The area of corporate disregard has a poor reputation for certainty of reasoning. To provide an alternative way of approaching the issue, we conducted an empirical study of the relationship between rationale and outcome within UK corporate disregard cases from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. We examine the evidence from three perspectives. First, we examine the broad range of instrumental rationales found in the case law by disregard rates in order to identify where issues might be arising with individual rationales. Secondly, as suggested in the wider empirical literature, we examine the rationale rates by jurisdiction in order to see whether there were problematic interpretation issues concentrated in particular parts of the court levels. Thirdly, we examine the rationale rates by substantive claim to see whether contextual aspects of the doctrine, as the court identified with family law in Prest, were influencing outcomes. By providing an empirical study on the rationales instrumental to corporate disregard outcomes we aim to introduce a broader evidential view of where concerns may lie, which can both aid critique of key judicial historical developments such as Adams and Prest and provide a broader evidence base that might aid future judicial reform of the area.

Twenty years after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, where are we in our understanding of the relationship between tort and human rights? This paper argues that we are not as far along in our understanding as we could be. The reason for that has been the methodology we used to understand the relationship, focused as it was around remedies, limitation and causation. This paper proposes a new approach, based around the right rather than the remedy. It aims to theorise one particular cause of action – the duty in Osman v United Kingdom – to exemplify this approach. For English lawyers, who have historically used the framework of the forms of action to understand our own law, it is argued that this a good way to comprehend the European jurisprudence.

This paper examines how continued reductions in fee levels for criminal legal aid work affect recruitment and retention in the English publicly funded criminal defence profession. Data from 29 qualitative interviews with English defence solicitors and barristers are analysed to explore the impact of these reductions on recruitment of new lawyers and retention of current lawyers. On the basis of these findings, also building on research conducted by lawyer professional associations, I argue that a combination of cuts to legal aid, the resulting working patterns and low morale has led to a position where the criminal defence profession, as we know it, is unsustainable.

The UK Supreme Court took the opportunity in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 to reverse the long-standing, but unpopular, test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh. It reduced the relevance of subjectivity in the test of dishonesty, and brought the civil and the criminal law approaches to dishonesty into line by adopting the test as laid down in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. This paper employs extensive legal historical research to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was too quick to dismiss the significance of the historical roots of dishonesty. Through an innovative and comprehensive historical framework of fraud, this paper demonstrates that dishonesty has long been a central pillar of the actus reus of deceptive offences. The recognition of such significance permits us to situate the role of dishonesty in contemporary criminal property offences. This historical analysis further demonstrates that the Justices erroneously overlooked centuries of jurisprudence in their haste to unite civil and criminal law tests for dishonesty.

Local community opposition to environmentally significant development proposals is commonplace, with environmental issues often at the forefront of community concerns. Whilst the development consent system provides multiple opportunities for local community groups to participate in the initial decision-making process, a legal commitment to such participation ensures neither its quality nor its effectiveness. This is especially so for local group ‘have-nots’ who lack resource and expertise, and whose focus on locally-based objections can delegitimise their valid and often broader concerns about the proposed development. This paper argues that access to legal expertise plays a significant role in promoting principles of fairness and competence in participation by helping shape local opposition views in a way that is both understood and accepted as valid by the planning system. Whilst there are important and valuable sources of advice and support currently available, many local groups find themselves in the position of having to raise considerable funds to pay for the legal expertise they need. This unsatisfactory position needs to be addressed if local groups are to meaningfully engage with the planning process.

In recent years, it has become common to see claims that the doctrine of legitimate expectations has no sufficiently defined purpose, and that administrative law scholars should do more theoretical work to bring coherence to this area of law. In this paper, I suggest this ‘conceptual critique’ of legitimate expectations is misplaced and that, instead, it reveals a much wider failing of contemporary administrative law scholarship. First, I show how there has not yet been, and is unlikely to be, a satisfactory answer to the conceptual critique. Following on from this premise, I suggest that the assumptions underlying the conceptual critique are faulty and, administrative lawyers need to fundamentally alter and expand how they study legitimate expectations. The aim now, I argue, must be to move towards providing an account of the practice of legitimate expectations in the wider context of public administration. My specific argument in this paper is thus a case for a significant reorientation and an expansion of the study of how law protects legitimate expectations, but the wider suggestion is that the same shift is required in administrative law scholarship generally.

War crimes allegations have dogged the UK military for decades. Yet there is no settled process to deal with them. Different legal responses deployed have all suffered from complaints of unfairness. This paper proposes foundations for a more satisfactory approach based on an existing three-part consensus. First, that norms governing individual and systemic conduct in military conflict are relatively undisputed; secondly, that the state has a non-negotiable investigatory duty should a suspected breach occur; and thirdly, that any investigation should take into account the context within which it is conducted. The paper then advances three propositions: (1) first order principles of practicability, expertise, and investigator independence should provide the non-negotiable foundations of any response; (2) second order or subsidiary principles including promptness, adequacy, reasonable transparency, and respect for basic standards of natural justice should apply when practicable; and (3) a standing institution designed to comply with the first and second order principles would provide a fairer process for all participants (accused, victim and the wider national and international communities) whilst also fulfilling coherence and legal certainty requirements. The paper concludes that current structures cannot fulfil these demands and it explores the basis for a better alternative.

Coexisting and eye-watering levels of food abundance, waste, overconsumption and hunger are symptomatic of a broken food system punctuated by vested interests in systematic overproduction. Against that backdrop, this paper evaluates England's ‘new’ approach to food waste in light of concerns that policy-makers have framed food waste as a consumer behaviour problem, rather than a structural challenge. The Resources and Waste Strategy's acknowledgement of normalised overproduction is thus remarkable, but unexpected. However, frame critical analysis reveals how an apparent departure from preoccupations with economic growth, combined with promises of government action, obscure an ongoing reluctance to intervene against powerful interests and the causes (not symptoms) of food waste. Legislative proposals, rather than reducing surplus, shift the burden of redistributing food away from the state and retailers, on to charities and farmers. With England, perhaps wrongly, seen as a world-leader on food waste, this has implications for other jurisdictions, as well as forthcoming consultations.