This paper examines issues that came before the Appellate Body in two disputes, US–Zeroing (EC) and the US–Zeroing (Japan). The core issue in both the disputes involves the US Department of Commerce's practice of zeroing. The scope of the claims in both cases was considerably broader than in the previous WTO disputes involving zeroing. The two arguments in support of the practice were that (a) the practice of zeroing has been a standard administrative practice for many years and (b) the Antidumping Agreement does not clearly prohibit it and hence deference must be given to national authorities. While, the Appellate Body was arguably correct in prohibiting the use of zeroing under the main methods of Article 2.4.2 AD Agreement as well as in various reviews, we consider that it overreached in considering zeroing to be in violation of Article 2.4 AD Agreement and possibly as inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, exceptional method. Finally, while the AB found zeroing in reviews violated Article 2.4.2 AD Agreement, we believe it would have been preferable for the AB to have limited its findings of inconsistency to Article 9.3 AD Agreement.

This article analyzes the decision of the WTO's Appellate Body in the dispute between Japan and Korea over Japan's imposition of countervailing duties on DRAMs imported from Korea. The legal analysis comments on the analysis of evidence, the lack of remand authority in the WTO system, and the meaning of a ‘direct transfer of funds’. The economic analysis discusses several issues related to determining the magnitude of the benefit to a firm of a financial bailout and the appropriate duration of a countervailing duty to offset the injury caused by a non-recurrent subsidy. We offer legal and economic criticisms of the Appellate Body's conclusion regarding the relationship between subsidies and injury to the domestic import-competing industry. We conclude that the Appellate Body's decision weakens the requirement of a causal link between subsidies and injury and, consequently, may open the door to protectionist abuse of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.