New ideas are seldom received with moderation. When Spengler's Decline of the West appeared it was greeted with wild enthusiasm, which collapsed like a pricked bubble under criticism. Now that Toynbee, a generation later, has taken up the theme, there seems to be a determination not to be caught a second time. His critics have no wish to be unfair, and much of what they say is true enough; but to anybody who has a sympathetic understanding of what he is attempting most of it seems entirely irrelevant and misleading.

Toynbee's critics fall broadly into two classes—those for whom he says too little, and those for whom he says too much. In the first class are those who complain that he does not define his civilizations, that he does not say whether he is for or against Christianity, or that he does not explain how the deterministic aspects of his results can be reconciled with his liberalism and his avowed belief in free will. Yet if Toynbee had given precise answers to these and other questions, if he had come forward with a cut-and-dried philosophical system, these same critics might well have been the first to complain that he was imposing a priori conceptions on the facts of history—a charge that has been made against every philosophy of history, and one which it is very difficult to refute. Surely we can respect the integrity of a historian who declines to go beyond the facts, or adopt opinions before compelled by the evidence.

Arguments, at least the best of them, should be based upon principles of logic, and therefore be beyond dispute. But unfortunately many philosophical arguments are based upon principles which, though claimed by some to be principles of logic, or at least to be true, are disputed or rejected by others. This difficult position arises, no doubt, because it is the philosopher more than anyone else who is entitled to delve into questions of the validity of first principles. In a philosophical undertaking of any magnitude it is therefore imperative for the author to state as clearly as possible the principles which seem to him certain, and which constitute the guiding lines of his method. Any criticism could then take only one of two forms: (1) it could allege that the argument under criticism does not conform to the principles laid down, though these principles are themselves accepted. (2) it could allege that the argument is mistaken because something is wrong with the principles, in which case the object of criticism is properly the principles and not the argument. But a valid criticism could not take the form of condemning a certain argument in the light of a principle which, while appearing to the critic to be true and undisputed, is in fact inconsistent with the principles which the author has laid down.

A New Philosophy of History for our age of transition from the Christian era to the period of world-unity, combined with a penetrating analysis of our present situation, is offered by Karl Jaspers' Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (Artemis-Verlag, Fr. 14.80). Jaspers is, however, more post-Hegelian than post-Christian, and in fact anti-Hegelian, but pro-Christian. Rejecting Hegel's dictum that the appearance of Christ is the “axis of world history,” i.e. the aim of the preceding, and the origin of the subsequent, centuries, Jaspers tries to discover the real axis of history empirically at about 500 b.c. Eager to find a common historical origin for East and West, he claims the time from 800 to 200 b.c. as axis-time. He believes that in these centuries, man as we know him to-day, with his religion, art, philosophy, and science, emerged in China, India, Iran, Palestine, and Greece. He further believes that a new axis-time is approaching, and the analysis of the three tendencies leading to it, i.e. of socialism, world-unity, and faith, forms one of the most valuable parts of the book. Like Toynbee he believes that a return to a transformed Biblical faith is necessary, if the West is to be saved. Pessimistic about the immediate future, he is optimistic concerning the remote future. History, as the history of single nations, states, or civilizations, is at an end. World History is only just now beginning. This is a book of European importance. It formulates the crucial question, whether Europe has still the spiritual strength to avoid a relapse into its Asiatic background with its despotism, uniformity and loss of personal liberty. In Jaspers' development, it marks a transition from reflecting upon mere possibilities to a consideration of historical reality. His booklet, The Spiritual Situation of our Time (1931) concluded with a chapter on “What may become of Man,” but what really did happen to man in the meantime proved that reality is much richer in possibilities than the liveliest imagination could possibly foresee. Does he now actually reach reality, or rather a “possible” History, as the stage on which man reveals himself in all his potentialities, and which moves from one fictitious axis-time to another equally fictitious? Jaspers' Einführung in die Philosophie (Artemis, Fr. 7.90), most enjoyable and a masterpiece of book-production, is the best introduction to his own philosophy. It emerges here as a possible form of philosophizing in an age of transition; original, sincere, cultivated and stimulating. His method is still the way of reflection, but this now includes meditation and self-examination. Jaspers rightly demands of-a philosopher (1) a thorough knowledge of one special science, (2) an equally penetrating knowledge of at least one great philosopher, and (3) sincerity in his daily conduct and acceptance of responsibility for whatever he is doing. Should he succeed in educating a generation of philosophers on these lines, that would indeed give new hope for the future of European philosophy. Jaspers' Inaugural Lecture, Philosophic und Wissen-schaft (Artemis, Fr. 1.30), discusses in a clear and competent manner this important problem and clearly exposes the confusion of some contemporary conceptions of science, e.g. in Marxism. His lecture, Unsere Zukunft und Goethe (Artemis, Fr. 3.–), rejects a Goethe cult, but stresses the new manner in which Goethe could be appreciated by the present generation. All in all, Jaspers represents the best in German tradition, and is now one of the leading European philosophers.

Philosophy in Italy (Philosophy, Vol. XXV, No. 93). The reference to Hobbes on p. 173, De Corpore, I, 3, should be De hom., 10.