In this article I want to address a number of issues thrust into the open by different manifestations of Islamist politics and the intersection of religion and identity politics in Western societies. This intersection should be read in conjunction with the emergence in Muslim-majority societies of forms of political activism that ground themselves in Islamic doctrines and invoke religious traditions as frames of reference. It is necessary in reading the contentions surrounding Muslim identity politics in Western settings that we take into account factors shaping the dynamics of interaction between Western countries and Muslim societies, not least among which are the long-standing historical relations associated with the colonial experience and its aftermath.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference, Diversity and National Identity in the European Union: Multicultural Challenges, at the Instituto Portuges de Relaçoes Internacionais, University Nova de Lisboa. Lisbon, March 22–23, 2007, Lisbon. This revised version benefited from presentations by Nacira Guénif-Souilamas and Schirin Amir-Moazami at the workshop, Conceptions of Islam, University of Bergen, August 27–31 2007, Bergen.

When I first was asked to write this piece about “double conferencing,” I immediately went to my vita. Looking at the evidence Nelson Dometrius presented introducing this symposium and placing myself on the degree year list, I found I was in the center of the controversy, having received my degree in 1998. Had I committed the crime of presenting the same paper at two conferences? I skimmed my CV, and yes, there it was: an identically titled paper at both a national and a section conference. Granted, this was the only one I could find on my CV, there was only a month between the two conferences, and we had made some changes based on feedback. However, there was more than enough overlap to place me among the group of violators.

Political science as a discipline has largely ignored research regulatory policies associated with institutional review boards (IRBs). Many political scientists—especially those in the senior ranks—are either oblivious to the existence of IRBs or actively decide to sidestep them by not submitting their proposals for review. Based on research conducted since 2004, we hold that APSA members at all ranks of the profession, along with political scientists worldwide, need to be concerned, not to say alarmed, about IRB policy. Why this sense of urgency, and why now?

The trial-heat forecasting equation grew out of an examination of Gallup's trial-heat polls (“if the election were held today, who would you vote for?”) at various points in election years as predictors of the November vote (Campbell and Wink 1990). My co-author Ken Wink and I found, not surprisingly, that polls as literal forecasts were not very accurate until just before the election, that taking the historical relationship between the polls and votes into account through a bivariate regression significantly increased their accuracy, and that taking the contemporary context of the election as measured by economic growth in the election year into account increased their accuracy even further. Corroborating Lewis-Beck and Rice's earlier finding (Lewis-Beck 1985, 58), we found that an equation combining the Labor Day trial-heat poll standing of the in-party candidate and the second-quarter growth rate in the economy produced the most accurate forecast of the national two-party popular vote.

On the eve of the election, the impending result of the presidential vote can be seen fairly clearly from trial-heat polls. Earlier in the election year, the polls offer much less information about what will happen on Election Day (see Campbell 2008; Wlezien and Erikson 2002). The polls capture preferences to the moment and do not—because they cannot—anticipate how preferences will evolve in the future, as the campaign unfolds. Various things ultimately impact the final vote. The standing of the sitting president is important. The economy is too. Both can change as the election cycle evolves. To make matters worse, late-arriving economic shocks have a bigger impact on the electoral verdict than those that arrive earlier. This complicates accurately forecasting the vote well in advance.

The governance of research ethics in Canada, including its research ethics boards (REBs), which correspond to the institutional review boards in the U.S., often is portrayed as an exemplary model of cross-disciplinary cooperation and consultation that is altruistically striving to protect research subjects from abuses in biomedical, social sciences, and humanities research. While there is indeed a great deal of altruism and good intention among those involved in this governance, power and interests also play a role that is of particular concern for political scientists. Governance arrangements have been driven by biomedical research, which is vastly better funded than social sciences and humanities (SSH) research. These arrangements have been imposed on the SSH research community with little sensitivity to the distinctive problems of SSH research, despite concerns about such problems that political scientists and other SSH researchers have expressed for a decade. A recent proposal initiated by major research funders to dramatically strengthen research ethics governance has generated even more alarm.

An increase in the number of political science papers that are presented at multiple academic conferences does not, as Nelson Dometrius recognizes, constitute one of the major existential crises of the twenty-first century. Indeed, I doubt that it would even make it onto anyone's list of the top hundred issues currently confronting the discipline of political science. Nonetheless, it does warrant more attention than it has received in the past (which, insofar as I am aware, is approximately none at all).

If it is assessed against an objective of reducing the number of Muslims recruited or inspired to commit terrorist acts in the name of al-Qaeda, then the U.S.-led, UK-backed war on terror launched in the aftermath of 9/11 has failed demonstrably. This performance-related assessment, as William Tupman and Carina O'Reilly argue, favors examining counterterrorism experience and the consistency of government conduct during the war on terror (Tupman and O'Reilly 2004). Such an approach, however, tends to expose the disregard the architects of the war on terror had for counterterrorism experience and policy-makers in the U.S. or UK have not adopted it in the six years since 9/11. Performance measurement may be routine in other areas of government-sponsored activity, but the war on terror has always been presented as a separate and exceptional activity dealing with an extraordinary enemy where familiar rules of engagement and conventional government behavior do not apply. However, in writing this introduction on 9/11 in 2007, it is apparent that the failure of the response to the world's most dramatic terrorist attack has finally become clear to many who supported it for the major part of its duration. Not that there is a consensus about the nature and extent of the failure. Nor is there a willingness to look to prior counterterrorism experience that might have been used to promote a measured, effective, and counterintuitive response to 9/11. Rather, notwithstanding moves to re-brand the war on terror in softer tones with particular emphasis on counterinsurgency “hearts and minds” approaches (Kilcullen 2006), the sixth anniversary of 9/11 marks the culmination of a poorly targeted military led response that has unintentionally boosted al-Qaeda credibility and recruitment.

In the months following the July 7, 2005, attack that killed 52 people and injured hundreds more, the British government was at pains to deny allegations that Britain was targeted by homegrown, al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists because of its Middle East foreign policy. Yet the government was privately aware by May 2004 that a “particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims … is a perceived ‘double standard’ in the foreign policy of western governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particular Britain and the U.S” (FCO/HO 2005). Specific causes cited were bias towards Israel vis-à-vis Palestinians; non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya; and “active oppression” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wider “war on terror.” Other alleged causes included social and economic deprivation, Islamophobia (particularly following 9/11), and intergenerational clashes between first, second, and third generation Muslims. But little attempt was made either before or after July 7, 2005, to examine the interaction between these domestic and foreign sources of radicalization. This paper attempts to do so by examining the rhetoric and actions of a range of young British Muslims including: examples of 48 persons convicted of, charged for, or killed by violent jihad—evidence of young Muslim opinion on extremism and causes of violent jihadi terror in Britain. The evidence from this preliminary study, though not large enough to draw reliable statistical inferences, does suggest that not only is British foreign policy a significant source of alienation among young British Muslims, but that attitudes towards British foreign policy interact with and often reinforce domestic social, cultural, and economic sources of discontent. As explained in the literature review below, examining the links between perceptions of foreign policy towards the wider Muslim Ummah and sources of domestic discontent offers a more satisfying account of British Muslim radicalization than those offered by the dominant structural (social network theories) and “aggrieved actor” interpretations.I would like to thank Jonathan Githens-Mazer for organizing the PSA panel at the 2007 APSA Annual Meeting where I presented this paper. I would also like to thank Shah Miah for allowing me to cite evidence from his BA research project (Queen Mary, University of London); Emily Mclean Inglis and Anthony de Silva for research assistance; and Zamila Bunglawala for advice and data on British Muslims and the labor market.

At the time of this writing (early August, 2008), the political landscape would appear to bode well for Barack Obama and spell almost certain disaster for John McCain. With presidential approval hovering in the high-20 and low-30% range for more than a year, and levels of economic satisfaction bottoming out, it “should” be a terrible year for the Republican Party in general and the Republican presidential nominee, John McCain, in particular, at least if the retrospective model holds. One factor that could mitigate the impact of negative retrospections, however, is that George W. Bush himself is not on the ballot to absorb the full impact of the national angst; in fact, for the first time since 1952, neither the president nor vice president is on the ballot.

In recent years, there has been increased discussion and even debate about how to reconcile a commitment to the ethical conduct of research in the social and behavioral sciences with a regulatory apparatus for the protection of human subjects that seems too often to fall short of its own aspirations and ideals. The gap between regulations and their implementation whether at the federal, state, or local levels is typically grist for the mill in political science. When, however, the issues are more in our own backyard—in our academic and research institutions—insight, interventions, and even empirical study are harder to come by. The purpose of this essay is neither to applaud what is right nor to decry what is wrong with the current system for the protection of human subjects as practiced. Our goal is to help further catalyze through this PS symposium a conversation about the need to produce system reform, illustrate some readily doable steps for doing so, and entice social science colleagues to work at their own institutions and at a national level for system change.

Like everyone else in the discipline, we have seen multiple appearances of a single paper title on conference programs, within vitas of job applicants, and in tenure/promotion files. Depending upon the context, our reactions have either been amusement, irritation, or (most frequently) indifference. To bring the entire situation home, consider the following: About three weeks ago, both of us submitted (separate) paper proposals to the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. And, sometime within the next five weeks, one of us intends to submit a proposal to the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, while the other plans to submit a proposal to the 2008 State Politics and Policy Meeting. In each case, these will be the same proposals that we sent off earlier to the Midwest Political Science Association.

Having been out of power in the House since 1994 and in the Senate for 10 of those 12 years as well, congressional Democrats' takeover of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections was an important moment in American political history. Having won the House and, somewhat more unexpectedly, the Senate by a bare majority, the Democrats recaptured control of an entire branch of the federal government for the first time since Bill Clinton left the White House. Controlling the levers of power in the House and the Senate—the legislative schedule, committees and subcommittees, and, to the extent that party bonds hold, the majority of votes in committee and on the floor—Democrats were poised to influence, but of course not unilaterally control, policymaking in the 110th Congress and the conduct of the last two years of the Bush administration through key congressional resources including funding and administrative oversight.I would like to thank all of the authors in the symposium for their willingness to participate and their excellent contributions. A special note of thanks also goes to Sean Kelly for his encouragement and advice on this project from first conception to final completion. Thanks also to Stephen Yoder and Rebecca Fowler at PS for their patience and guidance throughout.

Atul Gawande is a surgeon who began creating vivid word paintings of the performance of the American health care system in The New Yorker's pages while he was still a resident. Those of us who are immersed in, and charged with measuring, that system—as I have been for the last decade—find his “Annals of Medicine” column's evocations of heroic system successes and frightening system failures true to the processes we more prosaically try to analyze and evaluate. In December 2007 Gawande published a New Yorker essay called “The Checklist,” followed just days later by an op-ed piece in the New York Times (Gawande 2007a; 2007b).

The 2006 election will best be remembered for returning Democrats to power in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. By almost any metric, November 7 was a bad day for the Republicans. After 12 years of Republican majorities, the Democrats picked up 31 seats in the House and six in the Senate. While significant GOP losses were expected, the results on Election Day were essentially the best case scenario for the Democrats.

This article is about a simple two-variable equation forecasting presidential election outcomes and a three-variable equation forecasting seat change in House elections. Over the past two decades a cottage industry of political forecasting has developed (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992; Campbell and Garand 2000). At the 1994 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, several participants offered their forecasts of the upcoming midterm House elections. Unfortunately, not one of the forecasters was within 20 seats of the actual outcome. If, however, these forecasts had been pooled, as Gaddie (1997) points out, then they would have come remarkably close to the actual seat change that occurred. Moving forward, at the 1996 APSA Annual Meeting the collection of forecasters did a much better job with that year's presidential election. The forecasters also got the overall popular vote outcome correct at the 2000 APSA Annual Meeting for that year's presidential election. We all forecasted a victory for Al Gore, with James Campbell coming the closest to the actual total (50.2%) at 52.8%. At the panel at the 2004 APSA Annual Meeting almost every forecaster predicted the actual outcome correctly. Forecasting elections holds us accountable—we cannot go back and change our forecast for an election after it has occurred. Moreover, if we stick with one forecast, it easy to judge the overall accuracy of our equations.

On the morning of October 30, 2007, Hillary Clinton led Barack Obama, her closest challenger for the Democratic presidential nomination, by a comfortable margin in every significant national poll. That night, however, Senator Clinton, debating in Philadelphia, wandered into an ambush. Asked for her opinion of then-New York Governor Eliot Spitzer's plan to allow illegal immigrants to apply for driver's licenses, she first seemed to support the idea and then, under withering attack from Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd, almost immediately backed away from her tepid endorsement. Writing shortly after the debate, Mark Halperin (2007) of Time magazine opined that “[i]f [Clinton] loses the nomination, tonight will go down in history as the first step to her defeat.”

In 2004, for the first time the fiscal model was employed for the purpose of real-time, ex ante forecasting of a presidential election. The results were encouraging (Cuzán and Bundrick 2005). This year, however, the model encounters a set of challenging conditions, relevant only to it, never seen in the data before. In this paper, we briefly summarize the model, describe the problem, wrestle with ways to address it, and conclude with a forecast for November.

The correspondence between public preferences and public policy is a critical rationale for representative democratic government. This view has been put forward in the theoretical literature on democracy and representation (e.g., Dahl 1971; Pitkin 1967; Birch 1971) and in “functional” theories of democratic politics (Easton 1965; Deutsch 1963), both of which emphasize the importance of popular control of policymaking institutions. Political science research also shows a good amount of correspondence between opinion and policy, though to varying degrees, across a range of policy domains and political institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere. This is of obvious significance.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2006 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties specialist group, Nottingham, England, and at the 2007 National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. We thank Vinod Menon for assistance with data collection and Kevin Arceneaux, Suzie DeBoef, Harold Clarke, Peter Enns, Mark Franklin, Martin Gilens, John Griffin, Will Jennings, Rich Joslyn, Benjamin Page, David Sanders, David Weakliem, John Zaller, and the anonymous reviewers for comments.

For a quarter-century, conservative Republicans have used the “San Francisco liberal” label to place Democrats as outside the American mainstream. Imagine their dismay as the 110th Congress opened in January 2007 and Nancy Pelosi, a San Francisco Democrat well to the left of most of her party, ascended to the podium as speaker of the United States House of Representatives. This was, to be sure, a departure. Traditionally, House Democrats had selected ideological “middlemen” for top leadership posts (Truman 1959), particularly those from the “Austin-Boston alliance” that held unbroken sway in House Democratic leadership selection from the initial teaming of Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas and Majority Leader John McCormack of Boston in 1940 to that of Tip O'Neill of Boston and Texan Jim Wright in the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, Democrats “almost never” selected “‘Americans for Democratic Action-type’ liberals” as leaders (Peabody 1976, 470).