Suppose a collection of ictures is held by a trustee T on trust for beneficiary B. A picture is stolen by X, a thief; or alternatively, it is wrongfully sold by T to Y. What causes of action are open to B? At first sight this looks an easy question, involving straightforward application of the principles of equity and personal property. In the former situation (the theft example), T, who has the legal title, can clearly sue X in conversion. As for B, he in his capacity of equitable owner can no doubt force T to do so, if necessary by himself bringing proceedings against X and joining T as a party. In the second case, that of wrongful sale, T is clearly guilty of a breach of trust and liable to compensate B accordingly. As to the liability of Y, B will be able in equity to recover the picture from him in specie he has it, or its value if he does not (assuming Y's acts were sufficient to make him liable on the basis of “knowing receipt” of trust property).

In English law, the recovery of pure economic loss falls mainly within the province of the law of contract. Only in very limited circumstances does the law of tort provide for the recovery of such losses. As Cardozo C.J. explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touched, tort is concerned not to permit “liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”. Notwithstanding this reticence, their Lordships' speeches, though not the final decision, in the seminal case of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd. provided a notable inroad into the rigidity of this stance. Since Hedley Byrne, the question has become, instead, how far, not if, pure economic loss is and should be recoverable in the law of negligence.

This paper aims to defend what many academic commentators regard as indefensible—the rule in Foakes v. Beer.

For almost four hundred years (since Pinnel's Case) English law has been clear: the payment of, or promise to pay, a smaller sum than the amount due does not discharge the debt, since the debtor provides no considerationfor the creditor's promise to waive the balance—there is no “accord and satisfaction”. The House of Lords approved this rule, albeit reluctantly on the part of Lord Blackburn, in Foakes v. Beer.

As far back as 53 years ago, the adaptability of the common law to changing circumstances whereby new rights have been created by the courts, has been observed and accepted as a function of the judiciary. Scott L.J. in his dictum in Haseldine v. Daw stated: The common law has throughout its long history developed as an organic growth, at first slowly under hampering restrictions of legal forms of process, more quickly in Lord Mansfield's time, and in the last 100 years at an ever increasing rate of progress as new cases, arising under new conditions of society, of applied science and of public opinion, have presented themselves for solution.

The sale by the Churchill trustees of Sir Winston Churchill's pre-1945 personal papers to Churchill College, Cambridge early in 1995 caused much controversy. Over £12 million, generated by the National Lottery, was used by the National Heritage Memorial Fund to make the purchase, producing the jibe that the Trust's beneficiaries (notably the great man's grandson, Winston Churchill, MP) had won the Lottery without having to buy a ticket. This little drama brought into focus a number of constitutional questions about state papers.

At present the law fails to provide an adequate balance between the interests of licensor and licensee when a licensor revokes a licence but gives an unreasonably short notice. The prevailing orthodoxy has followed the Court of Appeal decision in Minister of Health v. Bellotti. This article will argue that the consequences of this decision have proved disastrous for both licensors and licensees. In direct conflict with Bellotti is the Privy Council authority of Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. The King.

The flexibility of the doctrine of confidence and its adaptability to illsorted and disparate situations has often attracted academic attention, but although it continues to develop, its ability to protect privacy has not perhaps been sufficiently emphasised in recent discussions of both privacy and confidence,despite the debate generated by the (recently abandoned) proposals for a new tort of invasion of privacy. The notion that developments in the doctrine of confidence could properly render it apt to protect privacy came under attack by Wilson in 1990 on the ground that legal obligations to maintain confidence of intolerably uncertain scope might arise as a result of the normal incidents of social life and friendship.

Land registration has long proved a source of concern to the Law Commission. Its Third Report in 1987 recommended significant changes to the substantive law; its Fourth Report subsequently incorporated these changes into a comprehensive draft Land Registration Bill which was intended to replace the Land Registration Act 1925 with a modern, simpler statute.

Martha Nussbaum's recent article “Equity and Mercy” eloquently advocates the continued relevance of a tradition of ethical and legal thought—the “equity tradition”—that has been neglected by legal philosophers in recent times. That neglect is partly due to the fact that contemporary legal philosophy (as in the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin) has concerned itself with the prior question of whether judges should or need to exercise discretion. The equity tradition presupposes an affirmative answer to that question where the rigorous application of a law yields a sufficiently grave injustice in the circumstances of a particular case or where such an injustice would arise because of a “gap” in the law. Yet it might have been thought prudent for those who assert the ineradicability and value of adjudicative discretion to have embraced and developed the idea of equity.

The freedom to criticise government, and even to counsel disobedience or revolt, is widely considered the principal mark of a free society. Where the dissident voice is silenced by laws against sedition, it has been argued, there is no genuine freedom of speech and, accordingly, no real political freedom.2 The force of this suggestion stems from the underlying idea that government, if constitutional and legitimate, should be government by consent: laws against sedition, or which otherwise curtail political debate in order to silence opposition, repudiate that idea by denying the legitimacy of dissent.

“FOR who shall interest us in contingent remainders,” wrote the young Mr. Maitland in 1879, “… while Chinese metaphysics remain unexplored.” It would indeed be a daunting challenge to kindle even a bare possibility of historical interest in the nooks and crannies of Fearne's elaborate learning. Yet so much progress has been made with Chinese metaphysics since 1879 that perhaps the time has come to riska brief excursion into the history of the contingent remainder. The occasion is a chance discovery in the Public Record Office which unlocks the strange story behind one of the first leading cases on the subject.

The doctrine of ultra vires has been aptly described by Sir William Wade as “the central principle of administrative law” but in recent years it has been subjected to criticism. First the academics weighed in and, increasingly, eminent judges speaking or writing extra-judicially have described the doctrine as a “fairy tale” or a “fig leaf” and declared its redundancy and lack of utility.

I propose to examine the underlying philosophy of the recent First Report on Legal Education and Training by the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct (ACLEC), and also some of the practical implications of the Report, particularly for university law schools.

It was a stimulating experience to be able to work on this Report which reflects the collective wisdom and experience of all seventeen members of ACLEC and draws on the views expressed by its consultation panels and the large number of respondents to its consultation papers. It is important to stress that the Committee's expertise is not simply that of the two law teachers on the Committee or the two barristers, two solicitors and two judges, but also that of the lay majority of the Committee whose experience is that of consumers of legal services, social researchers, educators and in other professions. In reflecting this breadth of experience, it is a Report unique in the annals of British legal education.