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On the Authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Weal B. Hallaq
Weal B. Hallaq
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Extract

Sunni Islam recognizes four sources from and through which the laws governing its conduct are derived. These are the Qur'an, the Sunna of the Prophet, the consensus (ljmā') of the community and its scholars, and qiyās, the juridicological method of inference. The first two sources provide the jurist with the material from which he is to extract through qiyas and ijtihād (the disciplined exercise of mental faculty) the law which he believes to the best of his knowledge to be that decreed by God. Except for a relatively limited number of cases where the Qu'an and the Sunna offer already-formulated legal judgments, the great majority of furū' cases, which constitute the body of positive and substantive law, are derived by qiyas. Thus, qiyas may be used to “discover” the judgment of a new case provided that this case has not already been solved in the two primary sources. The process of legal reasoning which qiyas involves is charged with innumerable difficulties not the least of which is finding the circle of common similarity, the 'illa, between the original case in the texts and the new case which requires a legal judgment. Since finding the 'illa entails a certain amount of guesswork (zann) on the part of the jurist and since it is highly probable that the 'illa is extracted from a text which is not entirely reliable or a text capable of more than one interpretation, Sunni jurists deemed the results of qiyas to be probable (zannī). It is only at this point that consensus may enter into play in the legal process. Should Muslims, represented by their jurists, reach an agreement on the validity of a zanni legal judgment, such judgment is automatically transferred from the domain of juristic speculation to that of certainty (qat', yaqīn). Consensus then renders this judgment irrevocable, not to be challenged or reinterpreted by later generations. Furthermore, this judgment, being so irrevocable, acquires a validity tantamount to that of the Qur'an and the highly reliable traditions embodied in the Sunna of the Prophet. Thus, such a case with its established judgment becomes a precedent according to which another new legal question may be solved. It is only in this sense that consensus functions as a source of law, a source which is infallible.

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International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , November 1986 , pp. 427 - 454
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

Author's note: This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, San Francisco, November 28-December 1, 1984.

1 Writers on legal theory (usūl al-fiqh) disagreed upon the question of who counts in consensus. A commonly held view, however, was that on general issues the community, the umma, can reach a consensus, but on technical and specialized points of law only qualified jurists, the mujtahids, count. See al-Ghazāli, Abü Hāmid, al-Mustasfā min 'ilm al-usūl, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1322 H.), vol. I, p. 181 ff.;Google Scholaral-Bahgdādī, al-Khatib, al-Faqīh wal-mutafaqqih, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1975), vol. 1, p. 172.Google Scholar

2 The definition of qiyas differs from one jurist to another. Thus one may find that in addition to analogy, qiyas encompasses reductio ad absurdum, a fortiori arguments, deduction, and induction. On the role of deduction in law see Abdel-Rahman, Hasan, “La place du syllogisme juridique dans Ia méthode exégetique chez Gazali,” in Hubien, H., ed., Le raisonnement juridique (Brussels, 1971), pp. 185–194. On the use of these arguments see my forthcoming articles, “The Logic of Legal Reasoning in Religious and Non-Religious Cultures: The Case of Islamic Law and Common Law,” Cleveland State Law Review, and “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyas.”Google Scholar Also: al-Ghazälī, Abä Hamid, Mi'yar al-'ilm fi fann al-mantiq (Beirut, 1964), pp. 32–33, 113–137, 154, 182 ff.;Google Scholaral-Basrī, Abū al-Husayn, Kitāb al-qiyas al-shar'ī, printed with al Mu'tamad fīt usul al-fiqh, ed. Hamidullah, Muhammad et al. , 2 vols. (Damas, 1964–1965), vol. II, p. 1031;Google Scholaral-Shawkānī, Muhammad b. 'Alī, Irshād al-fuhül ilā tahqīq al-haqq min 'ilm al-usül (Cairo, 1909), p. 198.Google Scholar

3 al-Shīrāzi, Abū Ishāq, al Luma' fī usül al-fiqh (Cairo, 1326 H.), pp. 56–58;Google ScholarRushd, Abū al-Walīd Muhammad Ibn, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1974), vol. 1, p. 6. The great majority of jurists upheld the infallibility of the community and, consequently, the conclusive certainty of consensus.Google Scholar See al-Isnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn, Nihāyat al-sūfī sharh minhāj al-wusül, a commentary on Baydāwī's Minhāī-wusūl ilā 'ilm al-usūl, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1316 H.), vol. II, pp. 166–167; Muhammad b. 'lī al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuhul, pp. 78–79.Google Scholar

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5 Most noteworthy of the sectarian Critics of consensus are the Rāida (Imāmiya) of the early Shī'a, the Ismā'iliyya and the Mu'tazilī scholar Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām (d. between 220/835 and 231/845). See al-Juwaynī, lmām al-Haramayn, al-Burhān fi usūl al-flqh, ed. Dīb, 'Abd al'Azīm, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1979), vol. 1, p. 676;Google Scholar Baghdādī, Faqīh, vol. 1, p. 154; al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn, al-Ihkām fī usūl al-ahkām, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1968), vol. I, p. 166.Google Scholar For the criticism of the later Fātimi scholar al-Qādī alNu'mān, see his Ikhtilāf usūl al-madhāhib, ed. Lokhandwalla, S. T. (Simla, 1972), pp. 56–115.Google ScholarCf. Bernand, Marie, “L'gmāc chez 'Abd al-Gabbār et l'objection d'an-Nazzam,” Studia Islamica, 30 (1969), 34 ff. who questions the later accounts attributing to Nazzam his position against consensus.Google Scholar

6 Cf. Mansour, Camille, L'autorité dans lapensée musulmane (Paris, 1975), pp. 60ff.Google Scholar

7 Hurgronje, C. Snouck, “The ‘Foundations’ of Islamic Law,” in Selected Works, eds. Bousquet, G.-H. and Schacht, J. (Leiden, 1975), p. 275.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., p. 276.

9 Hurgronje, “Sur Ia nature du ‘droit’ Musulmane,” in Selected Works, ibid., p. 227; trans. cited from Hourani, G., “The Basis of Authority of Sunni Consensus,” Studia Islamica, 21 (1964), 51–52.Google Scholar

10 Hurgronje, “The ‘Foundations’,” p. 289.

11 Idem, “Nature du ‘droit’,” p. 226.

12 Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh, 1964), p. 77.Google Scholar

13 Schacht, Joseph, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950), pp. 2, 94, 135.Google Scholar

14 Hourani, “The Basis of Authority,” pp. 13–60, especially pp. 49–54.

15 Ibid., pp. 14–15: “Thus no assumption is being made at all that consensus is an essential part of Islam, nor even that Traditions of the Prophet are so, though they will be considered seriously.” (Italics are mine.)

16 Ibid., p. 59.

17 Hazm, lbn, al-lhkām fī usūl al-ahkām, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1978), vol. 1, p. 12. See also Juwaynī, Burhān, vol. II, p. 152.Google Scholar

18 Hazm, Ibn, Ihkām, vol. I, pp. 11, 108. On Qur' anic verses and hadith asserting that the Sunna is part of revelation see Baghdādī, Faqīh, vol. 1, pp. 90 ff., 94;Google Scholaral-Shāfi'ī, Ibn Idrīs, al-Risāla, ed. Kīlānī, M. S. (Cairo, 1969), par. 236–257;Google Scholaral-Fārisīi, Abū 'Alī, Jawāhir al-usūl fī 'ilm hadīth al-rasūl (Madina, 1973), p. 4.Google Scholar

19 Batta, Ibn, Kitāb al-sharh wal-ibāna 'alā usūl al-Sunna wal-diāna, ed. and trans. Laoust, H. (Damascus, 1958), pp. 56 ff. (Arabic text).Google Scholar

20 Hazm, Ibn, Ihkām, vol. 1, p. 318.Google Scholar

21 The mutawātir traditions are transmitted by countless persons who hear or see the Prophet say or do a certain thing and, at each stage of transmission, the tradition is also transmitted by countless persons. The large number of transmitters makes it inconceivable that the witnesses or the transmitters could have agreed on falsifying the report. Because of the authenticity of such a report and the certitude surrounding its transmission, the mutawatir traditions are said to lead to certain knowledge of what they contain. Traditions transmitted by fewer people than those who have witnessed and transmitted the mutawatir traditions are considered ahadi, which do not lead to certain knowledge of the information they convey. Later jurists and theologians distinguished a third type of tradition which they termed mustafīd. This type stands in the middle between the mutawatir and the ahadi. See al-Bāji, Ibn Khalaf, Kitāb al-hudadūd fī al-usūl, ed. Hammād, N. (Beirut, 1973), p. 62;Google Scholar 'al-Baghdādī, Abd al-Qāhir, Usūl al-dīn (Beirut, 1928), p. 12.Google Scholar

22 Goldziher, I., Muslim Studies, ed. Stern, S. M., trans. Barber, C. R. and Stern, S. M. (New York, 1971), vol. II, p. 25;Google Scholar Bravmann, Spiritual Background, p. 197; Rahman, Fazlur, Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi, 1965), pp. 18, 19.Google Scholar

23 Rahman, Islamic Methodology, p. 19.

24 The Arabic: “Mā ra'ūhu al-mu'minūna hasanan fahuwa 'inda Allāhi hasanun wamā ra'ū al-muslimūna qabīhan fahuwa 'inda Allāhi qabīh.” This is also in line with the statement attributed to Ibn 'Abbās: “If you hear from me a saying in the name of the Prophet and you find that it does not agree with the book of God or is not liked by people (falam tajidūhu hasanan 'inda al-nāsi), know that I have reported a lie about the Prophet.” Goldziher, Muslim Studies, p. 133; Schacht, Origins, p. 86.

25 For the intellectual formulations of the later period (sixth-seventh/twelfth—thirteenth century) see Weiss, Bernard, “The Primacy of Revelation in Classical Islamic Legal Theory as Expounded by Sayf al-Din al-Amidi,” Studia Islamica, 59 (1984), 79–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Calder, Norman, “Ikhtilaf and Ijma' in Shaf'i's Risala,” Studia Islamica, 58 (1984), 76–77.Google Scholar

27 Ibid., pp. 77–78; Shäfi'ī, Risāla, par. 1328–1332, especially 1331.

28 Cited in Schacht, Origins, p. 92, from Kitāb ikhtilāf Mālik wal-Shāfi'.

29 Shāfi'i, Risala, par. 1312.

30 Ibid., par. 252–257, 266, 1329, passim.

31 Ibid., par. 266.

32 Ibid., par. 1102.

33 Ibid., par. 1315.

34 Shāfi'īs reference to this verse is mentioned in the much later works of Ahmad b. al-Husayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1065), Ahkām al-Qur'an, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1975), vol. 1, p. 39, also p. 32, and the biographical work of al-Subkī, Taj al-Dīn (d. 771/1369), Tabaqā;t a1 Shāfi'iyyat al-Kubrā, 6 vols. (Cairo, 1906), vol. II, p. 19.Google Scholar See also Goldziher, I., Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trans. Andras and Ruth Hamori (Princeton, 1981), p. 51.Google Scholar Schacht, Origins, pp. 90, 91, does not seem to have found the verse in any of Shāfi's discussions on the authority of consensus. Further on this point see Turki, Abdel-Magid, L'ijma' Ummat a1-mu'minin entre Ia doctrine et l'histoire,” Studia Islamica, 59 (1984), 60 (n. l)-63, 70 (n. l)-71.Google Scholar

35 Shāfi'ī, Risāla, par. 1319–1320.

36 Shawkānī, Irshād p. 71 (line 24); “Consensus is the agreement of the mujtahids of the community of Muhammad… on a certain matter in a certain age (Ittfāqu muftahidī ummati muhammadin.… fi 'asrīn mrin alācsari alā amrun mm al-umür).”

37 “Unfortunately, the parts of Jassas's Usal al-fsiqh which deal with consensus are still in manuscript and are not available to me. Here I draw on the quotations and discussion found in Hasan, A., The Doctrine of Jjma' in Islam (Islamabad, 1976), pp. 40 ff. Hasan used Ms. 229-Usul, Dār al-Kutub al-Misriyya, Cairo. My analysis of Jassâs's theory will go as far as the material quoted by Hasan will allow.Google Scholar

38 These traditions are: (1) “My community shall never agree on an error”; (2) “he hand of God is with the community”; (3) “A section of my community will continue to follow the truth”; (4) “Whoever separates himself from the Muslim community even a span, throws away the tie of Islam from his neck”; (5) Hudhayfa is reported to have asked the Prophet: “What can save me from it [schism]?” whereupon he replied: “The community of Muslims and their leader.”

39 A1-Qādī al Nu'mān, Ikhtilaf, pp. 56–58, 77 ff.

40 al-Jabbār, Abd, Mughnī fi abwāb al-tawhpid wal 'adl, ed. al-Khūlī, Amin (Cairo, 1963), vol. XVII, p. 212.Google Scholar See also Bernand, “L'ijma' chez 'Abd al-Gabbar,” pp. 27 ff.

41 al-Jabbār, Abd, vol. XVII, pp. 199, 206.Google Scholar

42 Ibid., p. 160; “li'annahum law lam yakūnū hujjatan lam yajib dhālikafihim.”

43 Ibid., p. 164 (line 2). It is rather difficult to square “rational evidence” in this context, as this runs in diametrical opposition to 'Abd al-Jabbār's argument as it has thus far been outlined.

44 Ibid., pp. 165–167.

45 Ibid., p. 170.

46 Ibid., pp. 196–203.

47 Ibid., pp. 171 ff., 178.

48 Ibid., pp. 172–175.

49 Ibid., pp. 180–181. Samples of these versions have already been given by Shāfi'ī and Jassas.

50 Ibid., pp. 182–185.

51 Ibid., pp. 186–188, 190. It must be noted in this context that the meaning of certain passages is difficult to make out. Evidently there are gaps in the texts which have not been pointed out by the editor. Confusion can also be detected in the attribution of the arguments to their proponents; i.e., the roles of the interlocutor and 'Abd al-Jabbar are sometimes switched. See, e.g., p. 186, lines 13, 18.

52 “On the concept of 'ada see Wolfson, H., The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 544–551. A highly elaborate treatment of 'ada can be found in volume XV of 'Abd al-Jabbār's Mughni (On Prophecies and Miracles), pp. 335–382, especially pp. 337, 346 ff., 368 ff.Google Scholar

53 'al-Jabbār, Abd, Mughni, vol. XV, p. 353.Google Scholar

54 Wansbrough, John, The Sectarian Milieu (Oxford, 1978), pp. 81 ff.Google Scholar

55 'al-Jabbār, Abd, Mughnī, vol. XV, pp. 354–355.Google Scholar

56 Ibid., vol. XVII, p. 203.

57 Basrī, , Mu'tamad, vol. II, pp. 459–478;Google Scholar trans. of the chapter on consensus with critical commentary by Bernand, M., L'accord unanime de la communauté comme fondement des statuts légaux de I'Islam (Paris, 1970), pp. 13–35, 128–132.Google Scholar

58 Basrī, , Mu'tamad, vol. II, pp. 471–474. Bernand's trans. pp. 26–30.Google Scholar

59 Juwaynī, , Burhan, vol. I, p. 679.Google Scholar

60 Juwaynī, , Ghiyāth al-umam fī iltiyāth al-zulam, ed. al-Mun'im, F. Abd and Hilmī, M. (Iskandariyya, 1979), p. 30;Google Scholar idem, Burhan, vol. I, p. 678.

61 Juwaynī, Ghiyāth, pp. 34–35; Burhan, vol. I, p. 679 at 11. 3–8.

62 Juwaynī, Ghiyāth, p. 34; idem, Burhan, vol. I, pp. 677–679, 683. Clearly, Juwaynī was well aware of the then developing concept of al-tawatur bil-ma'na, which has already been noted but also rejected by Abü al-Husayn al-Basri (see Juwaynī's al-Kāfi yafial-jadal, ed. Mahmüd, F. H. [Cairo, 1979], p. 94). According to this concept—to be discussed in full later—the authoritativeness of consensus rests on a multitude of ahadi traditions which have in common one meaning, i.e., that the community is infallible. Those who espouse this view explain that because these ahadi traditions were transmitted by so many transmitters who could not have known each other they cannot be spurious. Although some of Juwaynī's predecessors rejected al-tawatur bilma'na for epistemological and theological reasons, there is good reason to believe that Juwayni discarded this concept on political grounds. In his Ghiyāth al-umām, a political treatise which aims in part at the advocation and legitimation of the Sunni political regime against the Shīdī claims, Juwaynī discusses what he calls the spurious traditions which contain the words of the Prophet appointing 'Alī as his successor. He remarks that the Imamiyya claims the right to the Caliphate on the basis of these widespread traditions (pp. 19–20; nassun shāi'un walafzun mustafīd). These traditions, Juwaynī argues, are merely ahadis, for they are not known to have been transmitted on a wide scale (tawatur) in the community (pp. 22–23). Such ahadi traditions, however they are transmitted, cannot lead to certainty, and thus cannot be used in such serious matters of government as designating a caliph. Juwayni immediately goes on to say that caliphs are appointed by ikhtiyār (election), and the authoritative basis of such election is the infallible consensus of the community (p. 34). Obviously, when Juwaynī proceeded to establish the authoritativeness of consensus he could not use the principle of tawatur bilmacna, since he had just discarded it as incapable of inducing certainty.Google Scholar

63 Juwaynī, Burhan, vol. I, pp. 680–681; idem, Ghiyāth, pp. 36, 40–41.

64 Juwaynī, Burhān, vol. I, p. 682.

65 Ibid.

66 Juwaynī, Ghiyāth, p. 41 at II. 8–10. In effect, he states the same thing but in a less direct manner in Burhān, vol. 1, p. 683 at II. 8–9.

67 Juwaynī, Burhan, vol. I, p. 683 at 11. 8–12.

68 Ghazäli, , al-Mankhül min ta'liqat al-usäl, ed. Haytu, M. H. (Damascus, 1970), pp. 305–309, especially p. 307.Google Scholar

69 Ghazäli, , Mustasfāfa, vol. 1, p. 175 at I. I.Google Scholar

70 In addition to the tradition about Satan quoted by Shāfi'ī and the traditions nos. 1–4 quoted by Jassās (note 38 above) Ghazäli cites the following: (1) “God would not allow my community to agree on an error”; (2) “1 have asked God, exalted may he be, not to allow my community to agree on an error, and He answered my request” (3) “God does not pay attention to those who diverge”; (4) “They [i.e., the community of Muslims] will not be harmed by the disagreement of those who differ with them”; (5) “If a person leaves the community and dies, he will be considered to have died in the days of Jāhiliyya.” See Ghazāli, Mustasfa, vol. I, p. 175.

71 Immediate knowledge is that which is forced on the mind through means of sense perception and divine revelation, without inference and reasoning. Such knowledge cannot be doubted. Mediate or discursive knowledge ('ilm nazarī or muktasab), on the other hand, is that which occurs to the mind by reflection and inference. Bājī, Hudūd, pp. 25–27; Baghdādī, Usūl al-dīn, p. 8.

72 Ghazäiī, Mustasfā, vol. I, p. 177.

73 See also similar arguments in Shīrāzī, , Luma', p. 47;Google ScholarTaymiyya, Ibn, al-Musawwadafī usūl al-fiqh (Cairo, 1964), p. 319;Google ScholarNizām, Ibnal-Dīn al-Ansārī, Fawātih al-rahamüt, printed with Ghazālī's Mustasfā, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1324 H.), vol. II, pp. 119–120.Google Scholar For the opinions of Shirbīnī, , Fanarī, and al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn see Jam' al-jāwami', 2 vols. (Bombay, 1970), vol. II, p. 130.Google Scholar

74 Ghazälī, , Mustasfā, vol. I, pp. 177–178.Google Scholar

75 Ibid., p. 176.

76 al-Sarakhsī, Abū Bakr, Usūl, ed. al-Afghānī, Abū al-Wafā, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1372 H.), vol. 1, pp. 296–299.Google Scholar

77 al-Baghdādī, Al-Khatīb, Faqīh, vol. I, pp. 167–168.Google Scholar

78 Āmidī, , Ihkām, vol. I, pp. 150–162.Google Scholar

79 For Āmidī's interpretation of the verses see Weiss, Bernard, “Al-Amidi on the Basis of Authority of Consensus,” in Little, Donald P., Essays on Islamic Civilization (Leiden, 1976), pp. 344–351.Google Scholar

80 It is of interest to note here that a number of later usulists claimed that Āmidī held the authoritativeness of consensus to be zanni rather than qat'i, i.e., that consensus, when it is reached on a case of law, does not render the said case conclusive and irrevocable. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) was said to have held the same view. In al-Ihkām there is nothing to substantiate such claims about Āmidī. However, it is possible that Āmidī held such views in his other works on legal theory or kalām. See the commentary of Ismā'īl, Sh. Muhammad on Tahdhīb sharh al-isnawī 'alā minhāj al-wuscūl ilā 'ilm al-usūl, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1976), vol. II, p. 263.Google Scholar

81 See Weiss, “Al-Amidi,” pp. 351 ff. Of the sixteen traditions Āmidī quotes, two have not so far been listed here. These are: (1) “Stay with the great majority” and (2) The Prophet said: “My people will be divided into more than seventy sects, all of which will go to the fire [of Hell] except one.” The Prophet was then asked: “Which sect is it?” and he replied: “My community.” Āmidī, Ihkām, vol. I, p. 163.

82 Āmidī, , Ihkām, vol. I, pp. 163, 234.Google Scholar

83 Ibid., pp. 237–238.

84 Ibid., pp. 164, 238.

85 Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327) also advanced an argument similar to that of Āmidī. See al-Musawwada, pp. 317–319; on al-mutawatir bilma'na traditions, pp. 235, 243.

86 al-Shātibī, Abū Ishāq, al-Muwāfaqāt fi usūal al-ahkām, ed. al-Hamīd, M. D. 'Abd, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1969), vol. I, p. 10; vol. II, p. 40.Google Scholar

87 Ibid., vol. I, p. 12.

88 Ibid., pp. 14, 16–17.

89 Ibid., p. 15.

90 Ibid., p. 13.

91 al-Qarāfī, Shihāb al-Dīn, Sharh tanqīh al-fusal, ed. Sahd, T. (Cairo, 1973), pp. 324–325; on the principle of al-tawatur bil-ma'na, see pp. 356–357.Google Scholar

92 al-Isnawī, Jamäl al-Dīn, Nihayāt al-sūlfisharh minhāj al-wusü, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1317 H.), vol. Il, pp. 153–167.Google Scholar

93 al-Humām, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn, al- Tahrir, with the commentary al- Taqrīr wal- Tahbīr by Ibn Amīr al-Hhajj, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1317 H.), vol. III, pp. 83–86.Google Scholar

94 Ansārī, , Fawātīh, vol. II, pp. 213–217.Google Scholar

95 al-Shakūr, Ibn 'Abd, Musallam, vol. II, pp. 119–120, 213.Google Scholar

96 Ibid., p. 214.

97 Ibid., p. 216.

98 Baghdādī, , Faqīh, vol. I, p. 123;Google ScholarPazdawī, , Usūl, with the commentary Kashf al-asrār by ';Alā al-Dīn Abd al'Azīz al-Bukhārī, 4 vols. (Beirut, 1308 H.), vol. III, p. 176;Google ScholarGhazālī, , Musrasfā, vol. 1, p. 126; Ibn 'Alī al-Fārisī, Jawahir, p. 41;Google ScholarIzmīrī, , Hāshiya 'alā sharhh mirqāt al-wu'sāl, a commentary on Mir'āt al-wu'ūl by Mullā Khusraw, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1891), vol. II, p. 181;Google ScholarQarāfī, , Sharh, p. 314; Subkī, Jam' vol. II, p. 76; Ansārī, Fawāti', vol. II, p. 81.Google Scholar

99 Baghdādī, , Faqīh, vol. II, p. 181; Qarāfī, Sharh, p. 314; Subkī, Jam', vol. II, p. 76.Google Scholar

100 See Izmīrā, , Hashiya, vol. II, pp. 255–256.Google Scholar

101 The great majority of modern Arabic authors on usul al-fiqh reproduce the medieval arguments as thus far outlined. See, e.g., al-Khuddarī, Muhammad, Usūl al-fiqh, 4th ed. (Cairo, 1962), pp. 314–316. The emphasis on induction as a means of establishing the authoritativeness of consensus also appears in some of these works.Google Scholar See, e.g., Husaynī, 'Abd al-Fattāh, al-Ijmā' masdar thālith min masdir al-tashrī' al-Islāmī (Cairo, 1979), p. 280.Google Scholar