Bullard and Mitra [Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002), 1105–1130] find that, in a New Keynesian economy without capital and under four variants of the Taylor rule, the Taylor principle is sufficient to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability of equilibrium in most cases. Xiao [Macroeconomic Dynamics 12 (2008), 22–49] claims that with capital and mild increasing returns the Taylor principle cannot guarantee either determinacy or E-stability with any of the four rules. In this paper we show that in the Calvo-type sticky price models a second-order condition for profit maximization must be satisfied in firms' pricing decision problem, and we point out that the examples given in Xiao's paper to support his conclusion violate this condition. After imposing this condition, we find that increasing returns have little effect on determinacy and E-stability under two of the policy rules but significant effects under the other two. These results are obtained in models both with and without capital.

This paper finds evidence of nonlinearities in the dynamics of the euro area demand for the narrow aggregate M1. A long-run money demand relationship is first estimated over a sample period covering the past three decades. Although the parameters of the relationship are jointly stable, there are indications of nonlinearity in the residuals of the error-correction model. This nonlinearity is explicitly modeled using a fairly general Markov switching error-correction model with satisfactory results. The empirical findings of the paper are consistent with theoretical predictions of nonlinearities in the dynamics of adjustment to equilibrium stemming from “buffer stock” and “target-threshold” models and with analogous empirical evidence for European countries and the United States.

Empirical literature provided convincing evidence that explicit (i.e., legislated) inflation targets anchor expectations. I propose a novel game theoretic framework with generalized timing that allows us to formally capture this beneficial anchoring effect. Using the framework I identify several factors that influence whether and how strongly expectations are anchored, namely (i) the public's cost of decision making, (ii) the public's inflation aversion, (iii) the slope of the Phillips curve, (iv) the magnitude of supply shocks, (v) the degree of central bank conservatism, and under many (but not all) circumstances, (vi) the explicitness of the inflation target.

In a Markov switching framework, we show that the duration of recessions is significantly shorter than the duration of expansions in 11 manufacturing sectors, and in aggregate durables and manufacturing output. We find two leading indicators, consumer expectations and the term spread, act as important demand-driven forces behind asymmetry.

In aggregation theory, the admissibility condition for clustering components to be aggregated is blockwise weak separability, which also is the condition needed to separate out sectors of the economy. Although weak separability is thereby of central importance in aggregation and index number theory and in econometrics, prior attempts to produce statistical tests of weak separability have performed poorly in Monte Carlo studies. This paper introduces a new class of weak separability tests, which is seminonparametric. Such tests are both based on a necessary and sufficient condition and are fully stochastic, allowing to take into account measurement error. Simulations show that the tests perform well, even for large measurement errors.

I demonstrate that the precise timing of financial markets and goods markets in a simple cash good/credit good model does not matter for the main results in the Ramsey literature on optimal fiscal and monetary policy. In Ramsey models based on Lucas and Stokey [Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 55–93 (1983)] and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe [Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 23, 519–539 (1991)], nominal money holdings are freely adjustable in response to shocks in the period in which they will be used to purchase consumption. In contrast, under Svensson [Journal of Political Economy 93, 919–944 (1985)] timing, nominal balances cannot be adjusted in the period they will be used. The broad finding is that benchmark Ramsey results are not very sensitive to this slight, ultimately ad hoc, modification. In particular, optimal inflation continues to display very high variability just as in the original models, although this can differ depending on exactly which exogenous processes are driving the economy. That the basic results in the Ramsey literature are not sensitive to the choice of cash/credit timing is reassuring as Ramsey analysis is applied to an ever-expanding set of model environments.

The traditional economic approach to index number theory is based on a ratio of cost functions. Diewert defined superlative price and quantity indices as observable indices that were exact for a ratio of unit cost functions or for a ratio of linearly homogeneous utility functions. The present paper looks for counterparts to his results in the difference context, for both flexible homothetic and flexible nonhomothetic preferences. The Bennet indicators of price and quantity change turn out to be superlative for the nonhomothetic case. The underlying preferences are of the translation-homothetic form discussed by Balk, Chambers, Dickenson, Färe, and Grosskopf.

This paper compares the different dynamics of the simple-sum monetary aggregates and the Divisia monetary aggregate indices over time, over the business cycle, and across high and low inflation and interest-rate phases. Although traditional comparisons of the series sometimes suggest that simple-sum and Divisia monetary aggregates share similar dynamics, there are important differences around turning points that cannot be evaluated by their average behavior. We use a factor model with a regime-switching model that separates the common movements underlying the monetary aggregate indices from idiosyncratic variations in each series. We find that the major differences between the simple-sum aggregates and Divisia indices occur around the beginnings and ends of recessions and during some high-interest-rate phases. We note the inferences' policy relevance, which is particularly dramatic at the broadest (M3) level of aggregation. Indeed, as Belongia [Journal of Political Economy, 104 (5) (1996), 1065–1083] has observed in this regard, “measurement matters.”