Discretion gives decision makers choices as to how resources are allocated, or how other aspects of state largesse or coercion are deployed. Discretionary state power challenges aspects of the rule of law, first by transferring decisions from legislators to departments, agencies and street-level bureaucrats and secondly by risking the uniform application of key fairness and equality norms. Concerns to find alternative and decentred forms of regulation gave rise to new types of regulation, sometimes labeled ‘regulatory capitalism’. Regulatory capitalism highlights the roles of a wider range of actors exercising powers and a wider range of instruments. It includes also new forms of discretion, for example over automated decision making processes, over the formulation and dissemination of league tables or over the use of behavioural measures. This paper takes a novel approach by linking and extending the significant literature on these changing patterns of regulatory administration with consideration of the changing modes of deployment of discretion. Using this specific lens, we observe two potentially contradictory trends: an increase in determining and structuring administrative decision, leading to a more transparent use of discretion; and the increased use of automated decision making processes which have the potential of producing a less transparent black box scenario.

It is an accepted principle of domestic and international law and policy that the welfare or best interests of the child must be the primary or paramount consideration in any decision made with regard to that child's upbringing. While this ‘best interests standard’ has become a core principle of welfare law, what might constitute a child or young person's best interests is given very little formal shape or content. This has provoked sustained criticism from practitioners, academics and the judiciary. In response, this paper argues that the capabilities approach can give best interests assessments much needed normative content, thereby addressing many of the criticisms directed towards the standard. The approach provides a theoretically nuanced framework for theorising about basic social justice and for evaluation, deliberation, and policy development across social welfare sectors. In arguing for a capabilities approach to best interests assessments, the paper sets out an agenda for change. It addresses the conceptual and methodological justifications for this change, and explores the empirical work that would be required. It identifies the steps and underlying principles necessary for a best interests process aligned with the capabilities approach, providing the necessary foundations for a radical reconceptualisation of best interests processes.

The illegality defence is an important element of private law, but its operation has been unpredictable. In Patel v Mirza, the Supreme Court opted for a flexible approach, which does not increase predictability. This approach was recently confirmed in Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust and Stoffel & Co v Grondona. I propose a principle to guide the application of the illegality defence in tort: namely, the claim fails for illegality if the claimant's harm is the ordinary result of the claimant's wrongdoing. It is argued that the guiding principle: (i) substantially explains the case law; (ii) is normatively defensible; and (iii) makes the defence much more predictable.

This paper is concerned with when, if ever, deceptive sex should be criminalised. It defends the idea that it is necessary to distinguish between deceptions that will generally be punishable from those that will not and puts forward a novel framework for carrying out this task. Based on the concept of identity nonrecognition, this framework also offers a new way of understanding what makes certain kinds of deceptive sex wrongful. After setting out this framework, I analyse each of the deceptions that is most often carried out within ‘ordinary’ contexts, explaining why only some of these should generally be punished. The paper concludes by suggesting that identity nonrecognition has the potential to inform criminalisation debates more generally, and that its relevance extends beyond discussions about deceptive sex.

The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has been invoking the vulnerability criterion to overcome the drawbacks of cases concerning Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition of discrimination. This new criterion, allowing the Court to favour the applicants, highlights the applicants’ group affiliation. However, whether this criterion is effective in protecting vulnerable applicants against discrimination is doubtful. To examine this, I divide the Court's approach to Article 14 before and after the application of the vulnerability criterion. I argue that vulnerability criterion was used to fix the drawbacks of Article 14, but eventually backfired. The concept of vulnerability has been ambiguous, inconsistently used by the Court, and paternalistic. I suggest the Court focus on individual autonomy rather than grouping the applicants to improve their legal reasoning of Article 14.

The use of defamation law to protect corporate reputation is controversial. Australia, Canada and England and Wales have been at the centre of this debate, as although their defamation laws share many common characteristics, they adopt distinct approaches to allowing companies to sue in defamation. Consequently, in all three jurisdictions defamation law remains a cause of action that is relied upon by companies to protect their reputations. The primary concern of this paper is the efficacy of these approaches,1 particularly in light of the reforms made to Australia's defamation laws, adopted in 2020, that further restrict the right of corporations to sue in defamation. Ultimately, it argues that the Australian and English and Welsh approaches disproportionately disadvantage companies, particularly small ones, whereas the Canadian approach overprotects corporate reputation. It concludes by offering an alternative way forward that, although not perfect, provides a better balance between the interests.

This paper examines why Singapore law has not followed English law in the area of beneficial ownership of family property. It points out that the landmark cases in the two jurisdictions are underpinned by different family paradigms.The English landmark cases are based on the unmarried cohabitants paradigm and the legal rules that have emerged from these cases are aimed at, whether successfully or not, ensuring a fair division of the family home upon the breakdown of these relationships. In contrast, the Singapore seminal judgments are underlaid by contests between children over their parents’ property which raised questions as to the parties’ true intentions and the legal techniques to determine that. In the main, this paper argues that the legal rules that emerge in a society are shaped by the conditions of that society: these rules are purpose-built to resolve the specific types of disputes that come through the judicial system, which are in turn moulded by the distinctive conditions of that society. The discussion also shows that whilst the courts in the two jurisdictions differ in the legal techniques which they apply to determine these disputes, they do not appear to differ greatly in their understanding of human interactions and complex family relationships.

The paper explores the use of statistical data and statistical assumptions as evidence in criminal trials. It is suggested that a finding of guilt includes not only its main factual proposition but also additional propositions that support and affirm it. Specifically, it includes not only the proposition that the defendant committed the offence but also the additional affirming proposition that it is this defendant rather than any other potential defendant who committed the offence (the ‘D rather than A’ proposition). Some statistical generalisations provide reasons in defence of the main proposition but not in defence of the affirming proposition, which then remains random or arbitrary. Yet since criminal convictions include a moral judgement, they cannot be justified where some of their propositions are arbitrary. Accordingly, such statistical generalisations cannot justify a criminal conviction.

This paper considers the history and nature of the ‘modern rule of releases’, concerning compromises to settle or preclude litigation. The rule holds that only matters the parties had contemplated as well as what they intended to release will in fact be released, even if the compromise has been made in the most general terms. Thus the rule is engaged when the releasor executes a general release but does not appreciate the existence of some of the claims the words used purport to release. This paper shows how the rule is a confusion of different conceptual bases and lines of authority and was created by accidentally muddling them together. It argues that, despite this, it successfully straddles both bases, functions well conceptually and serves a vital role.

This paper presents the findings of a comparative statistical study examining the application and trends in the deployment and utilisation of European Union (EU) law before the Scottish and Irish courts over a 10-year period from 2009–2018. The paper poses the question, how does European integration impact on the domestic legal systems of EU Member States due to the increasing volume, and significance, of cases where EU law is raised and applied within domestic legal systems? The research presented is of particular relevance in light of Brexit. It allows prescient reflection on the significant disruption and impact the United Kingdom's exit from the EU is likely to have on areas of domestic law which are highly integrated with EU law. It highlights the potential difficulties implicit in attempting to unpick over 40 years of assimilation of EU law and principles into Scots law. These research outcomes should lead to further reflection and debate on the role of EU law and its impact on judicial decision-making in the Scottish and Irish legal systems in general.

Arguments for reform of the dynamic of medical negligence litigation in Ireland frequently centre on temporal and financial concerns. However, as the field of law and psychology has continued to grow, a body of international literature has emerged which recognises that litigation can have a destructive emotional impact on its participants, particularly in the context of medical negligence disputes.

This paper contributes to the discourse on law-caused harms through a critical exploration of the emotional burdens of medical negligence litigation from the perspective of both the plaintiff and medical practitioner, with reference to the findings of an empirical study (interviews with barristers, patient support groups, and medical professional bodies) and the literature. Whilst the temporal and financial efficiency of medical negligence litigation is important, if litigation can cause emotional harm, this should be considered a serious, undesirable effect of the traditional adversarial process, and may have broader implications for reform in this area.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in 2014 ruled in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data Retention Directive was invalid for exceeding the limits of proportionality in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). Subsequently, preliminary references from the England and Wales Court of Appeal and the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal sought clarification from the ECJ as to whether EU law permitted a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime. The ECJ in Tele2 and Watson ruled that in light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter, EU Member States were precluded from adopting national measures which provided general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication. The ECJ also ruled that Member States were only permitted to adopt data retention measures for the purpose of fighting serious crime, and only when access to retained data was subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body.

In 2018, the issue of the UK's data retention regime envisaged in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 came before the England and Wales High Court. The High Court ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with EU law because access to retained communications data was not limited to the purpose of fighting serious crime, and it was not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. This judgment was regarded by the claimants, Liberty, as a ‘landmark victory for privacy rights’. However, this paper questions whether certain aspects of the High Court ruling are indeed a victory, by assessing its compatibility with EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The UK is currently experiencing what can only be described as a political crisis. As faith in politics declines amongst citizens, there is an increasing trend to turn to the courts for answers – this is the thesis of Jonathan Sumption's Trial of the State: Law and the Decline of Politics. Based on the 2019 Reith Lectures, two recurring themes emerge throughout the book: the decline of politics; and the rise of law to compensate.

Paternalistic forms of regulation for the retail investment market have been gradual and restrained, even though significant gaps exist between investors’ needs and market-based provision. As ordinary citizens reckon with a variety of savings needs and become financial citizens responsible for their own financial welfare provision, financial health is not merely an issue of individual fortunes but a social need. Adverse financial welfare consequences can at scale become a social issue, as is reflected in the social demands and critique entailing from the collapse of London and Capital Finance in the UK. The need for more regulatory paternalism goes beyond preventing mis-selling, and the outworking of welfare beyond point-of-sale remains relatively unconsidered. Post-sale welfare is, however, increasingly recognised for consumer credit and is slower to catch on in relation to savings needs and investments. This paper advocates that the regulator should not remain ambivalent about the need for more paternalistic interventions. Paternalistic protection is not only about shifting more burdens to the industry but also about the provision of public goods where there are standardised baseline needs for retail investors. This paper unpacks the roles of both the public and private sectors in addressing retail investors’ financial welfare needs.

This paper examines the standard of proof applicable in proceedings for imposing pecuniary penalties for violation of competition rules. Australia, New Zealand and the UK have chosen the civil standard. This unfortunately overlooks the safeguards required by the relevant human rights treaties in proceedings that involve the determination of a ‘criminal charge’. Conversely, Hong Kong has adopted the criminal standard, which may prove unworkable in these proceedings in which economic analysis is key. After analysing whether one may set this quagmire aside by asserting that these proceedings do not involve the determination of a criminal charge, it will be argued that the more plausible solution is to accept the criminal charge characterisation, limit the civil standard to the effects-based elements of the charge and apply the criminal standard to other elements. This will achieve a permissible proportionate derogation from the human rights safeguards. Similar bifurcated models have been adopted for charges such as public nuisance and harassment, and have successfully withstood human rights challenges.

Professors MacQueen and Thomson have defined ‘contract’, within Scots law, as denoting ‘an agreement between two or more parties having the capacity to make it, in the form demanded by law, to perform, on one side or both, acts which are not trifling, indeterminate, impossible or illegal’. This definition reflects the fact that Scottish contracts are underpinned by consent, rather than by ‘consideration’. This, naturally, has the potential to be of great significance within the context of physician/patient relationships, particularly since the 2006 case of Dow v Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust acknowledged that these relationships could be contractual in nature. This observation is of renewed importance since the landmark decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, which found that physicians must ensure that they obtain full and freely given ‘informed consent’ from their patients, prior to providing medical services. In light of the present medical regime which requires ‘doctor and patient [to] reach agreement on what should happen’, the basis of liability for medical negligence, in Scotland, requires reanalysis: ‘To have a contract only when the patient pays is not consistent with a legal system which has no doctrine of consideration in contract’.

During 2020, weddings were profoundly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. During periods of lockdown few weddings could take place, and even afterwards restrictions on how they could be celebrated remained. To investigate the impact of such restrictions, we carried out a survey of those whose plans to marry in England and Wales had been affected by Covid-19. The 1,449 responses we received illustrated that the ease and speed with which couples had been able to marry, and sometimes whether they had been able to marry at all, had depended not merely on the national restrictions in place but on their chosen route into marriage. This highlights the complexity and antiquity of marriage law and reinforces the need for reform. The restrictions on weddings taking place also revealed the extent to which couples valued getting married as opposed to having a wedding. Understanding both the social and the legal dimension of weddings is important in informing recommendations as to how the law should be changed in the future, not merely to deal with similar crises but also to ensure that the general law is fit for purpose in the twenty-first century.