What affects who participates in politics? In most studies of political behaviour it is found that individuals with higher education participate to a larger extent in political activities than individuals with lower education. According to conventional wisdom, education is supposed to increases civic skills and political knowledge that functions as the causal mechanisms triggering participation. However, recently a number of studies have started dealing with the question of whether education is a direct cause for political participation or merely works as a proxy for other factors, such as pre-adult socialization or social network centrality. This review article provides an introduction and critical discussion of this debate.

The role of the electoral system in the political process is one which has long concerned political scientists. Traditionally, the emphasis has been on the ‘mechanical’ effects that such systems have or are assumed to have, on such features as the number and strength of parties in a given political system. More often the debate became of a polemical nature, fought on the respective merits of one or other of the major electoral systems. The culmination of all this effort was that, until recently, research in this area of the discipline consisted almost entirely of a body of material, basically unsystematic in scope and essentially descriptive by nature. More contemporary research has concentrated on discovering the precise nature of the empirical relationship between electoral systems and party systems, with some degree of success. Our concern in this paper however, is not to contribute to the knowledge of the ‘mechanical’ effects of electoral systems but, in a related fashion, to examine some possible theoretical properties that may have an equal importance for democratic theory.

This article outlines a theory of government failure that parallels the more well-established theory of market failure. It builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their selfinterest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation. The conclusion is reached that all three may create inefficiency and inequity, but that the form and magnitude of the failure will differ with the type of activity; hence it is important that the three are distinguished. It is also emphasised that the extent of government failure in each case (and whether it is greater or smaller than the corresponding areas of market failure) is ultimately an empirical question, not a theoretical one.

It has become clear from national surveys, both in Britain and elsewhere, that the attitudes of the mass public towards social and political issues tend to group together in broadly predictable ways. Analyses of British Election Study data have consistently found that attitudes towards economic issues such as nationalization, income redistribution and government intervention go together and are largely unrelated to attitudes towards moral issues. There are of course variations in the results, depending on the items included for analysis, but it has become apparent that a rather persistent attitudinal structure, at least at the aggregate level, has characterized the British electorate. Similar findings have been reported for the United States.

Two decades of turnover data were collected for the national legislature of twenty-five industrialized countries. After a discussion of turnover's significance, we compare turnover rates across countries. A set of variables expected to influence turnover rates is described and multiple regression is used to test the hypotheses developed. Results show that frequency of elections, opportunity for double listings, electoral volatility and legislative institutionalization have statistically significant effects on turnover. In addition the type of electoral system (majoritarian versus proportional representation) is shown to have a statistically and substantively significant effect, with turnover much greater in the latter. Possible explanations for this effect are explored.

The conventional wisdom about the US Supreme Court and the 2000 presidential election is that the Court wounded itself by participating in such a partisan dispute. By ‘wounded’ people mean that the institution lost some of its legitimacy. Evidence from our survey, conducted in early 2001, suggests little if any diminution of the Court’s legitimacy in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, even among African Americans. We observe a relationship between evaluations of the opinion and institutional legitimacy, but the bulk of the causality seems to flow from loyalty to evaluations of the case, not vice versa. We argue that legitimacy frames perceptions of the Court opinion. Furthermore, increased awareness of the activities of the Court tends to reinforce legitimacy by exposing people to the powerful symbols of law. In 2000, legitimacy did indeed seem to provide a reservoir of good will that allowed the Court to weather the storm created by its involvement in Florida’s presidential election.

This article outlines the concept of Global Experimentalist Governance (GXG). GXG is an institutionalized transnational process of participatory and multilevel problem solving, in which particular problems (and the means of addressing them) are framed in an open-ended way, and subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer review in light of locally generated knowledge. GXG differs from other forms of international organization and transnational governance, and is emerging in various issue areas. The Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances is used to illustrate how GXG functions. The conditions for the emergence of GXG are specified, as well as some of its possible benefits.

Why do new parties continue emerging and attracting votes in new democracies? Does the duration of the democratic regime facilitate party system stabilization? With original data on legislative elections in fifteen East European countries (1990–2004), this article shows that new party entry is more likely when the cost of entry is low, the benefit of office is high and the perceived level of electoral viability is high. Support for new parties is influenced by the extent of disappointment with existing parties. Further, while the number of new parties decreases gradually as democracies age, the support for new entrants follows no clear unidirectional pattern across time.

The hypothesis that parties are better able to carry out mandates in Britain than the United States is tested for the Reagan and Thatcher years. A list of specific pledges was compiled and it was determined whether or not the pledges were fulfilled. The primary finding is that more Conservative party pledges were fulfilled, compared to those of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. In each country policy took a conservative turn, but because more pledges were fulfilled in Britain, the ‘Conservative revolution’ was more thorough there than in the United States. It is suggested, in contrast to the findings of previous literature, that institutional differences between the two countries are one factor that matters when it comes to bringing about policy change.

The conjecture to be discussed in this paper is that liberal representative democracy suffers from internal contradictions, which are likely to increase in time, and that, on present indications, the system is likely to pass away within the lifetime of people now adult.

To live is to have problems. However the country as a whole fares, the individual has bills to pay, work to do, children to worry about – to mention only a few of the commonplace problems that people face in their daily lives. Commonplace or not, these are problems that people must wrestle with. They are immediate, inescapable, and serious, far more so for most than the ‘large’ issues facing the country. Students of voting have long suspected that such problems may influence political choices, but key questions remain unanswered. Which personal problems are taken to be political and which non-political? Do personal problems have an impact on voting behavior only if they are taken to be political? When and how do personal problems become translated into political choices? In this paper we shall address such questions as these.

Comparative studies of electoral institutions have largely neglected a fundamental characteristic of most of the world's electoral systems: malapportionment. This article provides a method for measuring malapportionment in different types of electoral systems, calculates levels of malapportionment in seventy-eight countries, and employs statistical analysis to explore the correlates of malapportionment in both upper and lower chambers. The analysis shows that the use of single-member districts is associated with higher levels of malapportionment in lower chambers and that federalism and country size account for variation in malapportionment in upper chambers. Furthermore, African and especially Latin American countries tend to have electoral systems that are highly malapportioned. The article concludes by proposing a broad, comparative research agenda that focuses on the origins, evolution and consequences of malapportionment.

This article uses longitudinal data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS) to investigate the determinants of voter turnout in the 1997 British general election. It introduces measures of cognitive ability and personality into the participation literature and finds that they are significant determinants of turnout. It also shows that standard turnout models may be biased by the inclusion of the much used ‘interest in politics’ measure. A bivariate probit model of turnout and political interest finds that individuals with high comprehension ability and an aggressive personality are more likely to both turn out to vote and have an interest in politics.

Active labour-market policy is an important tool for governments interested in the promotion of employment. This article explores a topic in the comparative political economy literature in need of more attention: the politics behind the promotion of active labour policies. It is argued here that social democratic governments are often not interested in employment promotion measures; labour is divided into those with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders); it is contended that social democratic governments have strong incentives to pursue labour-market policies that benefit insiders but not outsiders. There are factors, however, that either exacerbate or limit the effects of insider–outsider differences on social democracy. These claims are tested in three ways. First, the interplay of government partisanship and employment protection is explored in the British case. Secondly, the individual preferences assumed in the model are tested with Eurobarometer data. And thirdly, the effects of social democracy on active labour-market policy are analysed using data from sixteen industrialized democracies.

When political action entails individual costs but group-contingent benefits, political participation may depend on an individual’s perceptions of others’ beliefs; yet detailed empirical attention to these second-order beliefs – beliefs about the beliefs of others – remains rare. We offer the first comprehensive examination of the distribution and content of second-order climate beliefs in the United States and China, drawing from six new opinion surveys of mass publics, political elites and intellectual elites. We demonstrate that all classes of political actors have second-order beliefs characterized by egocentric bias and global underestimation of pro-climate positions. We then demonstrate experimentally that individual support for pro-climate policies increases after respondents update their second-order beliefs. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on second-order beliefs as a key factor shaping climate policy inaction and that scholars can use the climate case to extend their understanding of second-order beliefs more broadly.

This study uses new data on coups d’état and elections to document a striking development: whereas the vast majority of successful coups before 1991 installed durable rules, the majority of coups after that have been followed by competitive elections. The article argues that after the Cold War, international pressure influenced the consequences of coups. In the post-Cold War era, countries that were most dependent on Western aid were the first to embrace competitive elections after their coups. This theory also helps explain the pronounced decline in the number of coups since 1991. While the coup d’état has been (and still is) the single most important factor leading to the downfall of democratic governments, these findings indicate that the new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors.

This article examines how national parties and their members position themselves in European Parliament (EP) debates, estimating the principal latent dimension of spoken conflict using word counts from legislative speeches. We then examine whether the estimated ideal points reflect partisan conflict on a left–right, European integration or national politics dimension. Using independent measures of national party positions on these three dimensions, we find that the corpus of EP speeches reflects partisan divisions over EU integration and national divisions rather than left–right politics. These results are robust to both the choice of language used to scale the speeches and to a range of statistical models that account for measurement error of the independent variables and the hierarchical structure of the data.

Through a pooled cross-section time-series analysis of the determinants of wage inequality in sixteen OECD countries from 1973 to 1995, we explore how political-institutional variables affect the upper and lower halves of the wage distribution. Our regression results indicate that unionization, centralization of wage bargaining and public-sector employment primarily affect the distribution of wages by boosting the relative position of unskilled workers, while the egalitarian effects of Left government operate at the upper end of the wage hierarchy, holding back the wage growth of well-paid workers. Further analysis shows that the differential effects of government partisanship are contingent on wage-bargaining centralization: in decentralized bargaining systems, Left government is associated with compression of both halves of the wage distribution.

Elections constitute a principal avenue of citizen involvement in political life, and knowledge of their effects on public attitudes towards the polity and the role of the individual therein has important implications for theories of democratic governance. One sucli attitude is political efficacy, ‘the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process’. Although many studies have documented that political efficacy is positively associated with electoral participation, the causal mechanisms involved are not well understood. Most researchers have simply assumed that the ‘causal arrow’ runs from efficacy to participation, i.e. from the attitude to the behaviour. Investigations of the hypothesis that the behaviour (participation) affects the attitude (efficacy) are rare. Rarer still are enquiries focusing on the impact of election outcomes on efficacy, and studies that examine both effects are virtually non-existent. In this Note covariance structure analysis is used to investigate the effects of voting, campaign activity and the outcomes of the 1984 national elections on political efficacy in the American electorate.

This article examines the relationship between national political and economic institutions and environmental performance since the early 1970s in seventeen OECD countries. After presenting hypotheses about some of the effects of the most important structural and institutional variables on performance, I test these hypotheses using a multiple regression analysis. I find that neo-corporatist societies experience much better environmental outcomes than more pluralist systems. However, neither the degree of ‘consensual’ political democracy nor traditional political factors can explain much variation in environmental performance. These relationships hold even after controlling for other structural factors such as income and manufacturing intensity. The results are robust despite perennial small-n statistical problems encountered in comparative political economy.