THE public domain is all the rage. It is invoked to breach copyright’s encroaching enclosure of what one might grandiloquently call the cultural commons of the mind. The heralds of our “remix culture” deploy the public domain to smash that icon of the entertainment–industrial complex, the Romantic Author. But even before the Author became Romantic, he still served as a shill for concentrated industry, then the printing–bookselling complex. Authors’ moral claims of labourious entitlement merely masked the power grab of the printers. If we speak of a grab, we imply that copyright was seised from somewhere. So whence, in this account, was copyright wrested? From the public domain.

This article proffers a hypothesis about a persistent historical mystery: Why did the use of defence lawyers in felony trials at the Old Bailey increase so noticeably in the last quarter of the eighteenth century?

ARTICLES 29 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contain a series of limitations to human rights. Article 29(2) states:

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

ENGLISH public law has gained in coherence with the gradual disappearance of rigid doctrinal barriers to judicial review. The repudiation of earlier restrictions on review of ministers’ exercise of the royal prerogative marked a particularly significant step towards a more rational system of legal control. It is true that acknowledgement of the susceptibility of prerogative decisions to judicial review, in principle, was accompanied by warnings about the constraints of justiciability in practice; but the various supposed categories of non-justiciable decision-making have been gradually breached and eroded in the course of common law development. When individual rights have required protection, neither the formal source of the power in question nor its intrinsically discretionary character have proved impenetrable barriers to judicial scrutiny.

IN Borders (U.K.) Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another, the Court of Appeal has, yet again, succumbed to the “temptation to do justice” by further extending to claimants a disgorgement remedy on the claimed authority of A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party). We say “claimed authority” because, yet again, the extension of the disgorgement remedy is impossible to justify using legal argument respectful of precedent, for such argument is subordinated to the direct “pursuit of the justice of the outcome” (para. [28]).

TWO important decisions have recently considered the effect of human rights law on domestic property law: Kay v. Lambeth L.B.C.; Leeds C.C. v. Price, and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom. In each case, the claimant brought a domestic proprietary claim, one successfully, the other unsuccessfully, against a defendant. The aggrieved party argued that the domestic legal outcome conflicted with his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. In each case, the court had to decide whether the Convention had indeed been infringed by the bringing of a proprietary claim and, if so, what the consequences of that infringement might be.