The power of history to instruct policy makers and enforcers is demonstrated in this study of the seventy-five-year effort to control pollution by the petroleum industry of the upper Texas Gulf coast. Dividing his subject into three time periods, Professor Pratt shows that the goal of economic growth, even with highly inefficient and polluting production methods, ruled until about 1914; from 1914 to 1940, progress in pollution control resulted primarily from less wasteful refining technology; and in the most recent era pollution, having become critical, is finally being controlled insofar as industry cooperation and national regulation can achieve it. But, he warns, the problem has now attained international proportions, and he asks where the social institutions to effect regulation are to be found on that plane.

Of the myriad end products of the steel industry, none played a more strategic role in the evolution of the modern, vertically integrated enterprise than barbed wire. A unique solution to America's unique agricultural problem, the product attracted numerous manufacturers in the 1870s and 1880s. Profit margins, despite efforts to limit production and fix prices by means of pools, declined steadily, and firms that were not integrated backward into the production of rods (from which wire is drawn) had difficulty competing. Excess capacity and depressed prices convinced industry leaders like John W. Gates, Isaac L. Ellwood, and Charles F. Washburn that what was needed was a modern, fully integrated corporate holding company embracing every barbed wire manufacturer of consequence. The result was the formation of American Steel & Wire Co. in 1899 which, two years later, became an important component of the U.S. Steel Corporation.

Once the story of modern America seemed relatively simple. On one side stood a business elite defending a market system to which it owed its power and position. On the other stood the “common man,” economically weak but politically capable of forging tools that could alter the workings of market discipline. And between them, waxing and waning in response to “reform” and “counter-reform,” stood the aggregation of political tools that the “common man” had been able to forge. Such was the story told in “liberal” history; and with reversed heroes and villains, the same story was told in “conservative” history. Both assumed a business-government dichotomy, and both ignored or slighted those aspects of modern America that could not be fitted into it.

The corporate charter, so restricted in its use in England, found a constantly broadening range of applications in America from the colonial period onward. The test of importance to the general welfare, originally confined to municipal, benevolent, or at most public-utility enterprises, was being applied to manufacturing ventures by the second decade of the nineteenth century.

Introduction of the multidivisional enterprise, which has generally replaced the functional or departmental form of organization in the twentieth century, required management accounting techniques that provided both divisional and top management with data with which to evaluate individual managers' performance, company-wide performance, and future company policy. Professor Johnson discusses the development of these controls at General Motors, the results obtained with them in practice, and their alleged shortcomings, especially in respect to division managers' attitudes towards constructive decisions that might tend to limit in the short run the rate of return on the investment entrusted to them. He concludes with some observations on the influence that organization has had on corporate goals.

Rapid changes in the relationship between business and government from 1890 onwards brought a growing desire for a better exchange of ideas and information and, particularly, for a national organization that would facilitate this exchange. While the United States Chamber of Commerce has been viewed almost universally as the outcome of efforts by businessmen, Professor Werking shows that it was a few government bureaucrats, notably in the relatively new and ambitious Department of Commerce and Labor, who, with the support of the Secretary and the White House, became the decisive factor in the birth of the Chamber in 1912.

Jay Gould's image is stamped heavily upon the picture historians have drawn of the “Gilded Age” of American economic development. Our lack of knowledge of the man, and our meager efforts to understand him, account in large measure for the fatuous traditional interpretation of the era. Professor Klein explains how the work of recent historians has made the hackneyed view of both the man and his age obsolete. He reviews the constructive role that Gould played in the rise of modern America, and offers an explanation of why the man was singled out for extraordinary condemnation in his own time.

One of the most durable stereotypes of recent American history is that of the 1920s as “a conservative Republican interlude between the progressive Democratic administrations of Wilson and Roosevelt.” An important feature of this stereotype is the “Mellon plan” for tax reform. Professor Murray demonstrates that there was remarkable unanimity among Republicans and Democrats on the policy issues addressed by the “Mellon plan,” and finds continuity, rather than contrast, between the tax plans of the Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge administrations. As Secretaries of the Treasury came and went between 1918 and 1921, staff assistants cultivated the plan which Mellon later adopted.

Contrasting with the resentment of other power structures, especially corporate business, that democratic governments display is the obvious need of the powerful and the productive for each other in times of stress. Professor McQuaid follows the activities of a group of “corporate liberals” (i.e., big business leaders who believed that intelligent collaboration between business, government, and organized labor was an attainable goal) from World War I through the prosperous 1920s, the despondent 1930s, and the busy and prosperous years of World War II. He concludes that corporate liberal opinion grew more influential in both corporate and governmental circles during and after the period.

Notwithstanding the importance of maintaining soundness, commercial banks in early ante-bellum America still strove to maximize profits, according to Professor Adams, who cites Stephen Girard's conservative private bank as an example. Using internal data from Girard's bank, of the kind that is seldom available for banks, he shows that a flexible policy of shifting from government and quasi-government securities, as they became scarcer, to business debt, both long- and short-term, kept bank profits from declining. So long as Girard lived, his bank remained fully competitive with the growing number of chartered institutions.

The American city, following a half-century of rapid and choatic growth, was the subject of much attention after 1900. Efforts to reform its political structure and to improve and expand its service facilities demanded improvements in municipal accounting procedures as well. Professor Potts discusses the relative merits of commercial accounting, as applied to cities, and of new philosophies of accounting advanced in the light of the city's unique place in society. He explains how cities have oscillated between the two approaches, and concludes that the problem may be more adaptable to accounting philosophies designed for profit-making enterprises than has been generally supposed.

As the careers of men like J. P. Morgan and Andrew Carnegie illustrate so well, one of the most important elements of entrepreneurship is the ability to select talented lieutenants. This aspect of John D. Rockefeller's career is less well known, particularly in respect to his private investments. Dr. Fell takes one of Rockefeller's minor projects and demonstrates that the sagacity and perseverance of a lieutenant, Frederick T. Gates, meant the difference between a near-total loss and a remarkably profitable investment.

The bitter opposition of businessmen to the New Deal in its early stages is well known. Not so well known, however, are the efforts of a few business leaders to maintain constructive communication with the President and his advisers. Professor Collins traces these efforts, from the early stages during which both groups labored in mutual distrust, through the remarkable transformation in which such strong business personalities as Beardsley Ruml, William Benton, and Paul Hoffman helped persuade a deeply conservative Franklin D. Roosevelt to adopt compensatory deficit spending as a means to recovery. Finally, he shows that World War II marked not the end but a continuation of these positive efforts by businessmen to adapt to the new philosophy, and led directly to the founding of the Committee for Economic Development.

From its beginnings as a supplier of lamps for bicycles in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Professor Church follows Joseph Lucas Ltd., through three generations of management and several revolutions in the character of its trade, to its emergence as the largest supplier of components to British automobile manufacturers. Shrewd but rigidly upstanding business policies, a clear-headed view to the future, and conservative financing methods gave Lucas's the strength and flexibility to survive and eventually dominate a field that was constantly changing, and in which both domestic and foreign competition was an important factor. Lucas's management, watching the rise and fall of firms that were, as Professor Church says, “young, inventive, and financially weak,” might have agreed with Andrew Carnegie that “pioneering don't pay.” But Lucas's, like Carnegie, pioneered with great success where increased productivity, lower prices, and growth were the rewards.

Is there a “military-industrial complex” in the United States? What is the relationship between business, government, and the military with its needs for vast quantities of goods and services? How has organization for war and defense changed since the demands of World War I first made such questions important? How much do we know about what actually happened between World War I and Vietnam to change the relationship between private and public organizations? Professor Cuff discusses the complexities involved in trying to answer such historical questions, and prescribes a professional historian's regimen for future work on this subject.