The European Commission has adopted an Action Plan to speed up the full implementation of the Single European Market. As part of its strategy the Commission has launched a stream of cases under Article 169 of the EC Treaty seeking to ensure the implementation of Community law in the fields covered by this note, which takes up and explains some of them. The first case is Commission v. Belgium where the European Court found that the Belgian rules, which effectively excluded those searching for work from Belgium after three months, contravened the job-seekers rights derived from Article 48 as interpreted in Antonissen. The Antonissen rights have also been extended to Turkish workers lawfully resident in Germany. Germany found itself condemned for failing to implement directives

On 29 November 1996 Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“the ICTY”) handed down its sentence in the case of Dražen Erdemović. This was a decision of historie significance for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being that it was the first sentence passed by an international war crimes tribunals, applying international law, since the International Military Tribunals which sat at Nuremberg and Tokyo between 1945 and 1948; it was also the first time a truly international tribunal bas concluded the trial of a minor war criminal, as opposed to a senior military commander or political leader. In addition, it was the first sentence handed down by the ICTY, which has been plagued sincc its first days of operation by problems in securing evidence and witnesses, not to mention the presence of the accused. Now the ICTY has shown, in the face of widespread criticism and accusations of impotence, that it can actually perform the task assigned to it. The doubt about such a judgment is that the Erdemović case is not perhaps the best basis on which to assess the ICTY's performance, so singular were the accused's conduct and, indeed, the circumstances in which he found himself before the Tribunal. Essentially, had it not been for the accused's voluntary surrender and his extensive co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor, and the co-operation of the judirial authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in transferring Erdemović to The Hague, the case would probably never have happened at all.

The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement1 was concluded following multi-party negotiations on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. It received 71 per cent approval in Northern Ireland and 95 per cent approval in the Republic of Ireland in the subsequent referenda held on Friday 22 May, the day after Ascension. To some, it must have seemed that the timing was singularly appropriate following 30 years of “The Troubles”, which were perceived as being between a “Catholic minority” and a “Protestant majority”. While there are some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation that do require rights relating only to their religion, such as the right to worship in community,2 to practise and profess their religion,3 to legal recognition as a church,4 to hold property5 and to determine its own membership,6 some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation are properly national or ethnic minorities–religion is merely one factor which distinguishes them from the other groups, including the majority, in the population. One example of the latter situation is to be seen in (Northern) Ireland where there is, in fact, untypically, a double minority: the Catholic-nationalist community is a minority in Northern Ireland, but the Protestant-unionist population is a minority in the island of Ireland as a whole.7 The territory of Northern Ireland is geographically separate from the rest of the United Kingdom. The recent peace agreement addresses a whole range of issues for Northern Ireland, but included are, on the one hand, rights for the populations based on their religious affiliation, their culture and their language and, on the other, rights with respect to their political participation up to the point of external self-determination. It is a holistic approach. Like any good minority rights agreement,8 it deals with both standards and their implementation and, like any good minority rights agreement, it is not a minority rights agreement but, rather, a peace settlement.

The relationship between State immunity and diplomatic immunity has always been a rather complex one. The two concepts undoubtedly have a common juridical background in the form of the concepts of sovereignty, independence and dignity.1 On the other hand, recent developments in both fields have seen a move towards a more functional-based approach. Thus, in relation to diplomatic immunity, the dominant theoretical basis is that of functional necessity.2 As regards State immunity, recent developments in both international law3 and, more particularly, in UK law4, from absolute to restrictive State immunity, have resulted in a more functionally orientated approach, that is, a shift of emphasis in matters of State immunity from immunity ratione personae to immunity ratione materiae.5 Now two recent cases in the United Kingdom have raised the possibility that, in the case of diplomats at least, the two concepts may be combined to provide a double immunity for diplomatic agents against civil suit. More controversially, the cases have raised the possibility of a third type of protection based upon immunity ratione personae in what could be said to amount to a modified act of State doctrine. The cases in question are Propend Finance Pty Ltd. v. Alan Sing and The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police6 and Re P (Diplomatic Immunity: Jurisdiction).7

The addition of “Justice and Home Affairs” (JHA) to the list of subjects covered in Current Developments reflects the growing significance of this area of European law and policy within the overall Treaty framework. In this introductory note, a brief account is given of the history of co-operation between EU member States in JHA matters, culminating in the significant changes announced in the Treaty of Amsterdam in October 1997. It is a historical record which is marked by discontinuity and institutional complexity, full justice to which would require detailed analysis. Here we confine ourselves instead to a broad-brush approach, seeking to highlight the main themes which have characterised JHA co-operation. In future notes particular areas and issues of current interest will be examined more closely.

The last note1 on this subject recorded that the Commission's proposals for the definitive VAT system (initially envisaged to be presented before 31 December 1994) were still awaited.

Taking stock in its Agenda 2000—For a Stronger and Wider Union,1 the Commission offered a frank view of the shortcomings in this field. “Rural policy of the Union”, it said, “still appears as a juxtaposition of agricultural market policy, structural, and environmental policy with rather complex instruments and lacking overall coherence.”2 Consequently, the Commission sees an “urgent need for a radical simplification of rules and a greater, decentralisation of policy implementation”.3

The period under consideration (mid-1995 to March 1998) was a relatively quiet one for Article 85. Note should be taken of the publication in 1997 of the Commission's Green Paper on vertical restraints in competition policy,1 which is likely to lead to a significant overhaul of a number of block exemption regulations. The existing block exemptions on patent licensing and know-how agreements2 were merged into a new single block exemption on technology transfer.3 Perhaps the most interesting and potentially far-reaching development was the Commission decision in Bayer/Adalat,4 in which the Commission characterised as agreements—and so falling within Article 85—attempts by the German chemicals group Bayer to limit supplies of a range of pharmaceutical products from its wholly owned distributors in other member States to wholesalers there in order to stem parallel exports. This was not an Article 86 case (Bayer was not dominant in the relevant product market), of which refusal to sell is more commonly a feature, and an agreement between manufacturer and distributor/wholesaler which prohibits re-export of the contract goods has long been recognised as falling within Article 85(1). But in Bayer/Adalat the wholesalers never agreed to the (alleged) export ban, and in fact resisted Bayer's attempts to limit supplies both directly and by subterfuge. Nevertheless, the Commission found an agreement between the Bayer distributors and the wholesalers, effectively simply in continuing to deal, the former having committed “an infringement of Article 85(1) by imposing an export ban as part of their continuous commercial relations with [the latter]”,5 the ban having “been agreed [sic] as part of their ongoing business relations”.6

The internal financial market is still far from its completion. Parts of the financial market and certain financial institutions are not yet covered by implementing directives. In areas that are covered by directives, transposition by member States has not removed important practical barriers to cross-border establishment and provision of services. An interesting feature of the current developments in the EC regulation of financial markets is the Commission's use of “Communications” to implement Treaty freedoms and so to remedy the situation where the member States have blocked proposals for a directive or where unacceptable barriers remain after their transposition.