This article seeks to explain the breakdown of post-colonial order in the northern Brazilian province of Maranhão that culminated in the Balaiada rebellion (1838–41). Interpretations usually do not take into account the intense political agitation of the previous decades, which already involved lower class participation, and they fail to recognise the major socio-economic differences between the areas touched by the revolt. The main arguments are, first, that the struggle for Independence in Maranhão, more violent than in most other provinces, opened the door to lower class involvement in politics under liberal leadership. Secondly, the struggle between local elites for regional power led to exclusion of peripheral elites within the province and fuelled lower class unrest. Significant moments of rupture between liberal leadership and popular movement occurred as early as 1823–4 and 1831–2. Thirdly, the main structural factor leading to the 1838 outbreak of rebellion was the resistance to military recruitment by the free lower classes, which provided a unifying slogan to otherwise heterogeneous groups of peasants, cowboys, and fishermen. Fourthly, the differences in social structure between the cattle producing South, the cotton plantation belt of the Itapecuru valley and the strong subsistence sector in Eastern Maranhão account for substantial differences in terms of support and leadership during the Balaiada. Whilst fazendeiros lead the struggle in Southern Maranhão, as well as in most of the neighbouring Piauí province, leadership in Eastern Maranhão was almost entirely of lower class origin. Finally, the dynamics of the movement could lead in Eastern Maranhão to a rupture with elite liberalism and envisage the alliance between free rebels and maroons.

This article seeks to demonstrate the need to incorporate the international component of political strategy into analysis of the behaviour of democratising elites, a standpoint that too often has been neglected in democratisation theory. It explores a little-known aspect of Argentina's foreign policy that took place under the stewardship of the transitional democratic administration of President Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989). Specifically, it reveals that the first-freely elected administration that followed the Procesco military dictatorship articulated and implemented a strategy that aimed at defending and promoting democratic values in relation to Argentina's Southern Cone and Andean neighbours. Argentine bilateral relations with Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile are analysed through this analytical standpoint. It is argued that the Alfonsín government pursued such a policy out of a blend of fear for its own perpetuation and principled beliefs about the value of democracy as a mode of governance.

The tenuous organisational structure of the Venezuelan neighbourhood movement explains its failure to live up to the lofty expectations which social movements created in Latin America in the 1980s. To understand why structural looseness prevails, it is necessary to examine social cleavages as well as the disparity between the theoretical model which underpins much discourse and legislation, on the one hand, and the daily practice of neighbourhood associations, on the other. An additional area of enquiry is the division in the national leadership between an apolitical current and one that views electoral politics as a natural avenue for the movement to pursue. Scholars, even those who have recently emphasized the importance of links between social movements and political structures, overlook the importance of organisational unity at the national level.

This article examines the relationship between pact-making and democratic transitions in Nicaragua (1988–1997) and El Salvador (1990–1997). We argue that the process of elite bargaining about regime change affects the prospects for the consolidation of democracy. We emphasise three factors: (1) the choices key actors make as they bargain about bargaining, (2) their willingness to ‘under-utilise’ their power and (3) the influence of historical and structural contingencies upon the key choices made. Essential to our discussion of historical and structural contingencies is the interrelation of domestic and international actors and the importance of demilitarisation and institutional reform. We argue that these three factors favoured El Salvador more than Nicaragua, although neither nation has overcome the political polarisation characteristic of transitional regimes.

Regional economic integration schemes abound in Latin America, yet very little is known about the degree of popular support for such programmes. Now that democratic regimes rule in almost all of Latin America, public opinion can have an important impact on national policies. This paper examines the attitudes toward economic integration in 17 mainland Latin American countries with interview data from over 18,000 people. Bi-variate and multivariate analyses are conducted on the factors related to support for regional integration. Perceived benefits of integration and perceptions of personal and national economic situation prove to be important factors, as are higher levels of education, support for democracy and gender (males favour integration more than females). Two novel findings are that a positive opinion of the European Union along with satisfaction with the functioning of democracy are both linked to greater support for integration.

Since the trade liberalisation of the mid 1980s the trade regime facing Mexican manufacturers has changed dramatically. The economy has moved from one where import substitution behind tariffs and some licensing restrictions was the norm to a highly open trading environment with virtual free trade between Mexico and its largest trade partner the USA and modest tariffs of around 10 per cent with other countries. Since the late 1980s manufactured exports have grown dramatically at one of the fastest rates of any economy, although financed by large capital inflows the net trade balance in manufactures remains negative. This paper surveys the recent evidence on the impact of this liberalisation process on manufacturing performance. Various performance indicators can be used to assess the impact on manufacturing. Here four are discussed: (1) revealed comparative advantage measures of net trade balance; (2) efficiency wage estimates of unit labour costs; (3) total factor growth; (4) export growth. The performance of different branches of manufacturing is examined using these indicators and tests are conducted to establish links between movements in these indicators and the degree of exposure to foreign competition experienced by the various branches. The general conclusion is that the evidence is ambiguous with only some studies supporting the view that the greater the trade liberalisation in a branch the greater will be the subsequent improvement in performance.

Economic development is positively related to the presence of favourable cultural attitudes (‘progressive values’): the radius of trust, the ethical system, the nature of the exercise of authority, and attitudes to work, savings, and innovation. This article explores the possibility of a virtuous circle linking economic policies and Latin American cultural attitudes, mostly using examples from Chile since the mid 1980s. The link from culture to development emerges from education, economic awareness and professional economics, and the traditional culture and spontaneous cultural change. The link from economic policy to culture is represented by developments in macroeconomics and the financial sector, industrial protection and free trade, and female participation in the labour market. The role of poverty and inequality, and the effectiveness of exhortation versus incentives, and of concentrating the effort on several specific groups, are also examined.