Conflicts between farmers and herdsmen are certainly not new phenomena: they already occurred at the time of the biblical patriarchs. In West Africa, conflicts over the use of scarce natural resources between farmers and herdsmen are said to be on the increase. The occurrence of such conflicts is generally attributed to growing pressure on natural resources, caused by population increase, the growth of herds and the extension of cultivated areas outpacing population growth. That such conflicts appear to oppose two ethnic groups – generally Fulbe herdsmen versus a population group of farmers – is explained by the fact that not only has overall competition over natural resources increased due to a saturation of space, but that at the same time a balance between the two groups has been broken. The convergence of production systems, as a result of farmers engaging in cattle breeding and herdsmen in agriculture, entailed the disappearance of both ecological and economic complementarity between the two groups – a process that is said to have been accelerated by the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. The interpretation of these conflicts depends on the – sometimes implicit – assumption that formerly, in an often unspecified epoch in the past, relations between farmers and herdsmen could be conceived of in terms of symbiosis – a relationship based on mutual dependence and mutual advantage with implied complementarity in the ecological and economic spheres.

A constitution enjoys a special place in the life of any nation, for it regulates not only the exercise of political power, but also the relationship between political entities and between the state and persons. Being the supreme law, it helps to shape the organisation and development of society both for the present and for future generations, and sets objective standards upon which the people and the international community can judge government performance, thus providing a measure of accountability and transparency in national and local affairs. Further, a constitution sets out the rights and duties of the citizens, and provides mechanisms to enable them to protect their interests. Overall a constitution can contribute to the development of a politically active civil society as well as promoting good governance, accountability and the rule of law.

Prior to the 1990s the history of constitutions and constitutionalism in Commonwealth Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, was bleak. The newly independent states started life with the Westminster export model constitution bestowed upon them by the British. There was little or no opportunity for public debate on the document, and the nationalist leaders themselves had no genuine choice as to its structure and contents. The futility of forcing the model on the newly independent states, in the words of Karugire ‘a triumph of hope over experience’, inevitably led to constitutional instability and a round of constitution-making and amendment wholly designed to enhance executive power, remove checks and balances, and undermine the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms.

At the end of June 1997, the mandate of the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was completed with conditional success, and superseded by the more modestly manned and resourced Observation Mission in Angola (Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola – MONUA). The ‘draw-down’ of UNAVEM III marked the end of one period in the UN's somewhat chequered history of engagement in Angola. The completion of its mandate followed the apparent commitment on the part of UNITA (União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola) to move ahead to the final implementation of the Lusaka Protocol of November 1994. By the terms of this protocol, UNITA was to demobilise the greater part of its army and integrate the remainder into the national armed forces (the FAA – Forças Armadas Angolanas). Already in April, UNITA had complied with a central part of the political requirements of the protocol by inaugurating a new coalition government of national unity with the ruling MPLA-PT (Movimento de Libertação de Angola – Partido Trabalhista).

Civil society is the space of uncoerced human association and relational networks formed for the sake of family, faith, interests and ideology. Supporters of civil society have argued that this conglomeration of networks and organisations has helped to fuel democratic aspirations and channel democratic demands in Africa. Proponents maintain that civil society serves as a counter to the actions of the predatory African state, which seeks to limit individual freedoms and to encroach on societal resources. By questioning the actions of state officials and by challenging state policies, civil society organisations can cause the state to be more accountable and transparent, and can facilitate a positive deconcentration of political power. A plural, vibrant civil society encourages political liberalisation and the development of a democratic and legitimate state. It is because the organisations of civil society promote democratic values among their members that they are able to challenge repressive state actions and facilitate democratic development. Since their members trust each other and feel that they have a say in group activities, democratic organisations are more unified and effective at achieving their political objectives.

This article challenges these assumptions about civil society through an examination of rural Senegalese organisations. I argue that groups in civil society rarely teach their members democratic values because most associations do not practice legitimate, inclusive and accountable decision making. More often than not, social hierarchies and power relations that define how individuals of different genders and classes are to interact in the public realm limit democracy. As a result, civil society groups often become ineffective and disorganised, and cannot achieve their political, economic or social goals. The inefficiency and undemocratic nature of civil society have larger implications for democratic transitions in Africa.

The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) policy towards Africa in the 1990s has its roots in the crisis surrounding the Tiananmen Square crackdown on 4 June 1989, and the heavy and persistent criticism by the developed world levelled against Beijing's human rights record since that date. Previous to this, the importance of the African continent to China had become less and less important in the 1980s, as the Cold War underwent a thawing process and China's modernisation project demanded foreign investment and technological assistance. Though Chinese officials paid rhetorical lip service to such issues as South–South co-operation, the reality of the situation was that Beijing was mainly interested in maintaining intimate relations with those countries from which it could benefit economically. In stark contrast to China's position in the 1960s and 1970s, exhortations and propaganda grounded in Maoist foundations disappeared, for the ‘socialist modernisation’ project of Deng Xiaoping demanded economic investment and a non-conflictual approach to international politics. As a result, non-ideological relations with the United States, Western Europe and Japan based on expanding trade links and co-operation took a priority in China's foreign policy formulation.

The journey of nation-building is long and complicated. Even though the bases of Eritrean nationalism have been firmly established through our long liberation struggle, it has yet to be concluded. It is known that to build [a] peaceful and rich country is the hardest, and more complicated than to get success in war. The National Charter of Eritrea, EPLF (1994)

Over the last several decades, officials in both the public and private sectors have applied economic, military, cultural, academic and diplomatic tools to promote the spread of democratic pluralism in African and elsewhere. With the fall of Africa's most resilient tyrant, Mobutu Sese Seko, there is hope that even one of Africa's most troubled systems may be transformed into a state that reflects the will of the people and promotes the common good. Sober observers, however, remain pessimistic. Laurent Kabila's spotted record on human rights, his stubborn intolerance of political opposition, the challenging global economic and political environments, and the long history of bad government in Mobutu's Zaïre are obvious reasons for concern. Furthermore, the example of most other African states is not encouraging. With the exception of countries such as South Africa and Botswana, even the most tenuous democratic progress in Africa is often slowed, blocked or reversed.

Generally, blame for this state of affairs has been levelled against the African political elite, the burden of colonialism, or international political and economic pressures. Specifically, for the Congo, Mobutu's kleptocracy, Belgium's paternalism, America's backing of a friendly dictator and the World Bank's support for ill-advised ‘development’ schemes all have been criticised. While such reproaches may be well deserved, this article argues that it is important to ask if the persistent failure of democracy in the Congo as well as in other African states is also related to African political culture.