In the 1996 Hamlyn Lectures, under the title Turning Points of the Common Law, I examined four great cases where the House of Lords set the law of England, and consequently the law of most of the English-speaking world, on a new course by reversing decisions of the courts below. They were Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd1 (insistence on separate identities of company and controlling shareholder); Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions2 (discovery of a golden thread about onus of proof in English criminal law); Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller3 (qualified acceptance of duty of care in tort to safeguard against economic damage); and Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission4 (affirmation that material errors of law by administrative bodies are alwaysredressible by courts).

In September 2002 seventeen whales were stranded off the coast of the CanaryIslands at a time when NATO was testing its active sonar system designed to detect silent enemy submarines.1 The suggestion has been made that the use of sonar caused these whales to strand. In fact, sonar is just one of a variety of anthropogenic undersea sounds which, scientific research increasingly suggests, impacts negatively on marine biodiversity. Pollution of an acoustic nature is currently omitted from traditional works on the protection of the marine environment and is as yet the subject of very little jurisprudential discussion.2 However the topic, which has received scientific attention for over 30 years, has recently been identified as acause for concern and consequently, for action, within the parameters of a number of global and regional environmental instruments.

The core provisions of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations are deceptively simple: a contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties (Article 3(1)); to the extent that the parties have not made a choice, a contract is governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected (Article 4(1)). However, within these provisions there are a number of problems. First, Article 3 provides that the parties’ choice may be either express or ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty from the terms ofthecontract or the circumstances of the case’. This gives rise to potentially difficult questions about what constitutes an express choice and uncertainty as to the dividing line between, on the one hand, cases where the parties have made a choice (albeit not an expressone) and, on the other, cases where the parties have not made a choice at all. Secondly, the general principle in Article 4 is supplemented bya presumption (in paragraph 2), 1 which may, incertain circumstances, be disregarded (under paragraph 5). The operation of the presumption is problematic and the relationship between Article 4(2) andArticle 4(5) controversial.

There are several reasons, pertaining to both the development of a generallyapplicable framework and the elaboration of issue-specific approaches, why it is timely to reflect on whether liability regimes are an appropriate tool for international environmental protection. At the level of general norms, the International Law Commission (ILC) appears to have arrived at a crossroads, as it must decide whether and how to approach further work on liability for transboundary environmental harm. At the same time, discussions about issuespecific liability regimes have proliferated. Indeed, it seems that few multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) can be negotiated today without running across the liability issue in one way or another. The issue often divides Southern delegations, which tend to push for the inclusion of liability regimes, and Northerndelegations, which tend to resist. But the disagreement is not just a matter of policy and politics. There is also a lively debate in the literature about the pros and cons of international liability regimes. All the more reason, therefore, to assess whether engaging in the laborious task of developing a liability regime is a good investment of scarce negotiating resources. The goals that animate the quest for environmental liability are important ones: to make polluters pay for the environmental costs of their activities, to compensate innocent victims, to protect the environment, and, in certain contexts, to protect developing countries against environmental risks. The key question is whether, given these sensibilities, the approach makes sense.

International courts and tribunals have played a predominant role in the development of the law of maritime delimitation.1 In fact, since the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, eleven judgments concerning maritime delimitations were given by international courts and tribunals. Owing to the richness of international decisions, one may currently speak of ‘case law’ in the field of maritime delimitations. Thus it is indispensable to consider the evolving process of the law of maritime delimitation on the basis of the practice of international courts and tribunals.

After almost 50 years in existence in a variety of different forms, the EU finally has an express proposal on the table dealing with the potential withdrawal of a Member State. Article 59 of the draft Constitution states that any Member State may now ‘decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’.1 The Member State would have to formally notify the European Council of this decision. The Council and the Member State would then enter into negotiations on a mutually agreeable basis for withdrawal, including a framework for the future relationship between the EU and the Member State. The results of this negotiation would require approval by a qualified majority of the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.2 In any event, withdrawal would occur not later than two years following the notification unless extended by agreement between the Member State and the European Council.3

From Bosnia to East Timor, and now Iraq, property rights have been at the centre of many of the problems that individuals face in the aftermath of armed conflicts. The importance of a fair, transparent and effective property rights policy, as an element of post-conflict recovery and development, can hardly be overrated. Clear and undisputed property title plays a fundamental role in the economic recovery from conflict and is a prerequisite to attract foreign investment. The protection or restoration of property rights is closely linked to the return of refugees and displaced persons, the protection of human rights and the restoration of the rule of law. Because land is life in many war-torn societies, property rights violations tend to affect all parts of the surviving populations.

International human rights bodies with responsibility for monitoring the implementation and enforcement of rights protected by human rights treaties are usually empowered to indicate interim, or provisional, measures of protection in cases of urgency in order to safeguard the rights and persons of victims of alleged violations of human rights.1 Whether State parties are obliged to comply with a request for interim measures of protection has been the subject of some debate. The purpose of this note is to examine the issue of the binding force of interim measures of protection in the United Nations human rights system in light of the views of the Human Rights Committee (hereafter the Committee) in Piandiong, Morailos and Bulan v The Philippines.2 Before doing so, however, we need to recall briefly the Committee's role in securing the rights of the individual.

One of the better qualities of Karel Wellens's recent monograph on remedies against international organizations is that, at least nominally, his is a lengthy plea for a constitutional approach towards international organizations.1 Whereas traditionally international lawyers (and much of international law perhaps as well) would approach organizations from a functional perspective,2 in Wellens's view such an approach is no longer advisable, if it ever was: it would fail to do justice to, eg, human rights considerations, as it would often be open to organizations to argue that its functional interests ought to prevail over human rights considerations.3

By any measure the single most important development across the field of Community competition law during the period under review (Spring 2001–Autumn 2003) is the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, by which the Pope abandoned the Vatican for the embrace of the Free Presbyterian Church. Regulation 17 has been the bedrock of the enforcement of the Community rules since 1962.1 Fundamental changes to it, first proposed by the Commission in 1999,2 were so startling as to be likened to ‘a lifelong devout Catholic suddenly converting him/herself to Protestantism’.3 Yet they were adopted by the Council in late 2002, and published early in 2003 as Regulation 1/20034—the Council here, maybe, missing a trick in not waiting a fortnight so as to adopt it as Regulation 17/2003. The new regulation is to apply from 1 May 2004—the date also scheduled for the formal accession of the ten new Member States.

There has been much activity since the last report on this topic,1 not least that the citizenship provisions of the Treaty have burst into life with a series of cases and proposals which threaten to overturn the old order. The Commission's initial proposal2 to consolidate and radically reshape rights of residence has been revised in the legislative process,3 but is still un-adopted; the cases though are more dramatic.

EC intellectual property law has now reached a significant level of harmonization, and the Community can take pride in its achievements in this respect. The need to report a wealth of new matters leaves little space for introduction. However, two issues may be highlighted here briefly. The first is that in May 2004 ten new Member States will join the EU. Although enlargement offers immense opportunities, it also presents a considerable practical challenge. The second is the Commission's plan for a directive to harmonize procedure and remedies for intellectual property infringement throughout the EU.1 It seeks to go further than the ground rules on enforcement already laid down by TRIPs, and to lay down specific procedural codes for intellectual property infringement of all types—not merely piracy and counterfeiting. This enthusiasm for intervention in the procedural aspects of national law has raised serious concerns in some quarters.

Citizenship and human rights continue to play an important role in the evolution of Community law. Both sets of principles have appeared in the case law of the European Courts and in the creation of a Constitutional document for Europe. Part II of the draft Constitution incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. Additionally, the first report from the independent network of experts in fundamental human rights details the various international human rights obligations which the Member States are subject to, analysing Member State policy in a number of areas in the light of the international obligations.1 Paradoxically, at a time when greater emphasis is being paid to the constitutional recognition of human rights there are indications of divisions between some of the Advocates General, the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice (the Court) on the constitutional role of fundamental rights in relation to access to justice.

At the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council meeting in Brussels on 2 and 3 October 2003 final political agreement was reached on a new and expanded version of the Brussels II Regulation, a text which has commonly become known as Brussels II bis. The instrument, which was adopted by the JHA ministers on 27 November, has now received formal classification as Council Regulation No 2201/2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and Matters Relating to Parental Responsibility Repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000.1 The net result of this precipitous reform is that Brussels JJ shall cease to have effect from 1 May 2005,2 a mere 4 years and 2 months after it entered into force. Henceforth there will be a single, integrated instrument which will cover, inter alia, the free movement of judgments in matters of parental responsibility as well as of matrimonial judgments and introduce provisions on cooperation between Member States.

The Court of Appeal (Pill and Waller LJJ and Sir Martin Nourse) has considered interesting jurisdiction issues arising out of a projects dispute between a Pakistani company (‘Sabah’) and the Government of Pakistan (the ‘GOP’). The Court gave welcome guidance on the principles underlying the grant of anti-suit injunctions in cases where the parties have agreed to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. However, questions of how an anti-suit injunction obtained against a State may be enforced largely remain unanswered.