Paul Abramson's Note (this Journal, p. 505) is an interesting exercise in comparative data reanalysis. But we do not believe that it effectively refutes our argument that partisan weakening in Britain has been caused by ‘period’ rather than ‘generational’ factors.

The public institutions that support scientific research repeatedly face dilemmas of choice. Limited budgets require a high degree of selectivity in choosing which activities are to be supported. The criteria for selection involve a great variety of factors. Yet the justification for the support of any scientific research is most commonly expressed in such terms as ‘scientific promise’ or ‘relevance’ to some social or economic objective. Such justifications have a great deal of credibility, yet it is too frequently assumed that they correspond to the criteria actually employed in the selective support of specific science activities.

L. J. Sharpe's two-part article ('American Democracy Reconsidered’ in this Journal, III [1973], 1–28,129–68) is an important and controversial one. He questions many of the orthodox interpretations of American urban politics, suggests that some of the supposedly well-established observations about British and American contrasts may boil down to bits of conventional wisdom, and raises many points about social justice and democracy, which are at the centre of everyday practical politics but which sometimes slide from view in modern ‘value free‘ social science. The article will hopefully attract the critical attention of American writers, but meanwhile here are some reflections from a slightly different point of view on some of the themes of the article.

Ivor Crewe begins his paper on the affluent worker research by giving clear expression to a number of objections which may be brought against that work. He then goes on to make two tests of the embourgeoisement thesis which Goldthorpe, Lockwood and their colleagues called into question. This Note concerns itself with only one of the two tests, namely that based on correlations of residuals.

This article investigates the hitherto under-examined relations between affirmative action, paternalism, and respect. We provide three main arguments. First, we argue that affirmative action initiatives are typically paternalistic and thus disrespectful towards intended beneficiaries who oppose them. Second, we argue that not introducing affirmative action can be disrespectful towards these potential beneficiaries because such inaction involves a failure to recognize their moral worth adequately. Third, we argue that the paternalistic disrespect involved in affirmative action is alleviated when the potential beneficiaries' preferences against such initiatives are adaptive. We conclude that, although there is a relevant sense in which paternalistic affirmative action is disrespectful, it may be more disrespectful not to pursue such policies.

A growing body of research demonstrates that political involvement by Christian religious leaders can undermine the religion's social influence. Do these negative consequences of politicization also extend to Islam? Contrary to scholarly and popular accounts that describe Islam as inherently political, we argue that Muslim religious leaders will weaken their religious authority when they engage with politics. We test this argument with a conjoint experiment implemented on a survey of more than 12,000 Sunni Muslim respondents in eleven Middle Eastern countries. The results show that connections to political issues or politically active religious movements decrease the perceived religious authority of Muslim clerics, including among respondents who approve of the clerics' political views. The article's findings shed light on how Muslims in the Middle East understand the relationship between religion and politics, and they contribute more broadly to understanding of how politicized religious leaders can have negative repercussions for religion.

Democracies generate norms prescribing what behaviours and preferences are deemed acceptable. But what keeps these political norms in place? We expect that they are enforced by observers who disapprove of norm-breaching behaviour and are willing to apply sanctions that make it socially costly. We test this expectation with a survey in Spain, where respondents were shown pictures of individuals with different political views. We focus on norms against radical-right preferences, one of the most established political norms. In line with our expectations, individuals disapprove of radical-right preferences more than other political preferences. This makes them more likely to socially sanction those preferences, which they do mainly in indirect ways that do not force interaction with the person breaching the norm. We provide evidence on the individual-level predictors of norm enforcement. Our findings highlight the micro-level mechanisms by which social influence affects the behaviour of democratic citizens.

Legislators are likely to substantively represent groups to which they belong or with which they have some particular affinity. However, there are electoral systems that diminish this tendency and systems that promote it. More precisely, as district magnitude increases, representatives will be freer to focus on issues that are not decisive of vote choice for most voters. In this letter, we use a case of electoral reform and the nature of the post-reform chamber (Chile's Chamber of Deputies) to test whether increasing district magnitude makes it more likely that women will focus on women's issues. A series of tests on multiple sets of observations show robust results for the conclusion that as the number of candidates elected in a district increases, elected women become more likely to pursue women's issues.

How do politicians with coercive linkages govern? This article relies on original data on militia-linked mayors in Colombia from 1988 to 2015 derived from 42,000 pages of Colombian Supreme Court sentencing documents. Using a regression discontinuity design, it examines the governance records of militia-tied mayors who won the elections by a narrow margin. It finds that being ruled by a militia-linked mayor significantly reduces levels of insecurity and crime, but has pernicious effects on the provision of other public goods, especially education. I theorize that these politicians' (perverse) comparative advantage on security, combined with their crowding out of social spending, engenders these outcomes. I evaluate these mechanisms with data on the nature of paramilitary–mayor alliances, police reinforcements, municipal budgets, politicians' Twitter feeds, and in-depth interviews with paramilitary commanders and politicians. The article has implications for understanding the effects of voting for politicians with coercive ties on the quality of governance and democracy.

One of the most profound changes in the interest group sector over the last fifty years is interest groups’ increasing need to attract financial donors in order to assure long-term sustainability. Groups’ growing propensity to attract ‘chequebook’ members is thought to compromise their ability to foster the personal involvement of individuals in their communities. Yet we know very little about the consequences of these dynamics for the strength of the interest group sector in American communities. This widespread macro-level analysis of the interest group sector indicates that human capital is more important than financial capital for the strength of a community's interest group sector. Financially disadvantaged communities may still enjoy the benefits of a strong interest group sector provided they have a citizenry equipped with time to donate.

We argue that policy expertise constrains the ability of politicians to act on voter preferences. Representatives with more knowledge and experience in a given domain have more confidence in their own issue-specific positions. Enhanced confidence, in turn, may lead politicians to discount opinions they disagree with, producing a distorted image of the electorate. Two experiments with Swedish politicians support this argument. First, officials are more likely to dismiss appeals from voters in their areas of expertise and less likely to accept that opposing views may represent the majority opinion. Consistent with the proposed mechanism, in a second experiment we show that inducing perceptions of expertise increases self-confidence. The results suggest that representatives with more specialized knowledge in a given area may be less capable of acting as delegates in that domain. The study provides a novel explanation for variations in policy responsiveness.

The history of the Supreme Court tends to be divided into historical slices coterminous with individual Chief Justiceships. One speaks of the Taft Court, the Hughes Court, the Stone Court, the Vinson Court, and the Warren Court. Behind these titles lies the implication that they can be differentiated in terms of something more than merely temporal variation; the Chief Justice himself must be the catalyst which is supposed to make each era special. But, in what senses can a period of Supreme Court history be thought of as specifically associated with its current Chief Justice?

The study of urban politics has undergone considerable change over the last ten to fifteen years. During the 1950s and 1960s the ‘community power’ approach became well-established in American political science as the dominant form of analysis of local politics, although it was less marked in Britain. In contrast, and in part as reaction, to the ecological determinism and naturalistic explanation of the Chicago school in urban sociology that preceded it, power and decision making were seen as key features in explaining urban processes. Intentionality and human action were afforded explanatory dominance. In turn, however, this approach came under sustained critique as part of the ‘anti-behaviouralist’ or structuralist resurgence in Western social science in the 1970s which attributed causal primacy to structural determination and system contradictions, not actors or voluntarism. Yet structural approaches face methodological problems of functionalism and circularity, and in constructing tests of empirical adequacy and falsifiability. Some of the more interesting, recently-published work in urban politics seeks to maintain a non-behaviouralist, more structuralist interpretation of local policy outcomes within empirically-grounded analyses that allow space for politics and power. Dunleavy, Friedland and Saunders provided three of the best examples of such an approach, and have each sought to understand either a particular policy, or a set of policies in a particular locality, through frameworks which in varying degrees incorporate structuralist assumptions. They seek to apply objective cost-benefit analyses of public policies as empirically refutable hypotheses and accept the necessity of objective criteria for assessing whether or not interests have been met in any given situation. This article examines the extent to which these selected ‘non-behaviouralist’ interpretations of urban politics have successfully been applied to empirical contexts. A central element in this examination is a consideration of the way in which business is seen as a major influence in local politics.

In an ingenious piece of aggregate data analysis Stan Taylor finds a significant relationship between the percentage of the coloured population in a constituency, and the percentage voting for the National Front amongst whites, in the two general elections of 1974 (‘The Incidence of Coloured Populations and Support for the National Front’, this Journal, IX (1979), 250–5). He tests two alternative models of this relationship. The first is a linear model which postulates a white ‘backlash’ of increasing magnitude with further concentrations of coloured people; the second is a curvilinear model which postulates maximum National Front support in areas of moderate concentrations of coloured people, the argument being that people in this situation may feel most threatened by the possible future influx of coloured people. It is an elegant exercise in model building and testing, which finds the non-linear model consistent with the data for the February 1974 election, and the linear model consistent with the data for the October 1974 election.

In a recent article (‘On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Works of Mancur Olson Jr.’, this Journal, VI (1976), 257–72), David Marsh has attempted to test Mancur Olson's hypotheses concerning the rationale for individual or corporate membership of interest groups by using data from a study of the Confederation of British Industry. It is the purpose of this Note to defend Professor Olson's broad theoretical approach from some of Dr Marsh's criticisms. Olson applies the insights of established economic analysis to political theory; it is not his methodology which represents an innovation, but rather the use to which it is put. A defence of Olson's approach is, then, of necessity to some extent a more general defence of economic analysis.

Local Conservative associations have traditionally run their affairs independently and have successfully resisted interference from Central Office. Far from constituting a ‘centralized machine’ (as authors such as McKenzie, Beer and Crossman have maintained) the main feature of Conservative organization has been its decentralized, voluntary character. Nowhere has resistance to control by the party headquarters been more determined than in the major provincial cities. Here, confederations of city constituency associations, financed mainly by local business interests, have virtually excluded the Central Office area agents from participating in constituency organization. Attempts by successive national party chairmen to bring the city associations into the Central Office orbit have regularly been rebuffed. Consequently, Central Office's recent success in integrating the city associations into its area office organization marks the end of an era. It raises the question of whether the Conservative organization is at last becoming as centralized as many commentators have long supposed it to be. This note describes recent developments and assesses their significance.

In recent years the discipline of political science has focused much of its attention on political parties. In 1967 Professor L. D. Epstein noted ‘Writing about Political Parties in Western democracies is not a novel enterprise. It is several decades since political scientists, once preoccupied with constitutional forms, ceased to neglect parties’. In Britain, however, there remains much uncharted territory which requires detailed exploration by the political scientist. Much of the research carried out in Britain has concentrated on one of two levels of analysis, either national or local. Basic information about the intermediate branch of party organization, the regional and area structures, is lacking. As Professor J. Blondel has noted: ‘The eleven regions of the Labour Party and the twelve areas of the Conservative Party are rarely examined’. There is, therefore, a gap in our knowledge of political parties in Britain, a gap which Professor R. T. McKenzie readily acknowledged in his own study of British parties.