Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms?
- Part I From Delegated to Constitutional Decree Authority
- Part II Constitutional Decree Authority and Conflict Between the Branches
- 6 Dancing Without a Lead: Legislative Decrees in Italy
- 7 The Pen Is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil
- Part III Absence of Conflict Over Decree
- Appendix of Constitutional Provisions Regarding Decree
- References
- Index
7 - The Pen Is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms?
- Part I From Delegated to Constitutional Decree Authority
- Part II Constitutional Decree Authority and Conflict Between the Branches
- 6 Dancing Without a Lead: Legislative Decrees in Italy
- 7 The Pen Is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil
- Part III Absence of Conflict Over Decree
- Appendix of Constitutional Provisions Regarding Decree
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
For a brief moment in 1992, the forced resignation of a Brazilian president led journalistic observers to pursue a novel angle. In Latin America's largest country, where executives have traditionally sent assemblies packing, the reverse had finally come to pass. In the aftermath of the startling “Collorgate” affair, pundits wondered aloud about a new era of legislative ascendance. Would it henceforth be Congress rather than the president that would occupy the upper ground, employing its newfound assertiveness to reshape the national agenda?
In short, no. As subsequent events have made clear, the episode of Collorgate was an aberration and, as such, an unwelcome distraction from the real problems that underlie executive–legislative relations in Brazil. Since the promulgation of a democratic constitution in 1988, both the president and Congress have struggled to define the acceptable bounds of behavior in the making of public policy. The intensity of this struggle is a testament to the deficiencies of the 1988 Charter, which has been at the center of political debate almost since its adoption. In the specific case of executive–legislative relations, the most controversial provision of the 1988 Constitution is its Article 62, which allows the president to decree “provisional measures with the force of law.”
This chapter explores the effects of post-1988 decree power on executive–legislative relations in Brazil. Its purpose is explicitly empirical.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Executive Decree Authority , pp. 197 - 230Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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