The paper examines the efforts of several Jewish thinkers to cope with the discrepancy between the inherently theocratic principles of their religion and the modern, liberal ideas with which they wished to bring Judaism into harmony. It focuses first on Moses Mendelssohn's attempt at the end of the eighteenth century to provide a rationale for the dissolution of Judaism's coercive, collectivist dimension and to render the Jewish religion fully compatible, in practice, with liberalism. The next major focus is the recent work of David Novak, who has sought in different ways to show how one can proceed from traditional Jewish premises to the endorsement of nonliberal political arrangements that nonetheless preserve the best of liberalism's achievements. The final focus is on the Israeli religious thinker Isaiah Leibowitz's widely celebrated but in principle merely provisional relinquishment of the theocratic idea.

This essay treats the inspiration and nature of Yves Simon's philosophical life. His embrace of that life was importantly shaped by his engagement with the republican tradition in France, his passionate opposition to the fascist threat to France, and his later attachment to the aspirations of American democracy. However, his early philosophical interests took direction and inspiration from his encounter with Jacques Maritain who drew him to Thomism. His devotion to the truth was fierce, and he confronted honestly the threats to this defining quality of philosophical life from the pressures of social conformity and from the discouragement of seeing the inadequacies and disagreements in the history of philosophy. He came, as especially evident in his most influential book, Philosophy of Democratic Government, to esteem highly the virtue of prudence, seeking to protect it from both philosophy and social science.

This article offers an interpretation of British philosopher William Godwin's theory of property ownership, as outlined in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Godwin's work can be read as presenting an incoherent account of property rights, which, on the one hand, justifies its existence on seemingly utilitarian grounds while, on the other, impugns its legitimacy on egalitarian grounds. But the contradiction apparent in Godwin's position is actually illusory and can in fact be plausibly interpreted as comprising a coherent two-level understanding of political morality, wherein the right to own private property is best comprehended as a “right to do wrong.”

Post-Communist democratization continues to generate high levels of interest and scholarly debate. The dominant rubrics for the study of post-Communist transformation since the early 1990s have been provided by “democratic transition” and “democratic consolidation” theories and concepts which were mainly developed in endeavors to analyze and explain very different experiences in the Western hemisphere during the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, “the end of communist rule was unthinkingly (but almost universally) identified with the phase of democratic transition,” and “transition and consolidation have been the main concepts around which the discussion of democratization has revolved.” The books reviewed here offer stimulating changes of approach and challenge widespread “West-centric” assumptions about democracy and democratization.

While Isaiah Berlin considered himself principally as a political theorist in the liberal tradition, his was an unorthodox liberalism in both method and substance, rooted in the confluence of three traditions—British, Russian, and Jewish. Unlike many liberals, he wrestled with the tension between universalism and particularism, and also between individualism and communalities. He rejected all monistic approaches to morality (including liberal monism) but repudiated as well the moral relativism of much modern thought, espousing instead value pluralism. While we cannot arrive at a universally valid conception of the summum bonum, we can specify the summun malum—the great evils of the human condition. Berlin saw political theory as a branch of moral philosophy but drew political morality from political life rather than imposing it on politics. The range of goods and principles that human beings rightly prize cannot be combined into harmonious wholes in either our individual or collective existence. Some goods exclude others, and we must choose among them.

Michael Oakeshott, one of the most important political thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, has been understood to be a skeptical conservative, a romantic, a liberal individualist, an historian of political thought, a philosopher, a charismatic teacher. Each of these characterizations conveys something to be found in his life and work. This essay offers an intellectual portrait of his life's work from early to late through consideration of his major works from Experience and its Modes (1933) to Rationalism in Politics (1962; 1991), to the culmination in On Human Conduct (1975). His understanding of political philosophy is examined. The usefulness of the aforementioned characterizations is assessed.

In this article, I sketch a reading of Rawls's work that ties together many of the features that distinguish it from the work of other authors commemorated in this issue. On this reading, the two world wars and the Holocaust pressed the question of whether a just liberal democracy is possible. Seeking to defend reasonable faith in that possibility, Rawls developed a theory of justice for an ideally just liberal democracy. He argued that such a society is a “real possibility” because, given reasonable psychological assumptions, the basic institutions of a just society would engender the moral support of its citizens. In doing so, Rawls challenged alternative accounts of moral motivation that enjoyed some currency in the analytic philosophy of the time. The interpretation of Rawls's work defended here therefore locates him in the philosophical as well as the political history of the twentieth century.