usage rights of the Kazakhs, as defined by Turkestan’s governing Statute. By shifting the argument to the political, rather than legal, level, the industrialists eventually gained a monopoly to the exclusion of local entrepreneurs and even assumed State-like functions. This article reconstructs this controversy and allows a glimpse into the evolving claims to natural resources in the ‘periphery’ by both Tsarist colonial power and the Kazakhs themselves. The article also explores the features of autochthonous and Russian entrepreneurship and situates Turkestan in a web of trade connections to the global pharmaceutical industry.

To address the complex challenge of global antimicrobial resistance (AMR), a pandemic treaty should include mechanisms that 1) equitably address the access gap for antimicrobials, diagnostic technologies, and alternative therapies; 2) equitably conserve antimicrobials to sustain effectiveness and access across time and space; 3) equitably finance the investment, discovery, development, and distribution of new technologies; and 4) equitably finance and establish greater upstream and midstream infection prevention measures globally. Biodiversity, climate, and nuclear governance offer lessons for addressing these challenges.

Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) are significant for poverty alleviation, but are threatened by over-exploitation and climate change effects such as drastic drops in regrowth rates. How will fishers adapt? To shed light on this, we ran a common-pool resource experiment with SSF fishers in Thailand. Our results show that groups confronted with a potential abrupt drop in the regrowth rate are more likely to form cooperative agreements compared to groups not confronted with such a drop, which theory cannot predict. However, groups that form cooperative agreements do not necessarily manage the resource efficiently; many groups under-exploit. Over-exploitation is driven by individual characteristics, e.g., if individuals can diversify income, and if they are born outside the village. We conclude that more systematic exploration of the role of socio-economic factors, and how these factors interact with ecological conditions facing fishers, are needed. Our work can be seen as one step in this direction.

Habraken's Structure of the Ordinary (SOTO), Jacobs' view of cities, and Ostrom's Design Principles and Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework focus on essential elements and relationships for the effective governance of the environment. However, they have different perspectives about what is necessary for successful governance. This article compares and contrasts Habraken's, Jacobs', and Ostrom's views and applies them to Common Interest Developments (CIDs). Habraken, Jacobs, and Habraken discuss the importance of public territory. Habraken views public territory as relative: a territory in a built environment can be private relative to a larger, or higher level, territory, and public relative to an included, lower level, territory. Jacobs discusses the importance of connections and accommodating strangers without sacrificing safety. Ostrom views common-pool resources as goods whose use causes less to be available to others. For their part, CIDs represent a particular governance vehicle for defining what is public and private in large residential developments. For both Habraken and Ostrom, the transformation of the physical environment reflects agents' common values constrained by material, technical, cultural, and economic conditions. Rather than one mutual understanding, Jacobs wrote that balancing the commercial and the guardian values is crucial for society's health and survival.

Subtropical dry forests are among the largest and most threatened terrestrial biomes worldwide. In Argentina, the Native Forest Law (NFL) was passed in 2007 to regulate deforestation by mandating the provincial zonation of forested areas, while the erection of fences has been an increasingly common mechanism of private-land control reinforcement in the region; this is mainly fuelled by imminent land-use changes, recent land transactions or subsidies from the NFL. We explored the dynamics between the erection of fences and deforestation in the Northern Argentinian Dry Chaco (NADC) during the implementation of the NFL. We found that a third of land deforested during 2000–2017 had been previously fenced, with the highest percentage (44%) occurring during the sanction of the NFL (2007) and the completion of the forest-zonation maps (2011). Only 34% of deforestation within fenced areas occurred in zones where deforestation was legally permitted. In total, 327 386 ha of forests had been fenced within NADC by 2017, representing areas of potential access restriction for local people, who historically used forest resources for survival. Additionally, 57% of the fenced area occurred in zones where deforestation was restricted. A novel remote-sensing application can serve as an early-warning tool for deforestation.

Time discounting – the degree to which individuals value current more than future resources – is an important component of natural resource conservation. As a response to climate change impacts in island communities, such as sea level rise, discounting the future can be a rational response due to increased stress on natural resources and uncertainty about whether future generations will have the same access to the same resources. By incorporating systematic responses of discount rates into models of resource conservation, realistic expectations of future human responses to climate change and associated resource stress may be developed. This paper illustrates the importance of time discounting through a theoretical agent-based model of resource use in island communities. A discount rate change can dramatically change projections about future migration and community-based conservation efforts. Our simulation results show that an increase in discount rates due to a credible information shock about future climate change impacts is likely to speed resource depletion. The negative impacts of climate change are therefore likely to be underestimated if changes in discount rates and emerging migration patterns are not taken into account.

When herbicide-resistant weeds are highly mobile across farms, delaying resistance becomes a common-pool resource (CPR) problem. In such situations, it is in the collective long-term interest of farmers to conserve an herbicide's usefulness. Yet, each farmer has an individual short-run incentive to use the herbicide without considering effects on resistance. This study considers the potential for community-based (CB) approaches to address problems of herbicide-resistant weeds. Here, growers actively participate in designing, financing, and implementing programs, usually in collaboration with industry, government, and universities. CB approaches have certain advantages over top-down regulatory or subsidy-based approaches. Scholars and practitioners have developed effective governance mechanisms for many CPRs that could aid in developing effective resistance management programs. Successful CB management programs for insect pest eradication and areawide invasive weed control offer additional lessons about the potential and challenges of such efforts. Lessons from these examples can inform the design and implementation of successful, voluntary programs for herbicide-resistance management. Key research, education, and outreach priorities to help implement successful CB programs are identified at the close.

Controlling herbicide resistance (HR) and its associated environmental risks is impossible without integrating social and economic science with biophysical and technology aspects. Herbicide resistance is a dynamically complex and ill-structured problem involving coupled natural–human systems that defy management approaches based on simple scientific and technology applications. The existence of mobile herbicide resistance and/or herbicide tolerance traits add complexity because susceptibility to the herbicide is a resource open to all farmers, impacting the weed population. Weed scientists have extensively researched the biophysical aspects and grower perceptions of HR. They also recognize that the “tragedy of the commons” can appear when herbicide resistance is mobile across farms. However, the human structures and processes, especially private and public institutions that influence individual and group decisions about HR, have received little analysis. To start filling that gap, we discuss an integrative management approach to sustainable weed control that addresses the social complexity of farm heterogeneity. For example, the need for a private or public collective mechanism becomes apparent to address common-pool resource (CPR) aspects when one farmer's weed control actions influence their neighbors' situations. In such conditions, sole reliance on education, technical assistance, and other incentives aimed at changing individual grower behavior likely will fail to stem the advance of HR. Social science theories can be used to enrich the understanding of human interaction with the biophysical environment and identify key actors and social change processes influencing those interactions in the case of HR. The short-run economic advantages of herbicides such as glyphosate work against social change to address HR, including the development of collective actions when mobile HR conditions exist. We discuss seven design principles that can improve the efficacy and cost of such collective approaches and draw insights from CPR approaches outside of HR.

Overexploitation of coastal aquifers may lead to seawater intrusion, which irreversibly degrades groundwater. The seawater intrusion process may imply that its consequences would not be perceptible until after decades of accumulated overexploitation. In such a dynamic setting, static externalities may enhance the users’ awareness about the resource's common nature, inducing more conservative individual behaviors. Aiming to evaluate this hypothesis, we experimentally test predictions from a dynamic game of substitutable common-pool resource (CPR) exploitation. The players have to decide whether to use a free private good or to extract from one of two costly CPRs. Our findings do not give substantial support to the initial conjecture. Nevertheless, the presence of static externalities does induce some kind of payoff reassurance strategies in the resource choice decisions, but these strategies do not correspond to the optimum benchmark.