This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference and with standard revealed preference methodology. And it does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference theory.

In 1942, the British Minister of Health commissioned a report from the newly established Advisory Committee on Mothers and Young Children into ‘What can be done to intensify the effort to secure more breast feeding of infants?’. To make their case, the members of the sub-committee put in charge of the report sought expert testimony on the benefits of breastfeeding. They consulted medical officers of health, maternity and child-welfare officers, health visitors, midwives, obstetricians, paediatricians and a physician in private practice. They also consulted five ‘psychologists’ (a contemporary umbrella term for psychologists, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists). It is not surprising that the committee turned to medical professionals, as infant feeding had long been an area of their expertise. However, seeking the views of ‘psychologists’ when establishing the benefits of breastfeeding marked a more innovative development, one which suggested that a shift in conceptualising the significance of breastfeeding was gathering pace. In the interwar period, psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists showed growing interest in early infancy. It led to an extensive psychoanalytic engagement with contemporary feeding advice disseminated by the medical profession. This article will explore the divergences and intersections of medical and psychoanalytic theories on breastfeeding in the first half of the twentieth century, concluding with a consideration of how medical ideas on breastfeeding had absorbed some of the contentions of ‘psy’-approaches to infant feeding by the post-war period.

Professor Jay Spencer Birnbrauer peacefully passed away on November 1, 2017, aged 83, in Perth, Western Australia. Known to his friends and colleagues in Australia as ‘Birny’, he was a pioneer of applied behaviour analysis on both the Australian and world stage. He contributed to the development of behaviour-analytic technology for children with intellectual and developmental disabilities in the 1960s and played a central part in the formation of the Australian Behaviour Modification Association (known today as the Australian Association for Cognitive and Behaviour Therapy) in the 1970s. He was a purist in the field of applied behaviour analysis (ABA) and was relentless in his efforts to see ABA being provided to children with a developmental disability and their families. Birny's influence in Australia, and particularly Western Australia, was mainly imparted through his role with the Master of Applied Psychology program at Murdoch University. His most widely known piece of work, the Murdoch Early Intervention Program, was an early and important replication of Lovaas's evaluation of early intensive behavioural intervention for children with autism. Birny contributed significantly to our field and to many people's lives. He is remembered often and fondly by his many friends and colleagues.

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.

Robyn is a UK-qualified social worker who has a deeply held passion for, and some 30 years of experience working with disenfranchised and/or vulnerable people and children and young people in care. She has a strong interest in social pedagogy and residential childcare both operationally and strategically. Since 1995, she has been in a variety of management positions and has developed and delivered training, conferences, workshops and consultancy on children's social work and social care for the statutory, voluntary and independent sectors. Her work has aimed at improving both the experiences and outcomes for children and young people in or on the edge of care and raising the profile of those affected by, and working within, the social work and social care sectors.

This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with.