Measures restricting data flows outside one's borders, including mandatory data/server localization measures, are not only a barrier to trade, but also largely ineffective in achieving better internet security or trust. Nevertheless, governments deploy such measures, primarily on grounds of cybersecurity and privacy, potentially violating their obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In this article, I investigate whether GATS-inconsistent measures may be justified under GATS Art. XIV when aimed at ensuring privacy or cybersecurity, and, if so, whether GATS Art. XIV effectively balances trade and internet policy. As the internet governance framework is complex and somewhat ambiguous, applying GATS Art. XIV to cybersecurity/privacy measures necessitates balancing of trade liberalization principles and domestic internet policy. This exercise can be effective in weeding out data localization measures disguised as privacy/cybersecurity measures, particularly by employing relevant technical and factual evidence. However, given the lack of binding international law/norms on these issues, GATS Art. XIV has a limited role, particularly in cases involving direct conflict between multistakeholder/transnational internet norms and domestic internet policies, or where the measures are founded on contentious standards/benchmarks on privacy/cybersecurity. Ultimately, ensuring free and secure data flows requires a multidimensional policy response, including strengthening linkages between trade law and internet governance.

It has long been established in theory that uncertainty impacts on firm behaviour. However, the empirical basis for quantifying the uncertainty-reducing effects of trade agreements has not been firmly established. In this paper, we develop estimates of the effect of reducing uncertainty regarding regulation of foreign services markets by making commitments that are bound under a trade agreement. Specifically, we identify the effect on services trade of services trade restrictions, as measured by the OECD's Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), and the separate effect of ‘water’ in binding commitments, as assessed by the difference between countries’ commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or free trade agreements (FTAs) and applied levels of market access, as captured by STRI scores. Using a gravity model, we find that services trade responds positively but inelastically to reductions in services trade barriers, as measured by the STRI and, in our preferred regression, the response to actual restrictions is more than twice – specifically 2.4 times – as strong as the response to comparable reductions in uncertainty, as measured by water. Moving from GATS commitments to FTA commitments leads to a 4.7% increase in services trade because of the reduction in uncertainty.

In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, European Union regulators introduced the mechanism of ‘third-country equivalence’ for non-European financial institutions to access the EU internal market. This article evaluates for the first time the GATS-consistency of the European rules on third-country clearinghouses. Through this exercise, the article sheds light on the tension between financial regulation and WTO law, exploring how these two different disciplines can be reconciled. Building on the international economic law principles of non-discrimination and transparency, the analysis reveals that the European financial regulation could negatively impact the access of smaller countries to the EU market. The regulation in question is assessed under the GATS Article VI (Domestic Regulation), Article II (MFN), Article VII (Recognition), and the Annex on Financial Services prudential carve-out. The findings of the European case study indicate that the vast flexibility that trade law has delegated to national regulators possibly has adverse effects on the liberalization of financial services. The article concludes that if WTO Members do not derogate from their GATS obligations and commitments, the stability of the financial system would not be jeopardized, while the prospect of international integration would be increased.

The suspended provisions of Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP will not substantially affect the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Chapter 17 on State-owned enterprises (SOEs). As a consequence, the original TPP scheme remains an important treaty model and poses complex questions notwithstanding a growing literature. This article discusses TPP but unlike current writings which focus on comparative treaty methods of SOE regulation, we focus on how TPP/CPTPP will actually operate, paying attention to how its framers have defined an SOE not least in how they have viewed complex crossholdings, excluded non-profits, and preserved a role for State monopolies. Our answers differ from some of the existing literature – particularly on complex cross-holdings. We also provide detailed illustrations of how TPP's non-discrimination, commercial basis, and non-commercial assistance rules might work and comment on the chances of a rule cascade triggered by TPP, particularly in the current state of heightened Sino-American rivalry and allegations of State control in China's economy.

Geographical indications (GIs), signs used on products that identify their geographical origin and special quality or reputation, are atypical intellectual property. The conflicts of interest between the New World and Old World and the diversity of legal regimes have obstructed the international harmonization of GI protection. Neither the Lisbon Agreement nor the TRIPS Agreement have been able to establish a widely accepted international GI registration or protection system. Though the Geneva Act has remarkably improved the treaty regime of GIs, the different approaches of the European Union and United States still seem irreconcilable. This article examines the Chinese dual GI system from a treaty perspective and explores the common functions of GIs and Trademarks, concluding that China's Trademark Law can ensure GI protection that is compliant with the TRIPS Agreement and the Geneva Act. The Chinese solution can be a reference for other countries which protect GIs with a trademark system.

This article examines the effectiveness of the framework for the resolution of intra-African cross-border commercial disputes, arising from the projected increase in intra-African trade in goods, services, and investments under the African Continental Free Trade Area. It examines the peculiar nature of intra-African trade and of the participating entities to provide the context to discuss the three major processes adopted in commercial dispute resolution (litigation, mediation, and arbitration) in Africa. It then argues for the promotion of arbitration as the dispute resolution process of choice for such disputes. It reimagined the framework for arbitration at the continental level and made two proposals targeted at the greater efficiency of the process: the designation of Regional Arbitration Centres across the African Union's eight recognized Regional Economic Communities, to administer such references; and the establishment of an African Commercial Court as a one-stop court for the enforcement or annulment of the final award.

These compliance proceedings concern a second revised measure adopted by the United States regarding the labelling of dolphin-safe tuna products (the 2016 Tuna Measure). The 2016 Tuna Measure places three types of conditions on the use of the dolphin-safe label: (i) conditions relating to the automatic disqualification of certain tuna products (eligibility criteria); (ii) conditions relating to certifications (certification requirements); and (iii) conditions relating to record keeping and segregation of dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe tuna (tracking and verification requirements). Regarding the eligibility criteria, tuna harvested using large-scale driftnets on the high seas and tuna products containing tuna harvested by setting on dolphins anywhere in the world are automatically disqualified for the dolphin-safe label. Regarding the certification and tracking/verification requirements, the 2016 Tuna Measure makes a distinction between the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) large purse seine fishery, on the one hand, and all other fisheries, on the other hand.

This compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) concerned measures adopted by the United States to comply with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations and rulings in US–Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint). The types of measures at issue that were found to have caused adverse effects to the European Union (EU, formerly European Communities) in the original Panel and Appellate Body proceedings were NASA aeronautics R&D instruments; United States Department of Defence (DOD) military research instruments (‘assistance instruments’); the business and occupancy (B&O) tax rate reduction in the State of Washington in relation to Boeing's production of the 787; property and sales tax abatements related to Industrial Revenue Bonds issued by the City of Wichita, Kansas; and the FSC/ETI subsidies.

The dispute concerns a challenge by Ukraine of certain measures imposed by Russia concerning conformity assessment procedures for railway products, produced in Ukraine and exported to Russia. Ukraine alleged that the Russian measures prevented imports from Ukraine into Russia. For example, Russia was accused of suspending Ukrainian suppliers’ certificates of conformity, as well as refusing to process new certificate applications, due to alleged impossibility of carrying out required annual on-site inspections in Ukraine due to security concerns. These measures were subject to challenge by Ukraine under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), which applies to WTO Members’ technical regulations and related conformity assessment procedures. Two of the Appellate Body's most noteworthy findings reversing the Panel are addressed below.

The dispute concerns a challenge by Canada of certain countervailing duty measures imposed by the United States on supercalendered paper from Canada. Canada brought multiple claims under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, including a challenge of an alleged unwritten measure, pursuant to which the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) applies adverse facts available (AFA) to find countervailable subsidies in relation to unreported programs that were discovered during an investigation. In USDOC subsidy investigations, exporters are asked to report information on the use of specifically identified subsidy programs as well as whether they obtained any ‘other forms of assistance’ (OFA). It is the USDOC's conduct in applying AFA in relation to programs not reported under the OFA question that Canada challenged as an ongoing conduct (the OFA-AFA measure).

The dispute concerned anti-dumping duties imposed by Australia on two exporters of A4 copy paper from Indonesia which Indonesia claimed were inconsistent with several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Australia imposed these duties, ranging between 30% and 40%, on the basis of a comparison of constructed normal values with export prices. Those constructed values were based, for certain input items, on substitute values – prices of pulp exported by Brazilian and South American producers to China and Korea – rather than on the actual costs recorded in those exporters' financial records. These kinds of ‘cost adjustments’ currently rank among the most controversial topics in contemporary WTO anti-dumping case law.