In the course of their stately opinion in the case of The Wagon Mound the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared that “their Lordships have not found it necessary to consider the so-called rule of ‘strict liability’ exemplified in Rylands v. Fletcher and the cases that have followed or distinguished it. Nothing that they have said is intended to reflect on that rule.” The best excuse for the present addition to the controversial literature that is accumulating round this case is that, the courts having yet to pronounce on remoteness in cases of strict liability, there seems to be still some room for speculation, especially with reference to policy. It is therefore hoped that the fall, as it were, of yet another leaf in the forest will at least do no harm.

Hire-purchase is no longer the preserve of the poor. Since the Second World War it has become respectable and has helped much to raise industrial production and the standard of living. The social importance of the law of hire-purchase has increased proportionately to the leap in the national hire-purchase and instalment debt from some £461,000,000 in 1955 to £950,000,000 in 1961. Public and judicial dissatisfaction with the law has become increasingly apparent. During and since 1961, the centenary of (probably) the first finance company in the world, a vintage crop of cases of major importance has illustrated some of the main defects of the present system and demonstrated the still unsatisfactory position of the hirer. Numerous recent articles in legal and other periodicals harshly criticise the law and urge reforms, some of which were proposed in two abortive Private Member's Bills. Mr. F. Montgomery's Hire-Purchase of Motor-Vehicles Bill failed to get beyond first reading in February 1961 and Mr. W. T. Williams’ Hire-Purchase Bill, designed to extend and supplement the Hire-Purchase Acts of 1938 and 1954, was talked out on second reading in December 1961, after the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade had recommended the House to await the report of the Molony Committee on Consumer Protection.

The branch of equity which deals with fiduciary relationships does not receive a great deal of attention in legal works, and what has been written is not usually very full or very precise. It is proposed, therefore, in this article, first, to explore something of the background and development of this topic, secondly, to discuss the problem of defining a fiduciary situation and, thirdly, to suggest, in outline at least, a classification of the relationships and the principles which apply to each class.

That the much agitated question of mens rea in manslaughter should again be essayed may require some justification. Such is readily found in the deplorable circumstance that this major crime remains obscure and controversial in its most important aspect. Decisions may be found to support any of a variety of views about the presence, absence or nature of the mental element in manslaughter; textbooks on criminal law differ widely on the question; and student, teacher, practitioner, and doubtless also sometimes judge, are left in bewilderment by the abundance and variety of dicta, argument and opinion on the subject. This may seem good reason for not adding another view, but the writer is persuaded that, upon the basis of much valuable inquiry carried out in recent years by a number of workers in the field, it is now possible to state in reasonably clear and confident terms what is that element which, together with the actus reus of killing, constitutes the crime of manslaughter in English law. The writer would begin by acknowledging his indebtedness in particular to various writings of Dr. Turner, Dr. Glanville Williams and Professor Hart. They are not to blame for what follows; but whatever illumination this article may shed is the result of his study of their work.

Encouragement to write this article was derived from the following passage in Russell on Crime:

“It is … incumbent upon writers, especially in matters of general principle, whenever there appears to be a lack of precision in the authorities, to make concrete suggestions for the removal of doubts and difficulties.

I

The facts of the recent House of Lords decision, White and Carter (Councils), Ltd. v. McGregor, were so simple and have been canvassed so thoroughly as to be now practically a matter of common knowledge. The appellants' business consisted in the placing of advertisements, for a fee, on litter bins which were then distributed to various local authorities. They agreed to run the respondents' advertisement for a period of three years. The respondents repudiated on the ground that their sales manager who had concluded the contract had no authority to do so. The appellants refused to accept the repudiation and duly displayed the advertisements for the entire period, bringing at the proper time a suit for the full amount owing under the contract. The pertinent question was: were the appellants entitled to dismiss the repudiation and give effect to the contract on their side in order to secure performance on the other side; or rather were they obliged to adopt the repudiation as the end of the contract and the beginning of a suit for damages subject to mitigation? The latter view prevailed in all but the House of Lords where a majority of three to two preferred the former.

In coming to this conclusion the House of Lords in effect overruled an earlier decision, viz., Langford and Co., Ltd. v. Dutch, the facts of which were virtually on all fours with those of the present case. In Langford's case the appellant was unsuccessful in recovering the contract price for exhibiting an advertisement film which he persisted in showing despite the respondent's repudiation of the contract.

The decision of the Eden Government in November 1955 to appoint a Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries initiated a review of administrative procedures which throughout was confined to those areas of the administration where either an administrative tribunal or the ministerial inquiry procedure was already available. The Franks Committee's terms of reference, and it is possible that they were intentionally limited to reduce the scope of the inquiry to reasonable proportions, did not allow any consideration of those administrative decisions not subject to one or other of these procedures. One critic of the Committee's Report, Professor J. A. G. Griffith, commented that the inquiry had been directed in exactly the wrong direction, the procedures under examination already being predominantly open, fair and impartial; but “into the closed, dark and windowless procedures the Committee was not asked to let air and light.”

On November 4, 1950, at Rome, thirteen member nations of the Council of Europe signed a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The purpose of the Convention was to give practical effect to some of the ideals embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. In contrast to the Universal Declaration, which is a statement of long-term ideals having no binding force in law, the European Convention guarantees to everyone within the jurisdiction of the signatory states certain rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention. Chief among these are the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman punishment; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; the right not to be deprived of personal liberty save in certain specified circumstances; freedom of religion, thought and conscience; freedom of assembly and association; the right to marry, and the right to respect for private and family life. By a Protocol signed on March 20, 1953, three further rights were added, namely the right to property; the right to educate one's children in conformity with one's conscience, and the right to free elections. As one of the architects of the Convention, Sean MacBride S.C., former Irish Minister for External Affairs and subsequently counsel for the applicant in the Lawless case, has said:

“In effect, the Convention of Human Rights is a supranational constitution which binds the states accepting it to secure to all human beings within their jurisdiction the rights defined in the Convention.”