The journey of nation-building is long and complicated. Even though the bases of Eritrean nationalism have been firmly established through our long liberation struggle, it has yet to be concluded. It is known that to build [a] peaceful and rich country is the hardest, and more complicated than to get success in war. The National Charter of Eritrea, EPLF (1994)

The end of the Cold War has had contradictory effects on African security. Southern Africa and Ethiopia clearly benefitted from the end of superpower rivalry, whereas central and western Africa have seen an upswing of violence during the 1990s. The withdrawal of foreign patronage, the post-Somalia reluctance of the West and the UN to intervene militarily, heightened external demands for economic and political reform, and the changing nature of African insurgencies, have placed additional pressure on already weak governments. Many African states have only weak militaries to defend their security, the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Armed Forces of Zaïre providing the most recent example.

As recently as 1990, the idea of African states relying upon mercenaries from the former South African Defence Force (SADF) would have seemed both preposterous and insulting. Yet since 1993, Executive Outcomes (EO), the world's largest and best known ‘mercenary’ group, has marketed itself as a defender of African state security in this post-Cold War era. A private army with access to some 2,000 ex-South African Defence Force (SADF) combat veterans, EO has helped to defeat discredited insurgencies in Angola and Sierra Leone. Large sections of Africa need effective militaries and EO, which claims to fight only for sovereign governments, presents itself as a stabilising force for African development. To some observers, EO is ‘with the possible exception of the South African army, the most deadly and efficient army operating in sub-Saharan Africa today’.

This article examines the controversial Executive Outcomes military as a security option for African governments. It sketches EO's history, its military effectiveness, and its political loyalty, to assess whether EO threatens or assists African state stability. The article concludes by looking at EO's possible future, and the lessons which it offers about African security.

In 1992, several national newspapers in America and Europe ran headline stories which accused Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, the nationalist movement which had been locked in a vicious civil war with the MPLA–PT government of Angola, of conducting witchcraft trials and burnings of witches at his liberation base at Jamba. The revelations, provided by two high-ranking defectors from UNITA, caused an outcry among both critics and supporters, with all predicting Savimbi's ignominious defeat. Savimbi's longtime critics expected the latest scandal to deprive him of his remaining credibility, and predicted that the support he had gathered as a fighter for Angolan nationalism and a supporter of democracy would evaporate.

On the contrary, the incident had little impact on Savimbi's stature among his Ovimbundu supporters. Later that year he went on to win the majority of the Ovimbundu votes in the United Nations sponsored elections, and gained a chance to be in a run-off election against José Eduardo dos Santos for the presidency of Angola. Details about these and similar incidents which have taken place in Africa from the time of conquest reflect a political legacy that has deep roots in Africa's pre-colonial past. They also illustrate some of the fundamental differences that exist between African and Western conceptions of political behaviour and ideology that need to be addressed.

The establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 reflected and reinforced significant shifts in global orthodoxies in favour of the liberalisation of world trade, and posed problems for trading arrangements such as the Lomé Conventions between the European Union (EU) and the 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, which had initially been established in the very different setting of the mid-1970s. Integral to the Lomé Conventions has been the principle of non-reciprocity, under which the EU offered preferential conditions for access to its markets by products originating in the ACP states, without any requirement for reciprocal concessions (other than most-favoured-nation status) by the ACP. These preferences are due to expire with the 4th Lomé Convention in February 2000. Because they are non-reciprocal, these preferences cannot qualify under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. Being available only to a particular group of developing countries, they are discriminatory and cannot be regarded as being covered by Part IV of the GATT, or the Enabling Clause of 1979, since these measures only sanction special, differential and preferential treatment for all developing countries. As a result of the changed climate of opinion in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), emphasising the obligation of members to bring their trade measures into conformity with WTO disciplines, the EU sought and obtained a waiver from Article I (principle of non-discrimination) for the remaining duration of the Convention, leaving open the arrangements to be put into effect after 2000.

In the public discussions and consultations on a successor arrangement to Lomé, the European Commission has emphasised the need for such an arrangement to be compatible with WTO requirements, so as to ensure the legal security of preferences. It is therefore envisaged that Lomé preferences will be available only to the least developed countries (LLDCs), but will be generalised to all of the least developed countries, including for example Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao D.R., Maldives, Nepal and Yemen, and not just to members of the ACP Group. The Commission has proposed that the non-LLDC ACP countries should be offered a series of regional and sub-regional free trade agreements. Not only would such arrangements seek to be WTO compatible, but the Commission also sees reciprocal regional agreements as stepping stones to fully liberalised trade and the integration of the developing countries into the world economy – an important development cooperation objective of the Maastricht Treaty.

This article examines the Commission's proposals, and analyses the likely static and dynamic effects of a free trade agreement on the African ACP countries. It concludes by questioning whether the Commission's proposals would assist, rather than hinder, the regional integration and greater participation of these countries in the world economy.

Over the last several decades, officials in both the public and private sectors have applied economic, military, cultural, academic and diplomatic tools to promote the spread of democratic pluralism in African and elsewhere. With the fall of Africa's most resilient tyrant, Mobutu Sese Seko, there is hope that even one of Africa's most troubled systems may be transformed into a state that reflects the will of the people and promotes the common good. Sober observers, however, remain pessimistic. Laurent Kabila's spotted record on human rights, his stubborn intolerance of political opposition, the challenging global economic and political environments, and the long history of bad government in Mobutu's Zaïre are obvious reasons for concern. Furthermore, the example of most other African states is not encouraging. With the exception of countries such as South Africa and Botswana, even the most tenuous democratic progress in Africa is often slowed, blocked or reversed.

Generally, blame for this state of affairs has been levelled against the African political elite, the burden of colonialism, or international political and economic pressures. Specifically, for the Congo, Mobutu's kleptocracy, Belgium's paternalism, America's backing of a friendly dictator and the World Bank's support for ill-advised ‘development’ schemes all have been criticised. While such reproaches may be well deserved, this article argues that it is important to ask if the persistent failure of democracy in the Congo as well as in other African states is also related to African political culture.