Field data from a longitudinal study of drug dealing reveal the importance of interpersonal networks in determining the impact of criminal sanctions. The level of perceived sanction severity was in large measure dependent on the degree of disruption created in interpersonal relations and on the resilience of these relations in adapting to the sanctioning process. Perceived certainty of sanctions was likewise dependent on characteristics of interpersonal interactions. Perceived certainty and severity of sanctions combined to define the level of fear. Sanction-induced fear increased network density and closure. These network properties were largely responsible for the paradoxical impact of sanctions. The relevance of these findings for deterrence research is noted throughout.

An ecological model based on evolutionary game theory is developed to analyze the role of egoistic cooperation in regulatory enforcement. The model demonstrates that socially beneficial cooperation depends on 1) a combination of cooperative and deterrence routines in an enforcement strategy that is at once vengeful and forgiving, 2) firms concerned enough about future enforcement encounters to forgo short-term gains from evasion, and 3) institutional arrangements that provide suitable sanctions and cost tradeoffs for existing enforcement and evasion technologies in the particular enforcement arena. Factors limiting the advantage of cooperation are also reviewed, and other applications of the model are suggested.

Previous research suggests that differences in judicial decisions stem from differences in personal characteristics of the decision-maker. Dutch private law proceedings permit a research approach in which the judicial decision-making task is simulated by presenting written decisional problems to judges. Judges (N=114) made decisions on the same nine cases and completed questionnaires on role conceptions and personality.

Findings suggest that judicial decisions are only moderately influenced by the personal characteristics of the judges. The judges, however, differed considerably in their decisions. Neither the influence of personal characteristics of the judges nor the characteristics of the cases can explain to a substantial extent the differences in the decisions. It was concluded that judicial decisions stem from an interaction of personal and case characteristics.

This paper investigates the role of “relational distance” between complainant and offender as a determinant of legal sanctions in juvenile status offender cases. After reviewing evidence suggesting that greater relational distance is associated with harsher sanctioning, I develop the case for an alternative “relational resource” hypothesis, which emphasizes that conflicts among proximate parties entail an intrinsic loss of resources for the accused. This hypothesis is supported by status offense data from four decision points in the juvenile justice system which show, with some variation across decision points, that youth who are the subject of parent-initiated complaints fare consistently worse than youth accused by the police. The available evidence suggests that this is not explained by the possibility that parental accusations only occur when behavior is especially serious. Analyses of temporary detention and court disposition data reveal higher-order interactions that suggest that the impact of the complainant's identity is partially contingent on the formality of agency procedures and on the family's circumstances.

The concept of “reflexive law” contains two mutually contradictory elements: a doctrine of legal restraint and the notion that restraint can be achieved by procedural rather than substantive regulation. This critique argues that new procedures have historically not replaced substantive regulation but instead have repeatedly introduced more substantive and more formal regulations. Teubner's thesis that “reflexive law” manifests an “evolutionary tendency” is refuted, just as is the claim that his thesis could be inferred from sociological theories such as those of Luhmann or Habermas. As is so often the case in legal theory, “evolutionism” is used as a mask for the legitimation of presumably “progressive” legal ideas.

In this rejoinder, I try to clarify and to develop further the concept of “reflexive law” by expanding its theoretical framework. I make use of the theory of autopoietic systems—a recently developed version of system theory. Legal autonomy and social autonomy turn out to be the crucial concepts. Their reformulation in terms of closed, self-referential, and self-reproductive structures leads to the core problem for a post-interventionist law: Can the law adapt its internal models of social reality to the autopoietic organization of legally regulated social systems?