Lobbies are active participants in international co-operation. In a repeated game, this article allows domestic lobbies to offer contingent rewards to influence their government to make pro-co-operation policy adjustments. The effect of lobbies depends on the type and intensity of their preferences. If the lobbies are ‘internationally benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in whether the foreign government reciprocates with adjustments of its own, they unambiguously improve co-operation. However, if the lobbies are ‘domestically benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in their own government's policy, they are less beneficial for co-operation. A domestically benefiting lobby that is willing to compensate its government even without foreign reciprocity undermines the credibility of punishing free riders. This article demonstrates this argument in the context of trade and environmental co-operation.

According to Western observers Soviet political scientists have been making substantial advances in recent decades in their understanding of the United States. It is often pointed out, however, that cultural distance causes special problems. Soviet authors, it is claimed, tend to create images of their object of study which are coloured by conceptions of political behaviour specific to their own society. Although this is incontestable, it is worth remarking that American and British observers of Soviet politics and ideology are not exempt from the same kind of failing.

Most research on voting behaviour and elections has focused on cross-sectional analysis of particular elections. This technique is very useful in telling us about the influences on individual voter decision making. Less commonly research has focused on short-term electoral change, and has tried to explain specific election results with respect to one another, or in relation to long-term trends.

People often fail to make the choices that best satisfy their preferences. The design of the social environment inevitably makes some choices easier than others. According to Libertarian Paternalists, these facts justify governments nudging people towards better choices through changes to the so-called choice architecture. This is a form of means paternalism. However, the social environment affects not only people's choices or means, but also the preferences they adopt in the first place. Call this the problem of ‘preference architecture’. This article argues that preference architecture constitutes a fundamental challenge to the justificatory basis of Libertarian Paternalism. More generally, it explores when, if ever, government paternalism that influences preference formation can be justified. While Libertarian Paternalism cannot provide a satisfactory answer, the author defends a contractualist account of paternalism based on a notion of primary goods and democratic deliberation.

How do deported migrants engage in civic and political life after being forcibly returned to their home countries? Do experiences during the migration journey impact how deportees (re)engage? We explore how extortion experienced during migration alters political and civic engagement preferences. We utilize a multi-method approach combining original survey data of Guatemalans deported from the United States and a series of qualitative deportee interviews. We find that extortion during migration has a significant direct effect on increased citizen engagement. Economic hardship exacerbated by extortion may mediate this effect. Overall, extortion experienced while migrating has long-term financial consequences for deportees, with implications for their reintegration and the broader health of civic institutions in their home countries.

There are potentially multiple sources that make it difficult to compare the typical survey measure of the left-right self-placement cross-nationally. We focus on differential item functioning (DIF) due to the different use of response scales when the left-right is framed as an aggregate dimension of policies. We also examine whether and to what extent ordinary citizens’ use of the scale is cross-nationally comparable. Our goal is twofold. First, we assess the cross-national comparability of the left-right self-placement scale using the anchoring vignette method used in nine European countries. Second, we propose a measure that quantifies the extent of DIF at the country level. Our original survey and other benchmark studies suggest that the size of cross-national DIF (CN-DIF) in citizens' use of a left-right scale is relatively small when the left-right concept is considered in policy terms and when a comparison is made between Western European countries.

How do external threats affect leaders' incentives to repress? We argue that external threats both increase and decrease state repression, but through different causal pathways. Directly, external threats provide leaders with political cover to use repression against political opponents. Indirectly, threats incentivize leaders to augment state capacity, which decreases the likelihood of state repression. To test this argument, we develop a new latent measure of external threat using a Bayesian measurement model. We use mediation analysis to examine the direct and indirect effects of external threats on repression in developing countries from 1980 to 2016. We find that external threats increase government repression directly, but indirectly decrease repression through stronger state capacity. Our findings have implications for how international factors connect to domestic politics to help explain state repression. In addition, our new measure of external threat will help scholars study the consequences of the international threat environment.

Are young people less likely to punish undemocratic behaviour? I employ experimental data from five studies, ten countries, and seventeen unique country-year samples to reassess the proposition that young people are less committed to democracy than older people. The studies consist of four conjoint and one vignette experiments, which permit estimating an interaction between undemocratic candidate behaviour and respondent age on voting intentions. I find the interaction between undemocratic behaviour and age is negative – such that punishment of undemocratic behaviour increases with age – in all studies and almost all country samples. Moreover, the interaction is approximately linear and statistically significant in the pooled sample and most studies. Thus, young people are less likely to sanction undemocratic behaviour than older people. This letter contributes with the hitherto most comprehensive empirical contribution on age differences in commitment to democracy judging from punishment of undemocratic behaviour.

It seems a reasonable enough proposition that a president will organize his congressional relations to suit his policy goals and his personal style. Available literature supports this expectation – at least before the administration of Jimmy Carter. But, of course, recent presidents have been wise in the ways of Washington as a consequence of lengthy experience in the nation's capital. In fact, most have served in Congress. Among post-Second World War presidents, only Eisenhower before Carter lacked service on Capitol Hill (and Fred Greenstein now assures us that his political savvy was fine tuned).

Several theorems have been established recently on the existence or location of equilibrium policies in collective decision-making in the case when the alternatives are points in a multi-dimensional space. One of these theorems is founded on an assumption about individual preferences which seems intuitively plausible in the context of political decision-making. We have conducted a number of experiments designed to test this theorem directly. In addition, the resulting data were used to compare the accuracy of this assumption about individual preferences with that of certain alternative assumptions, some of which have also been used in theories of collective decision-making. Before the experiments and the analyses of the results are described, we first briefly present the theorem and the various alternative assumptions to be tested.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perhaps the nearest thing to a ‘flash’ party seen in British politics in modern times. It was formed in March 1981, largely on the initiative of four leading figures in the Labour party (Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams and William Rogers), following the apparent success of the left in dominating the party, and initially it had a sensational impact on British politics. It had thirty MPs by March 1982 (mostly as a result of defections by Labour MPs); in alliance with the Liberals it immediately went to first place in the opinion polls and stayed in that position until May 1982. The Alliance won four by-elections between 1981 and 1983, and in the 1983 general election, with 25.4 per cent of the vote, came within two points of ousting Labour from its second place. For the next four years the Alliance held its position and in the 1987 election its vote fell only slightly to 22.6 per cent.

Let me state at once the paradox referred to in the title. In nearly all capitalist countries, including Britain and Australia, most important trade unions are partisan in politics. That is, they openly, and as a matter of permanent policy, support a particular political party against its rivals. In a few countries, again including Britain and Australia, they actually become a part of such a party, through affiliation. If we look at the affairs and activities of the trade unions, there is little to suggest that this is an unpopular policy among their members.

At a time when the nuclear power industry in many Western countries faces political and economic obstacles to expansion, commitment to assertive development of nuclear power continues to intensify in the Soviet Union, as well as in most East European countries. Although in 1980 nuclear power provided only about 5·1 per cent of electrical generating capacity in the Soviet Union, the 11th Five Year Plan (1981–85) projected an increase to 14 per cent, or to approximately 38,000 MW (megawatts) of installed capacity. Although longer-run projections are less definite, it appears that by 1990 authorities hope to achieve between 80,000 and 90,000 MW of nuclear generating capacity. A similar commitment to nuclear power exists in most CMEA countries, particularly in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). As of 31 December 1982, the GDR's 1,830 MW of nuclear generating capacity was the highest in Eastern Europe (outside the Soviet Union), although Bulgaria has overtaken the GDR in terms of proportion of electrical capacity provided by nuclear power (16 per cent for Bulgaria and 11 per cent for the GDR in 1980). According to projections, Czechoslovakia should increase its nuclear capacity from 880 MW in 1980 to between 3,100 and 3,600 MW by 1985, while the GDR plans to raise its capacity to 2,270 MW.

Analyses of elections, whether academic or journalistic, are permeated by terms drawn from physics. We discuss the inertia or volatility of an electorate, the momentum of a campaign, pressures and cross-pressures, party actions and reactions, the impact of short-term forces. Although imprecise, these borrowings convey genuine information about the characteristics of an election, and they would be difficult to replace.