On 13 March 2020 the Hungarian Government announced the immediate closure of all schools throughout the country to prevent the spread of COVID-19 forcing several hundred thousand children to learn from home, and teachers to ensure their education. The Hungarian Educational Authority hurried to issue recommendations on the use of digital education tools. During the COVID-19 pandemic and the special legal order consequently introduced by the Hungarian Government, Hungary has seen the emergence of such non-binding measures adopted by public entities, complementing governmental action against the pandemic, with the aim of providing guidance to bodies exercising a public service function (“addressees”). These protective measures adopted under the special legal order are deemed to be successful and are largely followed by the addressees. Since soft law has hitherto been neglected by both Hungarian administrative governance and the legal literature, the recent burgeoning of non-binding measures deserves scholarly attention. In this article, we set out to map the specific context of the emergence of domestic soft law and the conditions for its adoption and reception, relying on our case study conducted in respect of the National Educational Authority’s recommendations.

The European Commission published a new Communication on better regulation on 29 April 2021, with the aim of improving the European Union’s (EU) policymaking process. By updating the better regulation agenda to mainstream sustainable development goals and the digital and green transition and by ensuring more foresight-based policymaking, this Communication shows that the Commission is moving in the right direction. Several proposals also have great potential to simplify the better regulation process and make it more transparent. By contrast, the envisaged simplification of the public consultation process may jeopardise its effectiveness and should be carefully reconsidered. In addition, a more cautious, stepwise approach to introducing, testing and adjusting the new EU one-in, one-out system is certainly needed. This article aims to identify and assess the key changes proposed by the new Communication and to share ideas for the preparation of the new Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox, which are expected to translate the Communication into practice.

This article further develops the concept of algorithmic vulnerability. The analysis is built on empirical evidence of the Chinese Health Code System (HCS), compared to similar plans for the “COVID-19 Certificate” in the European Union (EU). Implementing the HCS has shown two-sided regulatory implications: improving social protection (a national strategy, a common mutual-recognition standard, scaled-up public–private cooperation) and increasing risks of social exclusion (non-digital and digital forms of vulnerability). This article argues that algorithmic vulnerability is caused by mismatches between biased databases, unfairly pre-designed algorithms and dynamically changed risk groups in reality in the context of COVID-19 vaccination. It contributes a framework for deploying plans for digital certificates in the EU concerning minimising the social risks associated with algorithmic vulnerability. The framework consists of (1) reinforcing existing vulnerability inherited from non-digital society (eg caused by intersectional factors of race/ethnicity, gender, age and health) and (2) introducing new forms of vulnerability generated by algorithm design and implementation (eg excluding the risk groups of individuals who are un/mis/overrepresented in the databases, such as those defined by nationality plus COVID-19 status).

This paper examines, in the light of the COVID-19 crisis, the room for judicial oversight of health crisis measures based on the public’s expectations of how governments should act in the interplay with experts. The paper explains how trust theory and procedural rationality review help to address concerns related to legitimacy and expertise. The paper argues that courts should distinguish between two stages. In the initial stage, fear as a driver for government support based on expertise justifies that the proportionality test is limited to the question of whether measures were based on virologist expert advice. In the next stage, people expect the government to take expert-informed decisions, but also require that the government takes into account societal needs. Procedural rationality review in this stage demands that courts examine whether the decision was based on an informed balance of rights and interests.

This article offers a critical discussion of the “Report on Liability for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies” released by the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies. In particular, the authors consider: the excessive diversity of applications encompassed through the notion of “artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies”; the distinction between high- and low-risk applications as a potential source of legal uncertainty; the primary reliance on evidentiary rules over substantive ones; the problematic role attributed to safety rules; the unclear relationship between the Product Liability Directive and other ad hoc liability regimes; the radical exclusion of electronic personhood as a way of addressing liability issues; and the limited contextualisation of compulsory insurance and no-compensation funds.

Socioeconomic disadvantages are amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic all over the world. Public actions and omissions severely affect the poor, alongside their precarious living, health and working conditions. As we slowly prepare for the aftermath of the pandemic, thanks to the progression of vaccination, especially in developed countries, certain measures taken in this context, more specifically the “vaccination certificates”, are likely particularly to affect the poor, who usually also belong to other vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities or single parents, and could eventually constitute for them a state of permanent quarantine. In this contribution, I argue that COVID-19 vaccination certificates are a slippery slope towards exclusion and stigmatisation of the poor through a bureaucratic system based on privileges that raises important questions in light of the fundamental rights of the people who reside at society’s margins, struggling to conform to the “phantom of normalcy”.

This article considers the role of non-binding legal instruments adopted in Italy against the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the early months of 2020. To verify whether the use of such instruments restricted fundamental and human rights beyond constitutional and legal limits, the article first gives an overview of hard law measures adopted in Italy against the coronavirus. It then focuses on soft law measures, the use of which became significant only in Phase II of Italy's response to COVID-19 and argues that non-binding legal instruments provided the public with instructions on gradually returning to normal life. This contribution contains case studies on the soft law measures adopted in relation to private economic enterprise and freedom of worship. Italian soft law deployed during the COVID-19 epidemic was borne out of coordination between the state and the Regions and as the result of (even informal) dialogue with the relevant stakeholders. Despite some criticism of the soft law measures used, their role in restricting constitutionally granted rights was marginal, because only hard law measures adopted nationally and locally limited personal rights and freedoms in order to contain the pandemic.

This paper argues that COVID-19 has triggered a multiplication of heterogeneous bordering mechanisms that, far from stopping movement as such, have enhanced hierarchies of mobility. In particular, it shows that a confinement continuum has been put in place in the name of the “contain to protect” principle: migrants have been subjected to protracted lockdown measures in the name of their own protection. The piece concludes by interrogating how to rearticulate critique in COVID times in light of the enforcement of discriminatory “passports to freedom” (COVID-19 travel certificates).

Since 1974, the UK has followed a risk-based approach to safety that, in the event of an incident, is enforced through the courts. The legislation is intentionally non-prescriptive and thus requires duty holders and the courts to decide what control measures were reasonable in the circumstances from ex ante and ex post positions. This has proved challenging for all parties involved. This paper describes a series of cases that have shed light on the thought processes of the courts. It appears that there is some variability in decision-making that can be attributed to several factors, including understanding of the word “risk”, the acceptability of residual risk and the validity of historical data as a means of measuring risk. In the aftermath of incidents, there is a real danger that psychological factors may intervene when the prior risk is being assessed for sentencing purposes. It is argued that while the risk-based model continues to enjoy widespread support in the UK and is not challenged, its implementation could be much eased by attention to details. This would serve to simplify courtroom debates, support those practising risk-based regulation and enable risks to be better prioritised.

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, between March and July 2020, Spanish national and regional authorities made extensive use of soft law mechanisms to fight the spread of the virus and to tackle the consequences of the crisis. Soft law was used either as an instrument in and of itself, or as a justification for hard law instruments, with more than 200 non-binding measures being enacted by the state and by the Autonomous Communities. Spanish courts also used soft law as a tool to interpret existing hard law instruments, Such uses give rise to concerns about the transparency of administrative action and the principle of legal certainty. Moreover, the widespread use of soft law to justify the adoption of binding measures restricting fundamental rights might have consequences for democratic accountability and judicial control of executive action. This article indicates the need to reconsider the current system of constitutional and legal constraints attached to this form of regulation, by introducing some binding procedural rules relating to its adoption and its publication, and by clarifying its legal effects and the mechanism through which it can be enforced by courts.

Based on a mix of conceptual insights and findings from cases, this paper discusses three ways in which the effectiveness of regulation in the areas of competition, data and consumer protection can be improved by tailoring substantive protections and enforcement mechanisms to the extent of market power held by firms. First, it is analysed how market power can be integrated into the substantive scope of protection of data protection and consumer law, drawing inspiration from competition law’s special responsibility for dominant firms. Second, it is illustrated how more asymmetric and smarter enforcement of existing data protection rules against firms possessing market power can strengthen the protection of data subjects and stimulate competition based on lessons from priority-setting and cooperation by consumer authorities. Third, it is explored how competition law’s special responsibility for dominant firms can be further strengthened in analogy with the principle of accountability in data protection law. Similarly, it is discussed how positive duties to ensure fair outcomes for consumers are developed in consumer law. The analysis offers lessons for improving the ability of the three regimes to protect consumers by imposing greater responsibility on firms with greater market power and thus posing greater risks for consumer harm.

The global volume of travel has grown steadily for decades and hence the border closures and travel restrictions in response to COVID-19 have created an unforeseen impact on the number of international border crossings. In air traffic alone the data show a striking 75.6% decrease in the number of scheduled international passengers. We might hasten to think that the strict travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 crisis have in principle treated mobile populations equally – for once we have all been banned from travelling. We could even consider the recent initiatives to introduce “vaccination certificates” as a fair and democratic way to reintroduce safe international travelling. In reality, the idea of a COVID-19 certificate is but a new layer in the broader landscape of highly uneven global mobility where travellers’ citizenship and place of origin truly matter. This article discusses some of the major inequalities embedded in the global mobility regime and argues that the idea of the COVID-19 certificate as an equaliser remains completely disconnected from these underlying realities. To conclude, the article discusses problems related to uneven access to digital travel documents, such as the proposed COVID-19 certificate.

Swedish measures to fight the spread of COVID-19 differ from the strategies used in other comparable countries. In contrast to the lockdown approach that has been applied in many European countries, the Swedish strategy has been based to a substantial extent on individuals taking responsibility under non-binding recommendations. This contribution explores the Swedish strategy from a constitutional and administrative law perspective, highlighting the tension between the formalist system for delegating norms under the Swedish Constitution and the pragmatic use of non-binding rules such as the “General Recommendations” adopted by the Public Health Agency. The article concludes that the official use of soft law instruments is confusing from a legal perspective, because non-binding rules do not offer the traditional formal mechanisms for legal protection, the publication of norms or accountability. The legal-realist approach of the Supreme Administrative Court’s case law, however, has the potential of balancing some of the unfortunate effects arising from the Swedish combination of formalism and pragmatism.

For some time, pressure was placed on the European Food Safety Authority concerning the manner in which it conducted risk assessments in relation to food safety. This pressure culminated in the introduction of Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1381 as the upshot to the European Citizens’ Initiative on glyphosate. Concerns were expressed in the initiative regarding the transparency of the scientific studies used to evaluate pesticides, and following a Fitness Check conducted by the European Commission. Effectively, the new Regulation seeks to impose an obligation on EFSA to publish industry studies at the beginning of the risk assessment process. However, the mandatory nature of this obligation raises a number of concerns as to whether the urge to increase the transparency of the work of the EU authorities is more important than keeping the research confidential, two converse ideals in the realm of European law and effective processes. The present article submits that this codified focus on the risk assessment process and its accessibility for European citizens is a new frontier for transparency within the EU risk assessment processes. Yet while the changes pioneered by this framework are laudable, the Regulation is not without its qualifications.

While soft law is an integral part of the efficient and effective functioning of public administration in England & Wales, the extent to which it was deployed in response to COVID-19 is striking, with over 400 pieces of “guidance and regulations” created. In this article, we consider the general place of soft law in administrative law in England & Wales and the broad regulatory framework, including soft law, that governs the COVID-19 pandemic. This allows us to take a deep dive into COVID-19 and the criminal justice system, showing how the senior judiciary relied predominately on soft law (judicial guidance and protocols) to manage the system (set against the backdrop of targeted legislation and a limited number of Practice Directions, which have the force of law). We argue that the senior judiciary’s approach to the use of COVID-19 soft law has, in many ways, been more effective than that taken by the government. Yet there remains room for improvement, particularly in the nature of the judicial guidance issued and about what guidance was in place and when.

On 20 May 2021, the European Commission, Council and Parliament announced a breakthrough in the trialogue negotiations to establish the European Union (EU) Digital COVID Certificate. Originally, this standardisation effort was labelled as “Digital Green Certificate” and – “[i]n view of the urgency” – presented without a data protection impact assessment. It should allow citizens and residents of Member States to prove that they are either vaccinated against COVID-19, have recently tested negative or are currently immune against the virus. This article considers the proposal from a privacy perspective, taking into account the opinion of EU data protection authorities, ongoing negotiations in the EU institutions and relevant developments on the national and international level. While the European Parliament and others tried to improve the original Commission proposal, questions around the appropriateness and effectiveness of the framework remain. The technological and organisational implementation is essentially left to Member States, who already have started to develop their own tracing and identification systems.