Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on contributors
- Chronology
- List of abbreviations
- Maps
- Preface to the second edition
- Introduction
- 1 The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure
- 2 Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948
- 3 The Druze and the birth of Israel
- 4 Israel and the Arab coalition in 1948
- 5 Jordan and 1948: the persistence of an official history
- 6 Iraq and the 1948 War: mirror of Iraq's disorder
- 7 Egypt and the 1948 War: internal conflict and regional ambition
- 8 Syria and the Palestine War: fighting King ʿAbdullah's “Greater Syria Plan”
- 9 Collusion across the Litani? Lebanon and the 1948 War
- 10 Saudi Arabia and the 1948 Palestine War: beyond official history
- 11 Afterword: the consequences of l948
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Middle East Studies
7 - Egypt and the 1948 War: internal conflict and regional ambition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on contributors
- Chronology
- List of abbreviations
- Maps
- Preface to the second edition
- Introduction
- 1 The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure
- 2 Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948
- 3 The Druze and the birth of Israel
- 4 Israel and the Arab coalition in 1948
- 5 Jordan and 1948: the persistence of an official history
- 6 Iraq and the 1948 War: mirror of Iraq's disorder
- 7 Egypt and the 1948 War: internal conflict and regional ambition
- 8 Syria and the Palestine War: fighting King ʿAbdullah's “Greater Syria Plan”
- 9 Collusion across the Litani? Lebanon and the 1948 War
- 10 Saudi Arabia and the 1948 Palestine War: beyond official history
- 11 Afterword: the consequences of l948
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Middle East Studies
Summary
This chapter examines Arab historiography on Egypt's role in the 1948 Palestine War in order to disentangle myth from reality. Most Arab writers allocate the largest share of the blame for defeat in Palestine to the old regimes and marshal arguments and evidence to prove their incompetence, corruption, and treachery. Had the Arab world been ruled by more determined and nationalist leaders, so the argument runs, the war would have been won and the state of Israel would not have been born. Arab historiography called into question the very legitimacy of the old political order in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan. The defeat of the Arab states in 1948 represented one of the final nails in the coffin of the old ruling social and political classes. Intentionally or not, Arab writers played an important part in legitimizing the new men on horseback, who began to seize power since the late 1940s, and who promised to redeem Arab honor and prepare for a second round with Israel. Indeed, the institutionalization of militarism in the Arab world owes a great deal to the discrediting of the old regimes. Egypt was a classic case. Egyptian and Arab societies in general are still paying the price of this revolutionary transformation in Arab politics.
Egypt's decision to intervene in the Palestine War was influenced by political and tactical considerations. King Faruq decided to enter the 1948 War against the advice of his prime minister, Mahmud Nuqrashi, the army, and the major political parties. Despite the skepticism of the members of parliament and their questioning of the wisdom of intervention, they, like the king, were influenced by public sentiment and the logic of inter-Arab politics and supported Faruq's decision to enter the war.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The War for PalestineRewriting the History of 1948, pp. 150 - 175Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
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