Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The G-24
- List of Contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?
- 3 Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
- 4 Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making
- 5 Issues on IMF Governance and Representation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options
- 6 Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable
- 7 Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations
- 8 Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula
- 9 Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
- 10 Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board
- 11 Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote
- 12 Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress
Foreword
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The G-24
- List of Contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?
- 3 Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
- 4 Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making
- 5 Issues on IMF Governance and Representation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options
- 6 Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable
- 7 Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations
- 8 Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula
- 9 Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
- 10 Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board
- 11 Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote
- 12 Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress
Summary
In the Monterrey Consensus, agreed at the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, world leaders committed to broaden and strengthen the voice and participation of developing countries in international economic decision-making and norm-setting. This commitment reflected the perceived need to increase the representativeness of the Bretton Woods institutions, which operate within a governance structure largely defined six decades ago. It also reflected the need to adjust other multilateral financial institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements, to a global environment characterized by the growing importance in the world economy of a dynamic group of developing countries and to give developing countries in general, some representation in policy-making and norm-setting bodies where they have no formal participation, such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Forum.
This commitment has translated thus far into some actions and an ongoing discussion on the Bretton Woods institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have strengthened the offices of African Directors and some European countries have created an Analytical Trust Fund to support the African Chairs. These changes have been motivated by the evident concern to maintain the legitimacy of these institutions as representative global entities. The International Monetary and Financial Committee aptly summarized the major issue at stake in its communiqué of April 2005:
The IMF's effectiveness and credibility as a cooperative institution must be safeguarded and further enhanced. […]
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank , pp. xv - xviPublisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2005