The purpose of this work is to explicate Thomas Aquinas' teaching regarding the nature of satisfaction, punishment, and the relation between the two in the Passion of Christ. This task is undertaken as a response to recent treatments of Aquinas' soteriology that misinterpret his understanding of the penal nature of Christ's work of satisfaction. I argue that Aquinas' explication of Christ's ‘satisfactory punishment’ on the cross does not reduce the salvific significance of the Passion to the mere endurance of a penalty in order to fulfill an arbitrary legal requirement, nor does it reflect a notion of God as wrathful and delighting in human suffering. Rather, the punishment that constitutes the Passion is a complex reality that is willed by God and chosen by Christ as a fitting means of attaining the end of his saving mission, namely, the healing and elevation of sinners.

Having spent my professional career in England I am more familiar with English poetry than with Welsh and so one of my great pleasures now is reading Welsh poetry. A book I have read and re-read more than once is The Poems of Saunders Lewis. There the poem that has gripped me and still does is this great poem. Apparently, it received much attention when it was published - three articles by D. Z. Phillips with a reply and a note by the poet commenting on the background influences. Without returning to that, I want to note the importance of the influence. Simple though the language may be, the poem is full of philosophical and theological ideas together with a keen awareness of Biblical study.

The recent resurrection and rediscovery of Gilson's early political writings broaden the traditional view of Gilson by allowing us to see him as a serious, engaged, political thinker. This essay traces the background of Gilson's early political thought, the beginnings of a dramatic change both in Gilson's activity and writings in the late 1920s, possible reasons for that change, and focuses on Gilson's Pour un ordre catholique (For the Establishment of a Catholic Order). This emblematic work of Gilson's early political thought, which is a practical application of his Christian philosophy, remains relevant to addressing serious religious and political issues confronting Catholics today.

There has been a resurgence of interest in Mister Rogers, the person behind Mister Rogers' Neighborhood. The interest goes beyond stories of a famous television personality. There is a sense that Mister Rogers is needed today. U. S. culture is experiencing high levels of fear and anxiety, divisions and hostilities. Mister Rogers offers more than 'niceness' but a demanding theology. This theology offers tools for both diagnosing and treating our contemporary situation. Rogers believes that people have a need for acceptance and love, a vulnerability that is fundamental to our humanity. When this need is not met, people can turn in on themselves or lash out at others. Their fear can flow out into society and make it increasingly hostile. Rogers' treatment begins with the principle of specialness. People need to know that they are loved and accepted, and the affirmation of specialness meets this need. The principle also calls people to recognize the specialness in others, to love as they need to be loved. Rogers’ principle sets in motion a system of circulating love. Instead of unleashing hostility, Rogers' call to specialness unleashes empathy so more and more people are brought into the dynamics of love.

In this paper, I explore Kant's much-studied critique of the ontological argument, seeking to place Immanuel Kant and Anselm of Canterbury more directly in contact with one another; I do this in two ways. First, I discuss the historical reception of the ontological argument in Kant's eighteenth century context. Second, I move the discussion away from the first Critique, and look towards Kant's Pre-critical discussion of the ontological argument in The Only Possible Argument, where he initially sets out his primary objection. By shifting the focus towards these areas of Kant's thought, I aim to achieve three interrelated goals. First, I show that Kant had a limited knowledge of the history and origins of the ontological argument, which was transmitted to him through Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, who put a Cartesian spin on it. Second, I provide textual evidence which shows that Kant's objection does not succeed against Anselm's argument. Third, I elucidate that Kant's identification of God as the ens realissimum is compatible with Anselm's identification of God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’.

This essay investigates one aspect of the relationship between contemporary apologetics and cultural studies. It begins with a consideration of Avery Dulles’ famous History of Apologetics. While noting the many virtues of Dulles’ work, it critiques his lack of attention to the role of imagination, emotion, narrative, and personal testimony. The essay argues that Dulles’ work shows how constricted the study of apologetics has often been in comparison with its practice. The essay goes on to note recent developments in research into apologetics which have begun to apply recent philosophical and theological interest in narrative, imagination, and the emotions to this field. It explores the increasingly sophisticated conceptual apparatus available for this task, in particular the concepts of the Social Imaginary and the Overton Window. Finally, the essay attempts a dialogue with certain aspects of secular advocacy, in relation to the role of emotion in the public square. It concludes that the use of conceptual resources from other disciplines, and engagement in dialogue with secular advocacy, may be of benefit to apologetics.

This paper reflects on the context of lockdown in a global pandemic, where entire populations have experienced severe curtailments of the opportunity to exercise agency. The experience has made me notice the surprisingly large role that resignation has played in Christian moral thinking in earlier ages. This paper takes the devotional poetry of George Herbert as a case study, since Herbert had a particular preoccupation with the psychology of religious belief in circumstances where the will cannot be deployed to any end. Herbert reflects on the predicament in which the moral life has to continue even though opportunities for the exercise of agency have collapsed. After examining Herbert's poems of affliction, I conclude by setting out a brief case for understanding resignation as a moral practice – a practice that centres not on the will but on imagination and the emotions.

This article offers a critical discussion of Ian Ker's book Newman on Vatican II (2014).