Are professional lobbyists loyal partisans? There are thousands of professional lobbyists in Washington, D.C., who work with members of Congress and their staffs, many of whom also make contributions to congressional candidates and political parties. Although many lobbyists have backgrounds in partisan politics, they may have incentives to give money to candidates from both parties. This article finds that professional lobbyists tend to make personal contributions to their preferred party exclusively.

An unequal distribution of income and wealth is an inherent feature of all complex societies, and up to a point, a desirable one. A highly skewed distribution, however, raises questions of serious moral and practical concern: To what extent does socioeconomic inequality undermine the principle of political equality on which democratic societies are based? Under what conditions does it lead to lead to political polarization that retards economic growth or threatens the stability of democratic institutions? And under what circumstances do distributive struggles become the basis for violent social protest or rebellion?

On January 18, 1998, I walked off a plane in São Paulo, Brazil. As I cleared customs and weaved through the hot, steamy airport, the cafes and newsstands, I noticed one young woman's face on the front pages of all the newspapers and journals I passed. She was wearing a beret and hugging Bill Clinton in the photo, and her name was Monica Lewinsky. Never having heard of her before, I assumed the interest in her was specific to Brazil. Surely I would know her name if she actually mattered to anyone, I thought, and went on.

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.

In summer 2008, our Jobs Model forecast a Democratic presidential candidate two-party popular vote share of 56.6%, which would deliver the incumbent party the biggest defeat of any post-World War II contest (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2008). However, we argued, from our analysis of different experimental and observational evidence, that this unprecedented victory would be prevented by racially intolerant voters. We estimated the net racial cost of being a black candidate and corrected our overall forecast downward to 50.1% for Barack Obama. The unparalleled economic crisis, initiated after the release of our summer forecasts, prompted a reconsideration; the unique shock to the economy was no ordinary campaign perturbation. We calculated that the ensuing boost to anti-incumbent economic voting would add approximately two percentage points to the opposition; therefore, we issued a public revision of our forecast to 52.0 % for Obama (Lewis-Beck 2008). We are pleased that this final forecast fell so close to the actual result of 53.5%. Nevertheless, we contend the actual result should have been much closer to our original forecast. Given the dismal state of the polity and the economy prior to the election, the Obama victory should have been much bigger, as we show below.

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.

The Time-for-Change Model proved one of the most accurate of the 2008 presidential election forecasts run in the October PS symposium. Using three predictors—the president's approval rating at mid-year, the growth rate of real GDP during the second quarter, and the time-for-change dummy variable—the model predicted that Barack Obama would win the presidential election with 54.3% of the major-party vote. According to nearly final tabulations compiled by uselections.org, as of December 8, Obama has received just over 53.6% of the major-party vote. However, it is likely that Obama's final total will reach 53.7% of the major-party vote. Therefore, the model's current error of 0.9 percentage points is likely to decrease further. The model has now correctly predicted the winner of the popular vote in all six presidential elections since its creation in 1988.

As of January 2008, more than 400,000 people have been killed and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced in the regions of Darfur and Chad. This event has not gone unnoticed in the United States, as the 109th United States Congress (2005–2006) considered several measures in the House of Representatives to provide funding and peacekeeping forces to quell the violence in Darfur. The goal of this article is to explain individual members' of Congress (MCs') support for Darfur legislation by examining the influence of their individual, district, and institutional characteristics. The Darfur case provides the opportunity to analyze factors critical to congressional behavior in a context where there is reason to expect an MC's usual set of incentives—e.g., reelection and adherence to party—to be less prominent. In all, we contribute to congressional and foreign policy research by parceling out the determinants of congressional support for foreign policy in comparison to domestic policy.

Two ideographs make up the Japanese word gaijin, the first meaning “outside” or “out of place” and the second meaning “person.” Hence gaijin literally means an outsider or foreigner, and in polite Japanese most speakers opt for the slightly less brusque sounding gaikokujin, which places the emphasis on the foreign nation (koku) from which the alien comes. But as political scientists doing fieldwork abroad, we are all foreigners, if not because of superficial differences such as pigmentation, accent, or dress, then because of our motivations and goals—gaining information, generating and testing hypotheses, and so forth. When we speak to informants abroad—whether in Japan, India, France, or elsewhere—to further our research, we may see ourselves as 800-pound gorillas who can bring conversations to a halt, generate unwanted propositions from nearby residents, and induce stares and pointing.

Epic redistributive struggles between the rich and poor lie at the heart of prominent theories of economic development and the emergence of democracy (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The poor pursue democracy to secure credible redistribution away from wealthy elites; elites, fearing redistribution, but also the costs of revolution, decide whether to repress these efforts or to surrender to them. These theories, and the historical examples of working classes exacting redistributive or political concessions from elites, have been interpreted as suggesting that inequality and redistributive struggles should be central features of development and democratization. Where inequality is high, democracy should be unlikely to emerge, or to emerge and be unstable. Because elites in unequal societies are unwilling to adopt institutions that encourage growth and investment (such as institutions that protect non-elites from predation by elites), incomes should be lower as well.

As the other articles in this symposium demonstrate, a country's level of economic inequality is a function of a complex set of historical, geographic, economic, and political factors. Given this complexity, it is unsurprising that a country's regime type by itself does not tell us much about its level of economic inequality. The predictions of the linear tax model aside (Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies and non-democracies do not differ greatly in terms of their level and variation in inequality. Research focusing on democracies has helped identify some the sources of this variation, but inequality in authoritarian states remains relatively understudied. The growing body of work on authoritarian politics, however, provides a foundation for research in this area.

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.

Prior to the 2008 presidential election we provided forecasts of the final vote relying on a model containing only two variables: (1) the cumulated weighted growth in leading economic indicators (LEI) through the thirteenth quarter of the sitting president's term; and (2) the incumbent party candidate's share in the most recent trial-heat polls. The novelty is the reliance on the advanced reading of the economy from the quarter ending in March of the election year. (The exact equation and the exact forecast change as the poll readings get closer to the election.) Our final forecast (Erikson and Wlezien 2008) based on trial-heat polls in August was that Barack Obama would win 52.2% of the two-party popular vote. This turned out to be quite close to the Election Day outcome of 53.5% (as of December 2), a little more than one percentage point above what we predicted.

Several countries have conducted Internet voting trials in binding public elections over the past decade, including Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, Estonia—a former Soviet republic and now a full member of the European Union—has advanced the farthest in deploying Internet voting. In this article, we focus on how the Estonians have systematically addressed the legal and technical considerations required to make Internet voting a functioning voting platform, as well as the political and cultural framework that promoted this innovation. Using data from our own qualitative and quantitative studies of the Estonian experience, we consider who voted over the Internet in these elections, and the political implications of the voting platform.

The availability of relatively reliable and comparable data online and the increasing emphasis on statistical and formal research methods has led many political scientists to dismiss research in foreign countries as a waste of time and money. We leave that debate to others (see, e.g., Comparative Politics Organized Section 2005; Qualitative Methods Organized Section 2004). Instead, we offer suggestions for maximizing the contributions of fieldwork to the production of original research. We pay particular attention to research in developing countries owing to the unique challenges of undertaking research there, but we believe our insights are applicable to field research more generally.

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.

The Incumbency and National Conditions Model predicted that John McCain would receive 44.3% of the two-party presidential vote; he ended up with 46.6% (at this writing, November 13, 2008), yielding a prediction error of 2.4 points. This error is slightly smaller than the mean absolute value of the out-of-sample forecasts from 1952 to 2004 (2.68), so the 2008 election result is not anomalous in the context of this model. The addition to the model of the 2008 outcome does not generate many important changes to the coefficients, except that the significance of incumbency interaction went from 0.08 to 0.02 and the standard error and adjusted R2 of the model both indicate a slight improvement in fit.

Although collaborative research has become much more common in the social sciences, including political science, little is known about the consequences of collaboration. This article uses papers submitted to the American Political Science Review to assess whether the widely acknowledged benefits of collaboration produced papers that were more likely to be accepted for publication. The results indicate that collaboration per se made little or no difference, but that the disciplinary configuration of the authors did result in differences in the success of these submissions.

Fieldwork advice has increased and improved over the years. Yet, the bulk of political science fieldwork advice is general; it assumes that the subject to whom advice is given is simply a political scientist—in training, perhaps—with no other salient identities that might intercede (but see Mazzei and O'Brien 2005 and the PS 2006 fieldwork symposium, The Methodologies of Field Research in the Middle East, for recent exceptions). Of course in reality it is not just the fieldwork setting that varies; the relationship of the researcher to the field matters a great deal—and that may be much more dependent on our specific identities than we have previously credited. It is not simply the subjects that we study, but us as well who have to negotiate sometimes sticky issues of race, class, gender, nationality, and so forth.

While the world is focused on the economic impact of the financial and credit meltdown, what might be its impact on politics? In well-established democracies, probably not more than elections lost by incumbent parties seen as having mismanaged the economy. But what of consolidating democracies that predominate in the developing world, where some forecasts expect the crisis to hit the poor especially hard? This article uses AmericasBarometer survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean drawn on the eve of the crisis to project how it might affect democracy in the region.

Kathleen B. Jones, in her now famous essay about women-friendly polities, explains that that citizenship must be redefined to include a body that does not “easily fit military-corporate uniforms” (1990, 794). Jones calls theorists to recognize women's “embodied lives,” and in doing so, considers how “women's bodies are problematic” and “sex/gendered identity affects … life” (786). We argue here that recognizing women's embodied lives is similarly important to a discussion of gender and fieldwork. As researchers in the field, we have been defined by our social position as women, thus putting us at distinct disadvantages and advantages (Sundberg 2003).

In 2005 the Republican-controlled General Assembly redrew Georgia's congressional districts in order to gain additional seats in the 2006 midterm election. In this article we present a case study of the effects of redistricting on turnout and vote choice in Georgia's District 8 in the 2006 U.S. House election. It is apparent both from our findings and an elite interview, that unlike the more aggressive strategy employed by Texas Republicans in 2003, Georgia Republicans tried to thread the needle in their goal of winning District 8. Conventional wisdom suggests that if a political party controls redistricting it will maximize its electoral opportunities. But this was not the case in Georgia.

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.

At its most basic level, the Economic Expectations and Time-for-a-Change Model performed well in that it successfully forecast a Barack Obama victory. It was in estimating the two-party vote that the model underperformed. The point estimate was off by just under five percentage points. While not terrible, the model did not perform as well as it did in earlier years.

This article presents the results from a survey of political science department chairs regarding the tenure procedures and standards at their colleges or universities. The findings reveal that only a small fraction of the colleges and universities in the United States refuse to offer tenure or are attempting to limit tenure. We also find general agreement regarding the standards for evaluating teaching and service and that research expectations vary according to the highest degree offered by a department.