John Baker's “English Law and the Renaissance” is perhaps the most significant paper in English legal history to appear in the Cambridge Law Journal. In many ways it was a response to, and development from, F. W. Maitland's Rede Lecture with the same title, published some 80 years previously. Baker's paper marks a punctuation in his study of English law under the early Tudors, a subject which he has made his own, culminating in his magisterial sixth volume of The Oxford History of the Laws of England. In addition, it marked a major break with the earlier orthodoxy that English law in this period was fundamentally distinct from the law which was developing on the European continent. The present paper explores both of these themes.

This article surveys Tony Weir's case notes and book reviews for the Cambridge Law Journal between 1963 and 2002 in order to illuminate Tony's unique genius as a legal academic and thinker. Reading Tony's case notes and book reviews reveals that he cannot be characterised as either a “lumper” (someone who seeks to reduce the law down to a few elemental ideas and concepts) or as a “splitter” (someone who resists such a reduction). Instead, Tony's genius lay in his possessing the Keatsian quality of “negative capability”. This quality allowed Tony to be both a lumper and a splitter at the same time, refusing to identify himself definitively with either way of thinking about the law.

As part of the Cambridge Law Journal's centenary celebrations, this article reads two essays from the journal's 50th anniversary issue. The essays, by Cambridge professors Robert Jennings and Derek Bowett offer resources for the history of international law and its historiography. They shine a light on key debates on the law of the sea at a crucial moment of its development. A close reading of these essays also reveals starting points for new scrutiny of an “English” tradition of international law, including the place of the academy within the tradition, its blueprints for the future of international law and international legal order, and its relation to empire and capitalism.

This article takes as its starting point three ground-breaking articles by Len Sealy in the 1960s, and examines their lasting impact on the modern law of fiduciaries. It includes a detailed consideration of the modern tendency to describe rather than define fiduciaries; it critiques the current readiness to merge fiduciaries with other power-holders, thus ignoring the significant differences between the duties of loyalty in issue in the two contexts; and finally it evaluates and defends the modern approach to fiduciary remedies, especially equitable compensation.

In “The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations” Forsyth argued that English law should protect substantive legitimate expectations. However, he was concerned that too great an expansion of legitimate expectations could lead to incoherence and intuitive decision-making. I argue that recent case law, and Forsyth's analysis, have clarified some of these inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the doctrine of legitimate expectations stands at a crossroads. Should it adopt a rules-based approach and narrow legitimate expectations, or a principled approach that embraces a broader conception? I argue that English law needs both for legitimate expectations effectively to balance legal certainty and substantive equality.