The methodical aspects of comparative law is a field which has, up to now, hardly been cultivated systematically although probably more so in Israel than in some other countries.

The subject normally evokes the question whether comparative law is a legal technique, a method of legal thinking, or an autonomous discipline of legal science, a field of law in its own right. I do not intend to deal with this problem because I think the effort will yield little. Any possible answer I would suggest, is true only to some extent depending on the context: if, for example, comparative law is used for the interpretation of a legal rule, it certainly belongs to the method of interpretation and thus lies in the field of legal method; if a special course in comparative law is taught to introduce students to its techniques and its basic premises, you may properly regard it as a discipline of its own.

Israel judges usually have regard to English precedents which fit (or appear to them to fit) the case they are dealing with—sometimes, even when a local norm exists that may be applicable. And apparently they have not freed themselves from this practice even in those cases where it is neither Ottoman nor Mandatory law that is involved but Israel law in the narrow sense of that term, or in respect of those statutes which are intended to be part of an evolving Israel codification. The practice is likely to come into conflict not only with the view that English law—as referred to in Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922–47—is no longer relevant to our current law since the establishment of the State or the view that at least these Israel laws do not require supplementation from outside, but also with the view of those who, having reservations about such outlook, simply urge that English law need not apply, even under Article 46 itself, so long as a domestic legal order exists.

I. Generations of lawyers have laboured to establish a code on the law ol treaties. Eventually, a treaty on that subject was signed in Vienna on May 23, 1969—the “Treaty on Treaties”. Without intending now to go into questions regarding the Convention as a whole (it certainly is one of the best prepared pieces of modern international legislation), attention must be paid to a matter which the President of the Conference itself, Professor Roberto Ago, found necessary to point out in a specific Report on the Final Stage of the Codification of International Law to the International Law Commission, and which has been revived as a subject of doctrinal studies, under dramatic pressure, first by the bodies which feel responsible for the security of air traffic. The need for rapid entry into force of certain international Conventions, however, also poses the question whether experience, subsequent to the Vienna Conference, is appropriately helped by that code. This is the point of observation chosen for this paper: treaty-making as part of the functional operation of inter-governmental organizations.

The question is far from being purely academic. As will be seen below, several important IGOs have these last years posed the question of simplification of entry into force of ‘their’ treaty law. It must be asked therefore whether this is—or may become—a general trend or possibly one limited to a specific category of IGOs, and hence of treaties. We will show that there are no short-cuts to “simplification” and “simple” solutions.

Two recent English cases bring to the fore the difficulties that controlling shareholders face when they wish to remove incumbent directors. In the case of Bushell v. Faith, the director involved took refuge in an article of association which weighted the voting power of directors for the sole purpose of defeating a removal resolution. Although he held only one third of the outstanding shares, he was able to outvote the controlling shareholders and remain in the saddle. The House of Lords decided that the article in question did not run foul of sec. 184(1) of the 1948 Companies Act, which invalidates articles requiring more than a simple resolution for removal of directors.

The rationale of the Court of Appeal and of the House of Lords was that as long as multiple and restricted voting rights are generally recognized, no different rule can apply to voting rights weighted specifically for blocking a removal resolution. Only Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest endorsed the reasoning of Ungoed-Thomas J. at first instance (not reported) who held that the purpose of the article in question was to make a director irremovable and that it was tantamount to a requirement that more than a simple majority be necessary for removal.

The Land Law, 1969, brought into statutory effect a class of servitudes under the heading of “Easements”. On a first reading of the relevant provisions (sec. 5 and secs. 92–98) it might appear that their import is reasonably clear. Various questions, however, arise as to the meaning and scope of these enactments.

Are the new provisions founded, to a greater or lesser degree, on either the English or American concepts, or has the legislature in Israel endeavoured not only to broaden the scope of servitudes as such, but also to give legal sanction to a new class of servitudes which would not receive recognition either in England or in America? These questions will be considered in the light of the new Law and its relationship to the general approach and legal thinking on the subject in England and the U.S.A.