Actions in cyberspace by governments, businesses, NGOs and other players have become part of international relations and international security. Those actions reflect countries’ national interests and affect their bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relationships. This has led to the rise of cyber diplomacy, the activity of deploying international cooperation in cyberspace and using actions in cyberspace to achieve foreign-policy goals. The main focus of cyber diplomacy in its early stages is trying to forge a way to regulate state behavior and prevent and regulate conflict in cyberspace. Some governments have extended their cyber diplomacy portfolios to include the foreign-policy implications of new technologies. Both traditional tools from the diplomacy toolbox and new technologies are needed to build and maintain international cooperation in cyberspace. Cyber diplomacy is not the activity of using digital tools to accomplish traditional foreign-policy objectives–that is the definition of digital diplomacy.

The managerial technology of performance review is an indispensable tool in rendering decentralized managerial governance coordinated and coherent, and Chapter 4 discusses the effects of the UN’s system of results-based management on its counter-terrorism strategy. The chapter shows how performance review is driven by both carrot and stick. As to techniques of gratification, it looks at how the UN uses capacity-building programmes to address deficiencies in nation-states’ counter-terrorism practice on the basis of Counter-Terrorism Committee assessments. On the one hand, nation-states in receipt of such assistance are supposed to realize their sovereign status by exercising responsible leadership over their development; on the other hand, the UN agencies which run capacity-building programmes are gratified by the award of funds for demonstrating value for money. Performance review is only driven by the threat of punishment when gratification fails, and the chapter uses the Financial Action Task Force’s system of mutual evaluations to illustrate this. It shows how the practice of imposing counter-measures on recalcitrant nation-states serves to reiterate the importance of responsible leadership, rather than insist upon the implementation of a specific measure to counter-terrorist financing.

Hybrid tribunals are the international legal community’s response to the perceived weakness of fully international criminal tribunals in engaging national audiences and promoting reform of national legal systems. But despite locating themselves in the concerned post-conflict states or employing national attorneys, judges, and staff to serve alongside their international counterparts, hybrid criminal tribunals have not found these structural changes to be a quick fix. Instead, like international tribunals, they have also struggled to achieve their desired national legacy. This chapter focuses on one of the elements affecting hybrid tribunals’ performance in general and national impact in particular: the transnational collaboration between “internationals” and “nationals” that is one of the core features of hybrid tribunals. It explores the interpersonal and communal aspects of these transnational collaborations between nationals and internationals, building on previous work theorizing on these aspects of collaborations among internationals in international criminal law and rule of law initiatives, and drawing from a set of interviews with internationals who have worked in several transnational settings, including hybrid courts, other international criminal tribunals, and rule of law initiatives.

In Kakuma, UNHCR expects RCOs to compete in a ‘market’ for social protection: either they must provide services for which the community pays, or they can compete to partner with implementing partners (IPs). This chapter explores how the endemic market-based logic of Kakuma has shaped the landscape of refugee-led protection and assistance. UNHCR encourages RCOs, as it is reluctant to interfere with the market. The result is that refugee CBOs face ‘struggle’. They need resources to develop capacity and competence, but cannot access those resources without first demonstrating the same qualities. Yet few RCOs can thrive in this marketplace. While around 30 RCOs have registered as CBOs in the regional administrative capital, Lodwar, and are members of Kakuma’s RCO umbrella organisation, most struggle for funding or recognition. Only one RCO, SAVIC, has its own building and external funding, established through chance encounters and a network of connections built over time by its founders.

− ESG–Agency scholars have identified 20 environmental governance functions performed by agents in earth system governance, with most scholarly attention focused on rule-making and regulation; convening and facilitating participation; and knowledge generation, provision, and sharing. − Forms of governance and multilevel/multiscalar dynamics serve as structural factors that that enable or constrain the performance of agency in earth system governance. − ESG–Agency scholarship over the past decade confirms that the state remains a key agent of earth system governance, despite expectations that the state’s role would diminish with the rise of nonstate actors and the reconfiguration of authority in world politics.