This article examines Paolo Sorrentino's portrayal of moral degradation and pursuit of power in his twin biopics about Silvio Berlusconi: Loro 1 and Loro 2 (2018). It does so by performing a psychological reading of Sorrentino's representation of Berlusconi, as someone suffering from a personality disorder characterised by excessive power striving. It argues that this obsession with power also affects most of the films’ characters, who become obsessed with entering Berlusconi's inner circle – the pinnacle of wealth and power in a neoliberal society. In particular, it argues that their power striving circulates ‘virally’ in the film's narrative; the characters are willing to do anything to befriend their idol and attain absolute power. The ensuing analysis shows that Sorrentino's portrayal of Berlusconi – as the embodiment of a highly dysfunctional and obsessive, viral quest for power – comes to represent the deep pervasiveness of corruption, hedonism and commodification that marked the Second Republic.

This article explores the ways in which Silvio Berlusconi might figure in collective memory. It approaches this from a number of angles. First, consideration is given to the way political figures of the past have resonated culturally and the role of institutions including the mass media in this. Second, Berlusconi's own efforts to situate himself in relation to a shared past are explored, with reference to the place of three nostalgic appeals that figured with varying intensity at different points in his career. Third, Berlusconian aesthetics are investigated to explore the relative roles of kitsch and glamour. It is shown that kitsch gained the upper hand and that this also manifested itself in the monarchical aspects that his personality cult took on. Finally, Berlusconi is considered as a possible subject for a biopic and a discussion is offered of the way his life and career might be presented in different variants of this genre. Overall, it is suggested that expectations that he will be damned by history fail to take account both of the way he imposed himself on the collective consciousness and of the generic requirements of the mass media.

Silvio Berlusconi impacted massively on Italy's party politics. He restructured the right via Forza Italia and the People of Freedom co-creating a bipolar party system whilst championing a radical personalisation of politics. The new party system appeared to rotate around him, creating an unusual version of ‘moderate pluralism’. Thus, whilst there was government alternation, there was also gladiatorial confrontation more typical of ‘polarised pluralism’. More effective as an electoral mobiliser than a government leader, Berlusconi's fourth government collapsed in the face of the 2011 economic crisis. His party, whose institutionalisation had been prevented by the extreme personalisation of his leadership, began to fall apart, whilst voter disillusion boosted support for a new party, the Five Star Movement. By 2014, it appeared that Berlusconi's major legacies were the rise of Matteo Renzi, the new Prime Minister and leader of the Democratic Party; his failure to construct an enduring, moderate conservative party; and the exceptional success of the Five Star Movement.

This article considers the changed role of the Italian presidency and the impact and legacy of Silvio Berlusconi on this. After consideration of some of the methodological difficulties raised by these issues, the article looks at the role of the presidency up to 1992, when the presidency was interpreted in narrow terms set by the framers of the 1948 constitution and by the predominance of the party leaders of the period over the political direction of the State. The article considers how presidents from Sandro Pertini (1978–85) on, sought in different ways to expand the political role of their office. The article analyses the different ways that Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Giorgio Napolitano used their formal and informal powers both to maintain the status of the office and to promote political goals, and concludes with an assessment of the likely long-term impact of these changes and of Berlusconi's role in them.

A distinguishing feature of the Berlusconi era has undoubtedly been his personal conflict with the judiciary. Therefore, this article explores the impact of Berlusconi's 20 years in politics on the Italian judicial system. The main argument developed in this analysis is that, thanks to a strong institutional framework built with the 1948 constitution, the Italian judiciary continued to guarantee an effective mechanism of checks and balances. In spite of reiterated attempts by the centre–right majority to modify judicial procedures and organisation to advantage Berlusconi in solving his judicial troubles (ad personam laws), the judiciary was, in the long run, successful in restraining these actions. In fact, several of the ad personam laws were abrogated by rulings of the Constitutional Court, or made substantially ineffective in the implementation stage. Moreover, no substantial reforms of the judicial system have been accomplished, although they were frequently announced. Nevertheless, it may be argued that Berlusconi's anti-judicial rhetoric has had a significant impact on public attitudes towards the judiciary, and contributed to exacerbating the polarisation between two opposite views of the justice system in Italy. The persistent anti-judicial message affected public opinion and was deeply incorporated by centre–right voters, creating a real cleavage on the issue of justice. Moreover, this huge conflict on the justice issue increasingly distracted the attention of political actors from the real organisational problems of the system of justice.

Despite the populist radical right’s (PRR) popularity among political scientists, little scholarship has focused on its influence on foreign policy. This lack of study is due, in part, to a general lack of attention to the role of political parties in foreign policy, both in comparative politics and international relations (IR). This is unfortunate because, due to Europeanization and globalization, the domain of foreign policy has expanded, making foreign policy increasingly a domestic concern and, most importantly, touching on major themes of PRR parties. Combining insights from comparative politics and IR, we theorize the mechanisms, which may facilitate the impact of such parties on foreign policy. Subsequently, we examine whether the Italian Northern League (LN), as a prime example of a PRR party participating in a coalition government, has had an impact on Italy’s foreign policy and, if so, what accounts for this (lack of) influence. This paper concludes that, unlike common understanding, the PRR is not persistently anti-internationalist/anti-EU; rather, its position depends on the extent to which international politics helps or hinders the promotion of ‘the people’. Second, despite the LN’s strong coalition position, it pursued an effective foreign policy mainly regarding immigration policy. Third, IR theories of junior coalition partners and foreign policy should address the nature of the party system and how inter-party electoral competition affects the strength of a junior coalition partner. Fourth, these theories need to acknowledge that party preferences are sometimes trumped by national concerns, as suggested by more systemic IR theories.

In the mid-1970s the reform of Italy's radio and television system led to the end of RAI's monopoly and the advent of commercial television stations. This resulted in a reorganisation of the system according to the precepts of daily life and domesticity, with viewers at the centre of the relationship with the medium. This article, by analysing televisual archives such as game shows, explores how television formed part of the changes taking place in society and reveals how it became a kind of meeting-place, coinciding with the rise of an affluent society, between aspirations and desires and stereotypical models dictated by the market. These models were able to express new values that went beyond the boundaries of ideological affiliations and were in effect a response to the search for new forms of identity. In particular, television's place became an open space that was defined through modes of socialisation. It thus constructed a wider intimacy, a ‘mediatised hearth’, that progressively eroded the barriers between the private and the public sphere and led unexpectedly towards a ‘relationship of interest’ between television, competitors, viewers and financial backers. A new community then emerged, characterised more by possessing than by existing.

This article analyses the parallels between the role played by the Church, first during the Crisis of the Liberal State in the early twentieth century and then during the transition from the Christian Democratic regime to the ‘bi-polar’ Second Republic more than 70 years later. It explores both the particular, contingent forces at work in each, and the underlying explanations as to why the Church was able to successfully exploit these two processes of transition in the political history of Italy to its advantage. It concludes by arguing that the experience of these two crises demonstrates that the Church is not only a powerful force in Italian civil society but also effectively ‘a state within a state’ in relation to the functioning of Italy's political structures.

Italy's relationship with Germany has undergone substantial changes over the last 20 years. Since 1989, the two countries, traditional allies and partners in the EU and NATO, have experienced a number of tensions. A crucial problem for Germany lies in its incapacity to accept fully Italy's ambitions to be a leading European power. In domestic terms, the perception of Italy has been heavily overshadowed by the figure of Silvio Berlusconi who has allowed familiar stereotypes to survive and impeded a sober analysis of Italy's changed preferences.

This article examines French–Italian relations focusing in particular on economic exchanges and French perceptions of Italy as revealed in parliamentary debates and in the French press. The analysis suggests that in the eyes of the French, Italy is a two-faced Janus, rich in both defects and positive qualities. Except perhaps for the shrewdest observers, it is difficult for the French to come to terms with all the subtleties and complexities of the real Italy.

This article analyses the British perceptions of contemporary Italy and Italian politics. Through the use of a number of sources (parliamentary debates, governmental documents, newspaper articles and interviews) it argues that Italy is not perceived, within Great Britain, as a great power within the European system nor it is viewed as a peripheral actor. Rather, it suggests that Italy seems to have finally found in the post-Cold War scenario its proper role–a European middle power, with important responsibilities within a regional sub-system. A frequent request–and expectation–coming from British politics and society is that Italy should take on more international responsibilities, even in the sphere of defence–as the different readings of Italy's role and leadership in Afghanistan and Lebanon reveal. However, Italy's ability to play this role is believed to be hampered by several factors: its uncertain political situation, its unwillingness to engage in military operations, its reluctance to respect international commitments and its structural economic problems. As a result, further possibilities of cooperation with other international partners as well as its potential for autonomous action on the international stage are, in several cases, precluded. Moreover, if the relations between Italy and the UK are usually seen in a positive way, and Italy is viewed as a reliable partner, the nature of the cooperation between the two countries is often considered to be fragile and based on short-term common interests and strategies.

The results of the 2008 Italian general election were welcomed by many as the ‘sunrise of the Third Republic’, heralding a new political system which would emerge from a comprehensive constitutional reform agreed between the main parties of government and opposition. The party system now looks significantly different from that (or those) of the ‘Second Republic’. In particular, the disappearance of the radical left from Parliament and a clear reduction in the number of parties are the main factors underpinning optimistic predictions about a possible compromise on constitutional reform. Drawing on Sartori's classic work as well as on more recent conceptualisations of party systems, this article analyses the evolution of the Italian party system over the medium and long term. It is cautious, if not pessimistic, about the prospects for reform. High levels of polarisation, stemming from different conceptions of democracy maintained by the two main parties, can be expected to hinder bipartisan reform. In particular, the figure of Berlusconi appears to represent both the cornerstone of the ‘reconstructed’ party system and the main obstacle to a widely agreed re-drafting of the Constitution.

The European Union has been tightening its grip on the criminal laws of the member states. Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union introduced the framework decision as the appropriate instrument to harmonize criminal law. In this way, member states may be required to adopt minimum levels of criminal definitions and sanctions. This is a matter of ‘third pillar’ law. The case under scrutiny, however, is a perfect illustration of the delicate relationship between EU first pillar law and domestic criminal law.