In highly oppressive environments, collective resistance is very costly. Non-collective resistance constitutes a less risky alternative. Focusing on a particular oppressed setting, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, I identify everyday forms of non-collective resistance: signaling, persevering, eschewing, and coping. Characterized by low visibility and targeting political goals indirectly, these activities have not yet been recognized as forms of resistance. However, they constitute important resistance efforts that deliberately obstruct oppressive regimes. These efforts show that individuals who are not visibly resisting their rulers cannot be assumed to be loyal or to suffer from a barrier of fear, as often suggested by theories in politics. They also offer an important addition to theories that identify violence as a common response to oppression, suggesting that peaceful non-collective activities constitute an everyday alternative.

Human rights as a collective action frame has been an important aspect of social movement mobilization around AIDS since the beginning of the pandemic 25 years ago. As an epidemic strongly associated with homosexuality and other socially marginalized behaviors, the AIDS movement in the developed world fueled and built on traditions of gay identity politics and gay rights. When the AIDS epidemic was recognized in 1981, the gay movement had already reconstituted itself as a legitimate interest group pursuing civil rights and civil liberties. Building on the preexisting organizational foundations as well as cultural capital of the gay movement as well as others, the AIDS movement was not only able to push for the protection of the civil rights of people living with AIDS, but through its engagement with the medical profession and the political establishment over access to drugs, was able to insist on a correlation between health and human rights.Krista Johnson is Assistant Professor at Agnes Scott College in Atlanta ([email protected]). Her research on HIV/AIDS in South Africa was funded in part by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Ford Foundation.

Moving from a “gender and comparative politics” to a “comparative politics of gender” is a challenging proposition. In this essay, I offer two mechanisms for doing this—emphasizing the comparative nature of gender politics research and encouraging greater integration of gender research into the subfield of comparative politics. I illustrate how current research generally uses a “gender and comparative politics” approach that is insufficient for advancing the field and then describe how scholars can work to emphasize greater comparison and integration in the literature. This will help to move the gender and politics literature toward a comparative politics of gender.

President Donald Trump faced substantial scandal coverage early in his presidency. Can these stories about presidential controversies change the opinions of Trump’s fellow Republicans, or are the efforts of the news media to inform partisans about prominent issues futile? Past research on partisan reactions to major political scandals were confounded by problems with self-reported media use and single-shot experimental treatments. We address these concerns using a unique, repeated-exposure experimental design that either randomly supplied participants with news about the Trump-Russia scandal, or removed most of those stories from view, over the course of one week in June 2017. This design mimics sustained media attention to a political scandal and disentangles the effects of media coverage from selection in the context of a high-choice media environment. We find that Republicans randomly assigned to see more Trump-Russia headlines reacted more negatively than Democrats or Independents, rating Trump’s performance lower and expressing more negative emotions about him. Republicans’ perceptions of media bias were not affected by Trump-Russia stories, and effects were not contingent upon clicking the articles. Intense media focus on a story can alter partisans’ evaluations of politicians by shifting the balance of headlines.

Presidents are rightly held responsible for managing the national economy—they exercise substantial discretion over fiscal policy and have the potential for informally influencing monetary policy. At the same time, presidential accomplishments are circumscribed by market forces and institutions at home and overseas, and the complexities of fragmented authority and external constraints make judging performance difficult. I draw on the literature on economic policymaking and on the presidency to explicate a set of criteria for comparing presidential economic policy leadership, construct quantitative indicators of each dimension, and display the results of comparative analyses covering the second half of the twentieth century. The four criteria view presidents from three different vantage points: the separation of powers, focusing on presidents' success at gaining congressional approval for an economic agenda; the public, based on an original compilation of survey data tracking the electorate's evaluation; and the economy, tracing how presidents' policies affect overall prosperity and the distribution of income. Combining information about how crucial audiences have perceived and responded to presidential initiatives, with outcomes in the economy, this approach emphasizes comparison, and thus complements the qualitative depth of narrative approaches.

While the rise of celebrities-turned-politicians has been well documented and theorized, how their bids for office are treated by the establishment press has been less closely examined. Research on celebrity politics on the one hand, and on journalism standards on the other, have rarely been brought into conversation with one another. Here, we draw from both literatures to explore how the press covered Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Prior research on political journalism would likely have predicted that Trump, with his lack of conventional political experience and a career in reality TV, would have been treated to derisive, dismissive press coverage, which we refer to as “clown” coverage. But Trump’s fame and wealth, and the high entertainment value of his campaign, would also lead the media to cover him heavily. We argue that the collision of entertainment-infused politics with traditional journalism practices created a profound dilemma for the press’s ability to cover the campaign coherently, and that the press responded to this dilemma by giving Trump as much clown-like coverage as serious coverage, throughout not just the primary but also the general election. We support our argument through qualitative evidence from interviews with journalists and other political insiders, and quantitative evidence from a content analysis of New York Times and Washington Post coverage of Trump at key points throughout the campaign.

How can expertise best be integrated within democratic systems? And how can such systems best enable lay judgment of expert claims? These questions are obscured by the common framing of democratic politics against an imagined system of pure and unmixed expert rule or “epistocracy.” Drawing on emerging research that attempts to think critically and institutionally about expertise, I distinguish three ways of democratically organizing relations between experts and non-experts: representative expertise, in which experts are taken to exercise limited and delegated power under the supervision of political representatives; participatory expertise, in which expertise is integrated with publics by means of directly participatory processes; and associative expertise, in which civil society groups, advocacy organizations, and social movements organize expert knowledge around the objectives of a self-organized association. Comparing these models according to the cognitive demands they make on lay citizens, the epistemic value of citizen contributions, and the ways in which they enable public scrutiny and contestation, I go on to explore how they can support and undermine one another, and how they can open up new questions about democracy, trust, and expertise in political science and political theory.

Donald Trump’s success in the 2016 presidential primary election prompted scrutiny for the role of news media in elections. Was Trump successful because news media publicized his campaign and crowded out coverage of other candidates? We examine the dynamic relationships between media coverage, public interest, and support for candidates in the time preceding the 2016 Republican presidential primary to determine (1) whether media coverage drives support for candidates at the polls and (2) whether this relationship was different for Trump than for other candidates. We find for all candidates that the quantity of media coverage had significant and long-lasting effects on public interest in that candidate. Most candidates do not perform better in the polls following increases in media coverage. Trump is an exception to this finding, receiving a modest polling bump following an increase in media coverage. These findings suggest that viability cues from news media contributed to Trump’s success and can be influential in setting the stage in primary elections.

We investigate how the international investment regime turned into an investment vehicle. Through the process called third-party funding, financiers back international legal claims by firms against countries and in turn seek a share of any potential award. More generally, we add to debates on how international regimes evolve and at times generate unanticipated consequences. Building off work on the sociology of fields, we argue that institutional change can occur when individuals from different fields interact. Each field has its own local practices and beliefs about how governance institutions like international regimes function. When professionals from one field analyze problems in another, they use the tools from their native field. If potential solutions provide material and status benefits for the dominant actors in the targeted regime, cross-field coalitions can form and change the targeted regime’s practice. As hedge funds in the finance field and lawyers in the international law field sought to reinvent themselves after the 2008 financial crisis, they teamed up to make Investor State Dispute Settlement a speculator’s game. Theoretically, we embed theories of regime change within larger social relations, highlighting the importance of informal interactions among regime operators for the use and function of governance institutions. We underscore the role of field interdependence as actors engage in contestation across social and political domains. Empirically, we demonstrate the way in which financialization has had far-reaching consequences that extend well beyond traditional economic sectors, reconfiguring the practice of international law.

Debates around the effectiveness of high-profile Twitter account suspensions and similar bans on abusive users across social media platforms abound. Yet we know little about the effectiveness of warning a user about the possibility of suspending their account as opposed to outright suspensions in reducing hate speech. With a pre-registered experiment, we provide causal evidence that a warning message can reduce the use of hateful language on Twitter, at least in the short term. We design our messages based on the literature on deterrence, and test versions that emphasize the legitimacy of the sender, the credibility of the message, and the costliness of being suspended. We find that the act of warning a user of the potential consequences of their behavior can significantly reduce their hateful language for one week. We also find that warning messages that aim to appear legitimate in the eyes of the target user seem to be the most effective. In light of these findings, we consider the policy implications of platforms adopting a more aggressive approach to warning users that their accounts may be suspended as a tool for reducing hateful speech online.

Before the welfare state, people were protected from disabilities resulting from illness, old age, and other infirmities by care work provided within the family. When the state assumes responsibility for care-work tasks, in effect it assumes parental roles, thereby becoming a form of familial government in which the public provision of goods and services is analogous to care work provided in the family. My research pushes back the origins of the state’s obligation to care for people to a preindustrial form of government, hereditary monarchies—what Max Weber termed patrimonialism. It explicates how monarchs were cast as the parents of the people, thereby constituting kingship as a care work regime that assigned to political rulers parental responsibility for the welfare of the people. Using historical and quantitative analysis, I establish that retaining the legitimacy of monarchies as the first form of familial government in the course of Western European democratizing makes it more credible to the public and to political elites to accept the welfare state as the second form of familial government. That, in turn, promotes a more robust public sector supportive of social provision. The results reformulate conceptions of the contemporary welfare state and its developmental legacies.

Higher education in the United States has proud roots in the mission to enable people to engage in self-governance. The current political context is pushing us in another direction. I discuss the context in Wisconsin in particular, and use the challenges there as a reason to consider the civic purposes of political science. Rather than allow the political winds to blow us further into elitism, I argue that we should renew our commitment to educating people for citizenship.

In recent years, there has been renewed public discussion regarding the relationship between women’s equality and their traditional responsibility for carework. In this essay, we analyze the structures of choice and constraint that continue to produce the gender division of family labor and thus women's unequal participation in the public sphere. We conceptualize this as a problem of democratic freedom, one that requires building institutional pathways to sustain women's participation. Drawing on Nancy Hirschmann's arguments about processes of social construction and their relation to freedom, we argue that gender inequality in the public sphere means that women are unfree, in the sense that they are not participating as peers in the material and discursive processes of social construction that then help to shape their own desires and decisions. We use that framework to analyze the current landscape in which different subgroups of women make decisions about paid labor and care work. Our goal is to bring into view the way the social construction of desire interacts with the material context to underwrite inequality between women and men and across different groups of women. Gender equality and the project of democracy require participatory parity between women and men in the public sphere. We therefore turn in our last section to an effort to imagine how public policies could construct pathways that can help interrupt and undo the gender division of labor, and thus better support democratic freedom.

Scholars have long been skeptical of citizens’ ability to vote on the basis of their policy views. Voters lack incentives to pay attention to politics and so are often unaware of the policy stances adopted by presidential candidates and parties. However, some scholars have suggested that voter attention may increase when policy issues become important to them, such as when a crisis disrupts their lives. The coronavirus pandemic provides an opportunity to test this proposition. It is one of the most severe crises the United States has faced. It has disrupted almost everyone’s lives, and many people know someone who has tested positive or died from the virus. It is thus salient and important to many—if not most—voters. Despite this context, we find that many voters remain unaware of the 2020 US Presidential candidates’ stances on coronavirus policies. Their levels of knowledge are about typical for other policies, which is middling. In the absence of knowledge, voters cannot connect their policy views on the virus with their presidential voting decisions.

The recent surge of global populism has led many intellectuals to call for new forms of democratic elitism. Yet research into the sources of support for political organizations and regimes predicts that suppressing opportunities for public participation will likely exacerbate antisystem political tendencies. We cite the recent protests in Chile, a nation that has employed democratic elitism more effectively than perhaps any other, as illustrative of the eventual consequences of suppressing voice. Our research indicates that empowering citizens through vibrant parties and continuous democracy is the best way to avoid populist impulses and waves of contentious politics.

Institutional reforms often diverge from substantive problems and societal demands that originally prompted reform, raising questions about democratic responsiveness. Such reform gaps are prevalent in policing, wherein some police forces improve capacity and performance, while extrajudicial violence persists. I argue that police evade pressure for reform through strategic policy substitution, pressuring politicians to replace reforms that threaten bureaucratic autonomy with favorable reforms that preserve it. I describe how police act as veto players, thwarting high-threat structural and oversight reforms demanded by advocates to address violence and corruption by enacting low-threat operational and marginal reforms. Drawing on evidence from Colombia and Brazil, I demonstrate that operational reforms, (e.g., body-worn cameras and community policing) preferred by police can produce constrained institutional change. Such reforms may improve performance, but by preserving bureaucratic autonomy, they increase the police’s structural power and ability to resist future structural reforms, complicating efforts to address police violence.

The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue that state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been an unintended consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the United States and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government.