The purpose of this article is, first, to analyze certain of the obstacles JL that have principally impeded progress on the subject of disarmament over the past fifteen years and more; secondly, to suggest that these difficulties may be less likely to frustrate the conclusion of limited agreements in the field of conventional weapons alone than of the more comprehensive type of agreement that has been chiefly discussed; thirdly, to try to demonstrate that, so long as comprehensive disarmament remains unattainable, progress in regard to conventional weapons is not only more easily to be achieved but more valuable than progress in other spheres; and, finally, to discuss some of the particular fields in which it might be possible to reach useful agreements within this sphere.

This article introduces a functional typology of political orientations. The term “political orientations” is used here to refer to politically relevant symbols, whether cognitive, evaluative, or affective. It is equivalent to any one or any combination of the value, belief, and expressive symbol components of Parsons' cultural system that have political relevance. 1 The typology is not concerned with the specification of the substance or components of political orientations. Rather, it represents an effort to identify their functional significance.

Is regional cooperation feasible within Southeast Asia? The idea continues to have vitality, although most of the attempts to make use of the concept in this area have so far met with little apparent success. The Colombo Plan, SEATO, and the Bandung Conference are reminders only of the most prominent efforts to apply "regionalism" to the area. As early as 1947, the Burmese nationalist, Aung San, urged greater cooperation among Southeast Asian states, but his ideas had no lasting effect. And despite the many more formal proposals made since 1947, the area continues to be Balkanized. Yet today regional proposals seem to be proliferating and, for this reason, it is important that the obstacles to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should be well understood. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established, and the Malaysia plan, incorporating Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories, was put into effect in September 1963. In addition, and largely as a result of problems connected with the Malaysia proposals, "Maphilindo" was formed during June and July 1963. This is a loose consultative grouping of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. On a wider scale, there have been some proposals to organize an Asian Common Market; and the United Nations, through its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), seems to be urging certain forms of regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.1

After an eclipse of nearly two centuries, the ancient doctrine of Yst war has received renewed attention and interest in the twentieth century, primarily as the result of two conditions in the contemporary world. First, a new international system has come into being, replacing the European balance-of-power system of the recent past; and, secondly, modern technology has created military weapons without precedent in destructive capabilities, thereby radically altering the techniques and even the rationale of warfare. It will be the purpose of this article to examine the current status of the doctrine of just war to determine its viability for modern international politics and law. Specifically, the intent is to determine how relevant the doctrine may be to the two characteristic political conditions of our era just noted. A very brief historical review of the doctrine's development and demise will permit a fuller discussion of modern attitudes toward the subject.1

Chinese Communist military policy significantly affects our preparations for war and hopes for peace. However, we have few public studies of Chinese military policy and the reasoning on which it rests.1 This article tries to set forth the calculus or rationale which Peking employs to select military strategy and tactics. In other words, it makes no attempt to attack or defend Chinese military policy or to appraise that policy's specific strengths and weaknesses. It does try to locate the important factors that operate in the minds of Chinese decision-makers and Peking's perception of the consequences of different tactical choices. When we say that the Chinese have a calculus for military policy, we do not mean to imply that it works well or badly. We do imply that the Chinese have a military calculus which imposes a predictable pattern on their military policy. Obviously, an identical military calculus does not operate in the minds of all Chinese leaders. Accordingly, “Peking thinks” is shorthand for the “averaged” views that can be induced from the public record of Chinese words and acts.

Dr. Nolte's Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche is a work of exceptionally broad range that combines description, comparison, and interpretation in an admirable manner. It attempts three major tasks requiring skills rarely combined in a single historian: a general classification of Fascist systems aiming at a typology; a special examination of the main features of one pre-Fascist (Action Française) and two Fascist movements (in Mussolini's Italy and in Hitler's Germany); and an overall interpretation, in both historical and philosophical terms, of fascism as the dominant force of the period of European history extending from 1919 to 1945.

WHEN men define the future as radically unprecedented, how can they prepare to cope with it? Statesmen have traditionally been students of history, on the assumption that history is full of precedents for the future. But even when statesmen are ready to agree that reading history may be useless, it is not easy to find substitutes. Statesmen are not likely to prefer learning from science fiction. Many of them are now prepared to accept at one level of consciousness that thermonuclear weapons have made history obsolete as a guide to action; but there is no agreement on whether adequate substitutes for history have been created.

UNTIL recently most of the books by disarmers said little about the dirty business of nuclear strategy and most strategists made only occasional references to the Utopia of disarmament. And so it also was with the actual policies—military vs. disarmament—of the nuclear nations. So long as this split persisted there was little chance of disarmament being seriously considered, and so long as the best military analysts considered nuclear weapons useful and even vital to Western defense—as a great many of them did—there was little hope for nuclear disarmament. But in the last few years this split between armers and disarmers has begun to be bridged by an increasing number of men who analyze from both perspectives at once, and by a shift in the consensus on the specific question of the usefulness of nuclear weapons— a shift largely reflecting the steady increase in Soviet nuclear power. These trends were given a considerable assist from these two excellent works by eminent Englishmen, both of whom assume that nuclear parity (and therefore, they believe, nuclear uselessness) is upon us, and both of whom are concerned with deterrence and disarmament, and how to get from one to the other.

ARE there any connections between epistemological theories and JTXpolitical doctrines? This question is of more than theoretical interest. If such links exist, it follows that concrete political events are influenced, not only directly by political ideologies, but also, at least indirectly, by abstract philosophical beliefs.