This article builds on previous studies concerning the question of street-level bureaucracy, an expression coined by Lipsky (1980) – Street-Level Bureaucracy. Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russel Sage Foundation) – to highlight the importance of the discretionary power that professionals in public agencies exercise during the implementation of laws, standards and guidelines. Discretion may depend on the need to compromise between the limited resources available and the claims of citizens, or between administrative policy directives and assessments, on the one hand, and their interpretation by “street-level” bureaucrats, on the other. This article focuses on the dilemmas that labour inspectors face when dealing with employment irregularities involving domestic workers. Based on nine months of observations in a local office of the Italian Labour Inspectorate, it aims to understand how labour inspectors make use of their discretionary power when the workplace is the home. This article connects studies of street-level bureaucracy with the new institutional organisational analysis, focusing on the isomorphic pressures from the institutional field in which the labour inspectors operate, together with the manner in which such pressures shape labour inspectors’ discretion. Through this connection, the article aims to extend the scope of both theories.

Although energy policy used to be a nonpartisan issue in Congress, partisan conflicts over energy policies are intense these days. To examine how a nonpartisan issue became a highly partisan one, we create and use a new measure of energy policy positions of members of Congress. Our analyses of member behaviour show that, in addition to partisan realignment in the South, energy policy-specific factors – rising oil prices, the climate change debate since 1988, and the salience of energy policy in Congress – are significantly related to increasing party polarisation over energy policy. We also find that the increasing convergence between energy policy and environmental policy has significantly contributed to party polarisation over energy issues. The study thus provides important understanding of this specific policy area as well as insights into the party polarisation literature by demonstrating how policy-specific events and policy convergence transform a nonpartisan issue into a highly partisan one.

In this article, we describe two experiments measuring the impact of a collection of interventions informed by behavioural sciences to reduce unemployment. In a small-scale pilot study (n = 2,383) run in partnership with a Jobcentre in the UK, we found that small changes to the way jobseekers interacted with employment advisers showed promising effects. Based on these findings, we refined our intervention and tested it in a second, larger trial (n = 88,033) across 12 Jobcentres in the UK. We found that our intervention significantly increased off-flow from benefits. These experiments demonstrate that policies and programmes aimed at reducing unemployment can benefit greatly from a deeper understanding of the behaviours of jobseekers and employment advisers. Further, we suggest that this approach could have positive implications for other areas of public policy.

Politically motivated interference by politicians, or “politicised enforcement”, is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this article develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron–client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote economic growth and carry out clientelistic exchanges affect government decisions on enforcement. Moreover, these correlations remain robust after the implementation of reforms that promoted administrative centralisation within the enforcement agency, suggesting that politicised enforcement reflects the strategic behaviour of the ruling elites of the Party. These findings contribute to the literature on enforcement in authoritarian regimes broadly and in China specifically.

This article studies the political conflict surrounding the implementation of the European Union’s Services Directive in Greece between 2010 and 2018, the period in which the country was subject to external conditionality by external institutions. Focusing on the opening of jurisdictional boundaries for four professions (tourist guides, taxi owners, lawyers and engineers) that differ in terms of power and of organisational structure, we find that power differences, including control of the professions’ institutions of interest aggregation and representation, explain the liberalisation outcomes across the four professions. This article thus puts the spotlight on the role of domestic interest groups in the implementation of EU legislation and directs researchers’ attention to the broader issue of bias in interest intermediation, a classic, but lately understudied, issue in the study of politics.

The German government established a funding scheme for local climate policy in 2008. The translation of this programme into climate action varies between municipalities. This article studies the drivers and barriers for the diffusion of the programme among German municipalities. A major aim is to disentangle the diffusion effects across different steps within the policy cycle by employing Event History Analysis and spatial panel autoregressive models. Geographical proximity, party channels and transnational city networks are predictors of the diffusion process. Differences in diffusion effects between policy adoption and substantial policy output indicate that emulation as well as learning influence policy activity. Furthermore, increasing deployment of solar photovoltaic systems in neighbouring municipalities is associated with an intensification of climate policy in the focal municipality. The absence of similar effects for other renewable energy technologies hints at the “conditional nature” of policy learning with respect to the policy-makers’ vote- and policy-seeking behaviour.

Recent research on morality policy has focused on policy change, morality framing and the presence of favourable cultural opportunity structures (COSs). The resulting literature describing various aspects of morality policy has failed to discuss the impact of multilevel dynamic in this field. This contribution examines gambling policy in Italy, applying a multilevel approach to detect the presence of favourable COSs, and whether policymakers frame policies morally. Italy offers a particularly fertile field for the study of morality policy, featuring a liberal national approach versus local restrictive policy. By applying a methodology based on semistructured interviews and secondary sources, we examine the national and local political spheres, demonstrating that morality framing, when detected, is more likely to be found at the local level where the influence of experts and interest groups on legislators may result in the transformation of a health policy based on paternalistic considerations.

Transferring public service provision to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) raises concerns over accountability deficits. We argue that the governance of SOEs requires reconciliation of the accountability relations found in traditional models of public administration, and the normative structures of control and accountability developed in the world of private enterprises, commonly referred to as corporate governance. To this end, we propose a model for structuring accountability relations between SOEs and governmental owners. The model prescribes a distinction between the roles of elected representatives and top managers as “forums” for accountability concerning the governmental owner’s mission-related and non-mission-related preferences towards the SOE. The model’s relevance is tested empirically using data from a study of SOEs in Norway’s local government sector. The analysis indicates that accountability practices in line with the prescriptions of the model were associated with a heightened sense of control over the SOEs.

Policy scholars tend to view disproportionate policy and its two component concepts – policy over- and underreaction – as either unintentional errors of commission or omission, or nonintentional responses that political executives never intended to implement yet are not executed unknowingly, inadvertently or accidentally. This article highlights a conceptual turn, whereby these concepts are reentering the policy lexicon as types of intentional policy responses that are largely undertaken when political executives are vulnerable to voters. Intentional overreactions derive from the desire of political executives to pander to voters’ opinions or signal extremity by overreacting to these opinions in domains susceptible to manipulation for credit-claiming purposes. Intentional underreactions are motivated by political executives’ attempts to avoid blame and may subsequently lead to deliberate overreaction. This conceptual turn forces scholars to recognise the political benefits that elected executives may reap from deliberately implementing disproportionate policies, and that such policies can at times be effective.