In 2020 a group of U.S. healthcare leaders formed the National Organization to Prevent Hospital-Acquired Pneumonia (NOHAP) to issue a call to action to address non–ventilator-associated hospital-acquired pneumonia (NVHAP). NVHAP is one of the most common and morbid healthcare-associated infections, but it is not tracked, reported, or actively prevented by most hospitals. This national call to action includes (1) launching a national healthcare conversation about NVHAP prevention; (2) adding NVHAP prevention measures to education for patients, healthcare professionals, and students; (3) challenging healthcare systems and insurers to implement and support NVHAP prevention; and (4) encouraging researchers to develop new strategies for NVHAP surveillance and prevention. The purpose of this document is to outline research needs to support the NVHAP call to action. Primary needs include the development of better models to estimate the economic cost of NVHAP, to elucidate the pathophysiology of NVHAP and identify the most promising pathways for prevention, to develop objective and efficient surveillance methods to track NVHAP, to rigorously test the impact of prevention strategies proposed to prevent NVHAP, and to identify the policy levers that will best engage hospitals in NVHAP surveillance and prevention. A joint task force developed this document including stakeholders from the Veterans’ Health Administration (VHA), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), The Joint Commission, the American Dental Association, the Patient Safety Movement Foundation, Oral Health Nursing Education and Practice (OHNEP), Teaching Oral-Systemic Health (TOSH), industry partners and academia.

We assessed the long-term sustainability of a quality improvement intervention to reduce urethral catheter use at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital. During the 8 years after the initial intervention, point-prevalence surveillance showed that urethral catheter use continued to decrease (OR, 0.91; 95% CI, 0.86–0.97; P = .003) and that appropriateness of catheter use remained unchanged.

Healthcare-acquired infections are a tremendous challenge to the US medical system. Stethoscopes touch many patients, but current guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention does not support disinfection between each patient. Stethoscopes are rarely disinfected between patients by healthcare providers. When cultured, even after disinfection, stethoscopes have high rates of pathogen contamination, identical to that of unwashed hands. The consequence of these practices may bode poorly in the coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Alternatively, the CDC recommends the use of disposable stethoscopes. However, these instruments have poor acoustic properties, and misdiagnoses have been documented. They may also serve as pathogen vectors among staff sharing them. Disposable aseptic stethoscope diaphragm barriers can provide increased safety without sacrificing stethoscope function. We recommend that the CDC consider the research regarding stethoscope hygiene and effective solutions to contemporize this guidance and elevate stethoscope hygiene to that of the hands, by requiring stethoscope disinfection or change of disposable barrier between every patient encounter.

A common type of fungal disease investigation involves hospital-associated clusters of invasive mold infections (IMIs), which typically occur among immunocompromised patients. Responding to IMI clusters can be challenging for public health and hospital personnel for several reasons such as difficulty of confirming the existence of an outbreak, difficulty of determining source. Although many resources exist to guide patient notification about healthcare incidents (eg, bloodborne exposures, disease outbreaks), IMI clusters involve special considerations related to the complex diseases, uncertain exposures, and differential benefits and risks of notification. Early, nuanced communication about hospital-associated IMI clusters is almost always the best course of action to help reduce risks to patients’ health and foster trust between patients and hospitals.

We observed bacterial or fungal coinfections in COVID-19 patients admitted between March 1 and April 18, 2020 (152 of 4,267, 3.6%). Among these patients, mortality was 57%; 74% were intubated; 51% with bacteremia had central venous catheters. Time to culture positivity was 6–7 days, and 79% had received prior antibiotics. Metallo-β-lactamase–producing E. cloacae coinfections occurred in 5 patients.

We conducted a comparative retrospective study to quantify the impact of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on patient safety. We found a statistically significant increase in central-line–associated bloodstream infections and blood culture contamination rates during the pandemic. Increased length of stay and mortality were also observed during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Misdiagnosis of bacterial pneumonia is a leading cause of inappropriate antimicrobial use in hospitalized patients. We report a novel strategy of keyword abstraction from chest radiography transcripts that reliably identified patients with pneumonia misdiagnosis and opportunities for antibiotic discontinuation and/or de-escalation.

We performed a cross-sectional survey of infection preventionists in 60 US community hospitals between April 22 and May 8, 2020. Several differences in hospital preparedness for SARS-CoV-2 emerged with respect to personal protective equipment conservation strategies, protocols related to testing, universal masking, and restarting elective procedures.

In response to the Ebola outbreak of 2014–2016, the US Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) established 10 regional treatment centers, called biocontainment units (BCUs), to prepare and provide care for patients infected with high-consequence pathogens. Many of these BCUs were among the first units to activate for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) patient care. The activities of the Johns Hopkins BCU helped prepare the Johns Hopkins Health System for COVID-19 in the 3 domains of containment care: (1) preparedness planning, education and training, (2) patient care and unit operations, and (3) research and innovation. Here, we describe the role of the JH BCU in the Hopkins COVID-19 response to illustrate the value of BCUs in the current pandemic and their potential role in preparing healthcare facilities and health systems for future infectious disease threats.