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Pathologies or Progress? Evaluating the effects of Divided Government and Party Volatility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

O. FIONA YAP  and
YOUNGMI KIM
O. FIONA YAP
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence KS 66044
YOUNGMI KIM
Affiliation:
Leverhulme Trust, Early Career Fellow, School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LD
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Extract

A vast body of literature emphasizes that successful political development relies on stable and united political parties that underpin clear and responsive policymaking. By this perspective, divided government and party volatility represent pathologies that imperil political accountability and development. Indeed, studies contend that divided government – where different parties control the executive and legislative branches of government – lead to policy deadlock while party volatility – characterized by frequent party splits, solo switches, mergers, dissolutions or the establishment of new parties – confounds representation and accountability. Clearly, each on its own is seen as a considerable threat to political performance and democratic development; the confluence of the two points virtually to an inevitable political doom.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , December 2008 , pp. 261 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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