In this article we defend the importance of the concept of ‘stateness’ in scholarly understanding of political democratization. We argue that because processes of political democratization in different spatio-temporal settings often share important similarities they are therefore comparable. We investigate this proposition by comparing the process of American political democratization with those of other liberal democracies, old and new. We review extant accounts of the historical process of American democratization – including those addressing American exceptionalism, class structures, multiple traditions, social movements, and international pressures – before presenting an alternative comparative account based on the idea of stateness. Attention to stateness problems defined along legal, bureaucratic and ideological dimensions and derived from both the classic Weberian perspective on the state and the more recent ‘third wave’ of democratization theory help to place the long American experience of democratization in comparative perspective. This finding illuminates some of the common political challenges in the construction of liberal democracies, old and new.

Theory suggests that three factors – the importance of ideology to primary voters, costly movement due to candidate reputations and lack of competition – all contribute to candidate divergence in US congressional elections. These predictions are analysed with new data from a 2000 mail survey that asked congressional candidates to place themselves on a left–right ideological scale. The data reveal that candidates often diverge, but that the degree of candidate polarization is variable and may be explained by factors in the theory. Candidates with firm public reputations, those who face weak general election competition, and those who experience stiff primary competition are all more likely to deviate from the median voter's position. Perhaps more importantly, the locations that candidates adopt have clear effects on their vote shares.

Does their need for greater tax revenue force governments to democratize? Most research on contemporary democratization says little about the effects of taxation. Yet there are good reasons to believe that taxation led to representation in the past: representative government first came about in early modern Europe when monarchs were compelled to relinquish some of their authority to parliamentary institutions, in exchange for the ability to raise new taxes; similarly, the war for independence in the United States began as a rebellion against British taxes. Some scholars argue that a comparable process is occurring today: the need to raise taxes forces authoritarian governments to democratize. These claims have never been carefully tested. In this article, the ‘taxation leads to representation’ argument is explored and tested using pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 countries between 1971 and 1997. One version of the argument appears to be valid, while another does not. These findings are important both for scholars who wish to understand the causes of democracy, and for policy makers who wish to promote it.

Political theorists disagree about the extent to which issues of feasibility, stability, institutional design and human nature can be bracketed in analysing the concept of justice. At one end of the spectrum some argue that no analysis of justice can be adequate in the absence of an account of how it could be implemented, whereas at the other end there are those who argue that principles of justice are logically independent of issues of feasibility. Influenced by the work of John Rawls, many theorists occupy the middle ground, maintaining that analyses of justice must be realistic, that is, realizable under the best of foreseeable conditions. Against Rawls and others, this article argues that feasibility does not constrain what can count as an adequate principle of justice but nevertheless maintains that there are limits on such principles that derive in part from human nature, which divergent theories of justice must respect. It also distinguishes between different levels of analysis, some of which are governed by feasibility constraints.

The theory of delegation developed by Epstein and O'Halloran for the US federal system is used here to generate original hypotheses on the politics of delegation in the European Community (EC). It is argued that two institutional features of the Community, namely the decision rules of the Council of Ministers and the possibility of relying on both the Commission and the member states for policy implementation are at the core of the choices of delegation of EC legislators. Using an original dataset of 158 major EC legislative acts, it is demonstrated that the Council delegates greater policy authority to national institutions if legislation is adopted unanimously or in issue areas that require specialized and technical knowledge, while it relies to a greater extent on the Commission when acts are adopted by qualified majority voting or require general managerial skills at the supranational level.

Results also show that national administrators are the main providers of policy expertise, while the informational role of the Commission appears to be secondary, though not negligible. Finally, these findings qualify propositions on the relation between veto players and bureaucratic autonomy and on that between conflict within the legislature and delegation outcomes.

A raft of new research on the causes and effects of political corruption has emerged in recent years, in tandem with a separate, growing focus on the effects of political institutions on important outcomes such as economic growth, social equality and political stability. Yet we know little about the possible role of different political institutional arrangements on political corruption. This article examines the impact of territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parliamentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption cross-nationally. We find that unitary and parliamentary forms of government help reduce levels of corruption. To explain this result, we explore a series of seven potential causal mechanisms that emerge out of the competing centralist and decentralist theoretical paradigms: (1) openness, transparency and information costs, (2) intergovernmental competition, (3) localism, (4) party competition, (5) decision rules, (6) collective action problems, and (7) public administration. Our empirical findings and our analysis of causal mechanisms suggest that centralized constitutions help foster lower levels of political corruption.

This article explores the role of organized interests in congressional elections by examining the influence of the National Rifle Association (NRA) in contested House races in 1994 and 1996. Most research on the electoral impact of organized interests reports that groups have a negligible impact on the outcome. Yet anecdotal evidence regarding NRA influence abounds, particularly in 1994. We construct an aggregate model of congressional vote share that allows us to systematically analyse the electoral impact of the NRA in 1994 and 1996 House races. Unlike previous research of this sort, we provide evidence that the NRA can have a statistically discernible effect on election outcomes, but not in all elections and for all candidates. The NRA endorsement was particularly helpful to Republican challengers in 1994 (and to some extent Republican incumbents), but much less helpful to Democrats. These effects are much reduced in 1996 for all candidates. Likewise, having lots of NRA members in the district helped Republican challengers the most (in 1994) and Democrats not at all. Finally, reasons as to why the NRA was able to amplify but not mitigate the party trend, as well as individual-level mechanisms that might produce an endorsement effect, are discussed.

In an article published in this Journal, Nadeau, Martin and Blais argue that perceptions of the costs and benefits of alternative outcomes and general orientations to risk interact to affect voters' decisions in referendums on fundamental political questions such as Quebec sovereignty. We use Nadeau et al.'s data to demonstrate that their interaction-effects model is overly complex and suffers from serious multicollinearity difficulties. A simpler main-effects model has virtually identical explanatory power and removes anomalous findings. We also argue that their model is too simple because it omits variables such as party identification, feelings about party leaders and government performance evaluations that voters use as heuristic devices to help them make decisions when stakes are high and information about the costs and benefits of referendum outcomes is low. We analyse a dataset that includes these variables and demonstrate that they have strong effects in a model of referendum voting that controls for perceived costs and benefits of alternative referendum outcomes and several other variables. Additionally, differences in the magnitudes of the perceived costs and perceived benefits of alternative referendum outcomes are not statistically significant. This latter finding contradicts widely cited experimental results in behavioural economics and related ‘asymmetry’ hypotheses concerning the presumed status quo bias in major referendums.

What are the political consequences of economic reform in new democracies? Is the effect of economic reform on democratization the same across regions? Some scholars of transitology argue that economic reform has negative consequences on democratization largely because the resistance of established groups can undermine democratization processes. Others, mainly scholars of the post-socialist region, argue that in the post-socialist region economic reform has positive consequences on political democratization due in large part to the region's distinctive historical and structural legacies. The heated debate between Philippe Schmitter with Terry Karl and Valerie Bunce provides ample opportunity to (re)think about democratization in a more contextual and cross-regional perspective. However, there has been little systematic empirical analysis across regions. This analysis attempts to fill the gap by examining whether the dominant research paradigm of democratization is empirically valid across regions in transition.

In a recent issue of this Journal Professor Yap asks whether and how governments in what she calls ‘less-democratic’ countries, that is those where elections are uncompetitive due to a lack of democratic safeguards or opposition parties, are held accountable for the effects of their policies on economic performance. She argues that governments in these countries have an interest in avoiding strife and inducing private actors to provide resources necessary for economic prosperity. Because of this, ‘when their economies are performing less than optimally, these governments tend to offer credible apologies in the same year to attenuate the potential labour disquiet and loss in production investment.’ Yap develops the concept of a credible apology as the joint occurrence of punishment of responsible actors or reparations to injured parties, and an increase in monitoring activity by non-government actors. She then presents evidence for South Korea for 1964–87 and Singapore and Malaysia for 1966–94 showing that, ceteris paribus, the tendency of production investment to decrease and strike activity to increase in years with high unemployment is offset if the government makes a credible apology.

Yap is quite clear that she assumes a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies. Indeed, such a causal relationship is necessary for the concept of accountability; the events that Yap classifies as credible apologies must be made in response to unsatisfactory economic performance in order for us to say that these governments are being held (or are holding themselves) accountable for the consequences of their policies.

I appreciate the work that Professor Lowry has put into the evaluation of the credible apologies argument presented in my article, ‘Non-Electoral Responsiveness Mechanisms’. Lowry states that I assume ‘a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies’. I am obliged to point out that this is inaccurate – I make no such assumption. What does cause the government's credible apologies? It is the need for the economic resources of labour quiescence and production investment from the respective resource-owners. Theory and empirical studies suggest that the withdrawal of such resources follows less-than-optimal economic performance; it follows, then, that governments in the less-democratic countries who need these resources are forced to pay attention to economic performance and offer credible apologies following sub-optimal economic performance.