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By a classical theorem of Harvey Friedman (1973), every countable nonstandard model
$\mathcal {M}$
of a sufficiently strong fragment of ZF has a proper rank-initial self-embedding j, i.e., j is a self-embedding of
$\mathcal {M}$
such that
$j[\mathcal {M}]\subsetneq \mathcal {M}$
, and the ordinal rank of each member of
$j[\mathcal {M}]$
is less than the ordinal rank of each element of
$\mathcal {M}\setminus j[\mathcal {M}]$
. Here, we investigate the larger family of proper initial-embeddings j of models
$\mathcal {M}$
of fragments of set theory, where the image of j is a transitive submodel of
$\mathcal {M}$
. Our results include the following three theorems. In what follows,
$\mathrm {ZF}^-$
is
$\mathrm {ZF}$
without the power set axiom;
$\mathrm {WO}$
is the axiom stating that every set can be well-ordered;
$\mathrm {WF}(\mathcal {M})$
is the well-founded part of
$\mathcal {M}$
; and
$\Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $
is the full scheme of dependent choice of length
$\alpha $
.
Theorem A.
There is an
$\omega $
-standard countable nonstandard model
$\mathcal {M}$
of
$\mathrm {ZF}^-+\mathrm {WO}$
that carries no initial self-embedding
$j:\mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$
other than the identity embedding.
Theorem B.
Every countable
$\omega $
-nonstandard model
$\mathcal {M}$
of
$\ \mathrm {ZF}$
is isomorphic to a transitive submodel of the hereditarily countable sets of its own constructible universe
$L^{\mathcal {M}}$
.
Theorem C.
The following three conditions are equivalent for a countable nonstandard model
$\mathcal {M}$
of
$\mathrm {ZF}^{-}+\mathrm {WO}+\forall \alpha \ \Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $
.
(I) There is a cardinal in
$\mathcal {M}$
that is a strict upper bound for the cardinality of each member of
$\mathrm {WF}(\mathcal {M})$
.
(II)
$\mathrm {WF}(\mathcal {M})$
satisfies the powerset axiom.
(III) For all
$n \in \omega $
and for all
$b \in M$
, there exists a proper initial self-embedding
$j: \mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$
such that
$b \in \mathrm {rng}(j)$
and
$j[\mathcal {M}] \prec _n \mathcal {M}$
.
Let ${\cal E}$ be a topos, ${\rm{Dec}}\left( {\cal E} \right) \to {\cal E}$ be the full subcategory of decidable objects, and ${{\cal E}_{\neg \,\,\neg }} \to {\cal E}$ be the full subcategory of double-negation sheaves. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Unity and Identity ${\cal E} \to {\cal S}$ for the two subcategories of ${\cal E}$ above, making them Adjointly Opposite. Typical examples of such ${\cal E}$ include many ‘gros’ toposes in Algebraic Geometry, simplicial sets and other toposes of ‘combinatorial’ spaces in Algebraic Topology, and certain models of Synthetic Differential Geometry.
The forcing theorem is the most fundamental result about set forcing, stating that the forcing relation for any set forcing is definable and that the truth lemma holds, that is everything that holds in a generic extension is forced by a condition in the relevant generic filter. We show that both the definability (and, in fact, even the amenability) of the forcing relation and the truth lemma can fail for class forcing.
In addition to these negative results, we show that the forcing theorem is equivalent to the existence of a (certain kind of) Boolean completion, and we introduce a weak combinatorial property (approachability by projections) that implies the forcing theorem to hold. Finally, we show that unlike for set forcing, Boolean completions need not be unique for class forcing.
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