The informational role of prices contributes positively to their variability. In a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, traders rationally respond to price changes by revising their estimates of other traders' private signals and hence their own expectations of future dividends. The resultant shifts in traders' demands amplify any supply shock-induced price changes. We develop an infinite horizon noisy rational expectations model and calibrate, simulate, and test it using U.S. stock market data. The price variability in a heterogeneous information economy is shown to be 20% to 46% higher than in an otherwise equivalent economy in which all signals are publicly announced.

This study compares the relations between asset flow and performance in the retail mutual fund and fiduciary pension fund segments of the money management industry, and relate empirical differences to fundamental differences in the clientele they serve. A striking difference is the shape of the flow-performance relation. In contrast to mutual fund investors, pension clients punish poorly performing managers by withdrawing assets under management and do not flock disproportionately to recent winners. We interpret these and other empirical differences in the context of the manager evaluation procedures typical in each segment. We conclude that pension managers have little incentive to engage in the risk-shifting behavior previously identified among mutual fund managers.

We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds from 1988–1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when increases in the investment advisor's compensation are larger and when the fund uses affiliated brokerdealers to solicit subscriptions to the offer. A clinical analysis shows that rights offerings allow investment advisors to sidestep fee rebates and increase pecuniary benefits to affiliated entities. Overall, our results suggest the presence of significant conflicts of interest in rights offerings by closed-end funds.

The options-based approach to studying irreversible investment under uncertainty emphasizes that the opportunity cost of investment includes the value of the option to wait that is extinguished when an investment is undertaken. Thus, the investment decision is affected by the determinants of the value of this option. We extend and generalize a standard model of irreversible investment by introducing a second fully reversible technology, and also incorporate partial reversibility by allowing capital to be abandoned at a cost. As in the existing literature, we find that the threshold value of the “underlying asset” (in our case, demand) at which investment takes place is increasing in the uncertainty of demand. We also find that the value of the option and thus the threshold value of the option value multiple at which investment takes place may be either increasing or decreasing in the uncertainty of demand. In addition, we find that for the case in which capital is used to replace the reversible technology, the threshold value of the option value multiple is insensitive to the degree of reversibility of capital.

We use a two-year panel of individual accounts in an S&P 500 index mutual fund to examine the trading and investment behavior of more than 91,000 investors who have chosen a low-cost, passively managed vehicle for savings. We identify classes of momentum investors and contrarian investors. We use these classes to build up “behavioral factors” based on contrarian and momentum flows and we show that they are relevant for pricing. They perform well against a benchmark of loadings on latent factors extracted from returns.

If stocks were severely undervalued in the late 1970s and early 1980s, then the bull market starting in 1982 was partly just a correction to more normal valuation levels. This paper tests the hypothesis that investors suffer from inflation illusion, resulting in the undervaluation of equities in the presence of inflation, with levered firms being undervalued the most. Using firm level data and a residual income/EVA model, we find evidence that errors in the valuation of levered firms during inflationary times result in depressed stock prices. Our misvaluation measure can be used with expected inflation to make statistically reliable predictions for real returns on the Dow during the subsequent year. Our model suggests that stocks were overvalued at the end of the 1990s.

I develop an agency model where returns-chasing behavior by mutual fund investors causes beta not to be priced to the degree predicted by the standard CAPM. Mutual fund investors chase returns through time, precipitating unusually large aggregate cash inflows into mutual funds just after dramatic market runups. Mutual fund investors also chase returns cross-sectionally across funds so that the highest-performing funds capture the largest fraction of the aggregate inflows into the mutu al fund sector. The interaction of these two flow-performance relationships induces an asymmetry in payoffs to mutual funds where fund managers care most about outperforming peers during bull markets. Since high-beta stocks tend to outperform in up markets, active fund managers tilt their portfolios toward high-beta stocks, reducing the beta risk premium in equilibrium. To support the model's time-series flow-performance assumption, I show empirically that market returns have a large economic impact on subsequent aggregate mutual fund flows. In addition, data on mutual fund holdings suggest that the aggregate stock portfolio held by equity funds is overweighted in high-beta stocks relative to the overall market, though this does not include the cash held by mutual funds. Fama-MacBeth tests indicate that the equity premium falls only slightly as the relative size of mutual funds increases, and the relation is not statistically significant.

The paper explores the economic value of being able to span market outcomes through the use of options. We model an economy with a single risky asset. Consumption takes place at one date, corresponding to the horizon of all investors. Options on the consumption good are not redundant securities in the economy because volatility is uncertain. The model enables us to examine the benefits to investors of using options to optimize their investments. Within this model, the gains from the use of options appear to be relatively minor.

We provide empirical evidence on order submission strategy of investors with similar commitments to trade by comparing the execution costs of market orders and marketable limit orders (i.e., limit orders with the same trading priority as market orders). The results indicate the unconditional trading costs of marketable limit orders are significantly greater than market orders. We attribute the difference in costs to a selection bias and provide evidence suggesting the order submission strategy decision is based on prevailing market conditions and stock characteristics. After correcting for the selection bias, the results show the average trader chooses the order type with lower conditional trading costs.

This paper solves, in closed form, the optimal portfolio choice problem for an investor with utility over consumption under mean-reverting returns. Previous solutions either require approximations, numerical methods, or the assumption that the investor does not consume over his lifetime. This paper breaks the impasse by assuming that markets are complete. The solution leads to a new understanding of hedging demand and of the behavior of the approximate log-linear solution. The portfolio allocation takes the form of a weighted average and is shown to be analogous to duration for coupon bonds. Through this analogy, the notion of investment horizon is extended to that of an investor who consumes at multiple points in time.

We examine the extent to which offer prices reflect public information for 3,325 IPOs over the period 1990–1999. We focus primarily on four variables: share overhang, file range amendments, venture capital backing, and previous issue underpricing. We show that 35%–50% of the variation in IPO underpricing can be predicted using public information known before the offer date and therefore conclude that IPO offer prices underadjust to widely available public information to a much greater extent than previously documented.

Are auction markets or dealer markets better able to identify informed traders? Our analysis of firms that transfer to an alternative exchange structure indicates that traders are more anonymous in a competing dealer market than in an auction environment. Our evidence also shows that the associated changes in the probability of trading with an informed trader are related to changes in the bid-ask spread. The reduction in bid-ask spreads is more pronounced for firms with higher probability of transacting with an informed trader prior to the relocation from a dealer to an auction market.

This article studies the valuation of options written on the average level of a Markov process. The general properties of such options are examined. We propose a closed-form characterization in which the option payoff is contingent on cumulative catastrophe losses. In our framework, the loss rate is a mean-reverting Markov process, with no continuous martingale component. The model supposes that high loss levels have lower arrival rates. We analytically derive the cumulative loss process and its characteristic function. The resulting option model is promising.

This study empirically investigates how new information is incorporated into intra-daily DM-$US quotes, and finds evidence that certain dealers consistently incorporate new information into their quotes before others and that their behavior is influenced by market conditions. In general, Chemical Bank's quotes are the first to contain new information. However, in the periods of uncertainty around central bank interventions, evidence suggests Deutsche Bank is the price leader and its quotes are influenced by information and inventory considerations.

This study compares the speed of price adjustments to seasoned equity offering announcements by NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks. We find that price adjustments are quicker by as much as one hour on Nasdaq. This result is not due to differences in issuer characteristics or announcement effects across the markets, but due to differences in market structures. Greater risk taking by dealers, more rapid order execution, and more frequent informed trading (SOES bandits) on Nasdaq, as well as stale limit orders and a less efficient opening price-setting mechanism on the NYSE/AMEX, all contribute to faster stock price adjustments on Nasdaq.

This study investigates market price integration by testing per-share trade execution price or cost (TEP/C) differentials for matched intraday trades for a sample of Canadian shares cross-listed in the U.S. The TSE trade price advantage over the entire time period changed significantly after both the TSE's own minimum quotation increment reduction and that of its U.S. competitors. We show that the differential TEP/C is equivalent to the international effective spread differential and that market quality comparisons, which benchmark using the National instead of the International BBO, need to compare both national effective half-spread and midspread differences. Our cross-sectional regression results support our predictions that TEP/C differentials can be explained by differences in national midspreads and by ex ante proxies of national effective half-spreads. The TEP/C differentials vary inversely with increasing levels of our measure of signed market nonfragmentation.

This paper examines preferencing arrangements and tacit collusion in laboratory asset markets. In the experiments, dealers may internalize by matching the best quote or by passing orders to the dealer posting the best quote. Although some markets were highly competitive, several markets reached a collusive equilibrium with wide spreads and near complete internalization of order flow. The paper further examines the role of market transparency and passed order flow on quote-setting behavior and suggests that these affect the mechanism leading to tacitly collusive equilibria.

This paper extends the seminal Cox-Ross-Rubinstein ((1979), CRR hereafter) binomial model to multiple assets. It differs from previous models in that it is derived under the complete market environment specified by Duffie and Huang (1985) and He (1990).

The complete market assumption requires the number of states to grow linearly with the number of assets. However, the number of correlations grows at a faster rate, causing the CRR model to be indirectly extendable. We solve such a problem by recognizing that the fast growing correlation number is matched by the number of the angles of the edges of a hypercube spanned by the risky assets. As a result, we derive a solution that allows the number of equations to equal the number of risky assets and the riskless bond. The resulting tree structure hence provides the same intuition of pricing and hedging contingent claims as that provided by the CRR model.

Finally, the proposed model is not only as easy to implement as the one-dimensional CRR model but also it is more memory efficient than the existing multi-factor lattice models.

We identify and characterize a class of term structure models where bond yields are quadratic functions of the state vector. We label this class the quadratic class and aim to lay a solid theoretical foundation for its future empirical application. We consider asset pricing in general and derivative pricing in particular under the quadratic class. We provide two general transform methods in pricing a wide variety of fixed income derivatives in closed or semi-closed form. We further illustrate how the quadratic model and the transform methods can be applied to more general settings.

American options require numerical methods, namely lattice models, to provide accurate price estimates. The computations can become expensive when more than one state variable is involved. Analytical upper bounds can therefore provide a useful guideline for how high American values can reach. In this paper, we derive analytical (closed-form) upper bounds for American option prices under stochastic interest rates, stochastic volatility, and jumps where American option prices are difficult to compute with accuracy. In a stochastic volatility model (Heston (1993) and Scott (1997)) that has two random factors, we demonstrate that the upper bound only takes a very small fraction of the time that the American option needs to compute.